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Abstract  
 
My thesis explores the growing research area of social entrepreneurship by exploring 
the struggles over the meaning of social enterprise which emerged during the 
institution-building process of social enterprise as a new organizational form in 
South Korea. Although the initial idea of social enterprise was self-sustaining and 
self-financing to pursue their own social agenda, some of them have been integrated 
into the existing taxonomy of business or public policy system. In my thesis, I aim to 
reveal how independent bottom-up social enterprise initiatives are integrated or not 
into public policy through the case of the emergence of Korean social enterprise. In 
Korea, the government’s attempts to integrate social enterprise activities resulted in 
struggles over the meaning of social enterprise between top-down and bottom-up 
actors especially after the legalization of the Social Enterprise Promotion Act in 2006. 
To explore how each actor is involved in institution-building projects and how their 
activities influence specific institutional changes in the context of social enterprises 
in Korea, I present multiple data sources. Collected data includes official documents, 
meeting and public hearing minutes, newspaper articles, but mainly semi- and in-
depth interview data with social entrepreneurs and professionals from different 
groups working with social entrepreneurship during a fieldwork in Korea between 
March and August in 2014. I used a macro discourse perspective to explore how 
actors understand and use discourses of social enterprise differently in changing 
economic, social and political environments. Then I analyzed how actors take 
different strategies based on their positions and own interests in order to legitimize 
the claim they make against the existing discourse. In this process of analysis, I will 
conclude that a dominant discourse can be contested by relatively powerless bottom-
up actors in the institutional field through constant struggles over the meaning of 
social enterprise and that these struggles can put bottom-up actors in a higher 
institutional position that can make institutional changes.  
 
Keyword: social enterprise, institutional entrepreneurship, social movement, macro 
discourse analysis, South Korea 
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 	 1 
Introduction 
 
Personal Motivation  
 
What can we do to live better? This question has been in my mind for a long 
time and from my personal experiences and research I have learnt that business is an 
area which can contribute to improving the quality of people’s lives. In particular, as 
a result of my Chinese literature major, I was able to gain a greater in-depth 
knowledge concerning the circumstances and lives individuals living in the 
underdeveloped areas of China. Furthermore, thanks to my background in political 
science studies, I was also able to observe and analyze the role of several key factors 
from different perspectives given the complexities of an increasingly globalized 
world. International organization studies, as my third major, also led me to look at 
the international efforts put into place to solve problems taking into account the 
perspective of a globalized world. In this sense, it was inevitable to focus on social 
enterprises which are dedicated to solving social problems by means of innovative 
businesses, as my main interest of research.  
In my master’s thesis, I emphasized the importance of globalization and of 
innovation in the case of Korean social enterprises. I mainly adopted the social 
enterprise typology as defined by Alter (2004) along with the theory of social 
entrepreneurship to explain the different forms of Korean and global social 
enterprises. I concluded that global social enterprises can be replicated in other 
socioeconomic conditions, without losing business opportunities when expanding 
their business and social missions. I also found that they are relatively free from 
specific organizational types and are generally more entrepreneurial. Korean social 
enterprises, on the contrary, tend to emphasize their social missions, rather than an 
entrepreneurial mindset and activities. 
The term “social enterprise” was officially introduced to Korean society 
when the Korean Ministry of Labor (MoL)1 enacted the Social Enterprise Promotion 
Act (SEPA) in 2006. Nevertheless, my main academic interest and experiences on 
                                                
1 The Ministry of Labor (MoL) changed its organizational name to the Ministry of Employment and 
Labor (MoEL) in 2010. In this thesis, I used the both names according to the years of their activities. 
MoL is used for organizational activities before 2010, and the MoEL is used after 2010.   
 	 2 
the topic had already started to evolve around the concept of social enterprises some 
time before that date. It was when I organized the first student fair trade group in 
Korea that I took my first steps into the social enterprise sector. I discovered the term 
“fair trade” through a “Human Rights and Justice” class in 2006 and realized that 
“fair trade” can be an effective business tool to solve the social problems of the 
world. At that time, my cohort and I made the effort to study fair trade and social 
enterprise history and their related systems in both underdeveloped and developed 
countries. We also held seminars, conferences and events to raise public awareness 
with regard to this topic. Thanks to these activities I learnt that theory can be 
translated into action and that the realization of an idea and of the concept of social 
business varies according to the context where an organization emerges originally.  
My research interest and prior experiences in student movements led me to 
work in the research area of social entrepreneurship. More specifically, my previous 
job experiences at the Entrepreneurship Center of the Sookmyung Women’s 
University as a Deputy Director have enhanced my understanding on the struggles 
and conflicts around the meaning of the notion of social enterprise between different 
groups of people in South Korea. In this occasion, I was able to meet more than 300 
social entrepreneurs managing several social entrepreneurs’ academies, such as the 
“Social Entrepreneurs’ Academy” which was hosted by the Ministry of Employment 
and Labor, the “Seoul Social Entrepreneurs’ Academy for Chief Executive Officers 
and Employees” and the “Social Enterprise Course at the Senior Entrepreneurship 
School”, amongst others especially in 2011. I had the opportunity to observe and 
communicate with social entrepreneurs very closely and had a clear impression that 
there is no consensus on the meaning of the concept, even though the government 
had provided the official meaning of Social Enterprise through the law. 
In addition to these opportunities, additional encounters with social 
entrepreneurs in the field helped me to understand governmental approaches on 
social enterprise in Korea. Through several meetings with government officers, I 
found out that the Korean government has somewhat narrowly focused on the role of 
social enterprises as a tool to advance governmental objectives, most notably in 
relation to job creation, rather than the consideration of social value creation. These 
experiences helped me to realize that the role and future of Korean social enterprises 
 	 3 
from the perspectives of the government, civil society, business and academia are all 
seen differently from one another. 
Besides these experiences in the field in Korea, I was also able to observe 
similar phenomena in other countries specifically in the research field of social 
entrepreneurship before and after I started my Ph.D. research project entitled “how 
have historical and socio-economic factors affected the top-down and bottom-up 
emergent processes of social enterprise in South Korea?” Every time I attended 
conferences and seminars on social enterprises, there was a certain confusion on the 
definition of social enterprise between researchers, scholars and practitioners. The 
question I most often heard during many academic events was the following: “are we 
talking about the same thing? Everyone here is talking about different organizations, 
although they still use the same term ‘social enterprise’. We really need to have a 
clear concept of social enterprise to be able to discuss its activities and sustainability.” 
All these experiences, combined together, have given me valuable insights 
into research on social enterprises as a new organizational form and more 
specifically, on the struggles over the definitions of social enterprise between 
different actors who present different experiences and understandings in relation to 
the concept. My research question has undergone further elaborations over the last 
four years of Ph.D. studies and has taken the form of a specific inquiry namely, “how 
has social enterprise as a new organizational form been institutionalized through the 
interactions between different actors in different social positions? And how does 
each actor use their own discourse of social enterprise so that it is included in the 
institutional field?” In the next sections of the Introduction chapter, I will present the 
definition of social enterprise which I have adopted for this research project. And I 
will then elaborate on the research questions and on the contributions of my thesis, 
both theoretical and practical.  
 	 4 
Research Background and Problem Statement  
 
It has only been around 25 years since the first social entrepreneurship related 
article in management and entrepreneurship was published in 1991 (Waddock and 
Post 1991) according to Short, Moss, and Lumpkin (2009). During the last 25 years, 
social entrepreneurship and social enterprise are increasingly being recognized as 
legitimate fields warranting substantial research by diverse disciplines, such as 
sociology (Hockerts, Mair, and Robinson 2010), entrepreneurship (Chell, 
Nicolopoulou, and Karatas-Oezkan 2010; Corner and Ho 2010), management 
(Bagnoli and Megali 2011; Meyskens et al. 2010), ethics (Cornelius et al. 2008), 
finance (Austin, Stevenson, and WeiSkillern 2006), psychology and education 
(Chand and Misra 2009), and politics and institutions (Hemerijck 2002; Dey and 
Steyaert 2010).  
Nonetheless, it is clear that the diversity in social enterprise research has not 
led to a common understanding of the definitions and concepts of social enterprise 
and other related characteristics. Many scholars (Gergen and Thatchenkery 1998; 
Lehner 2011; Perren and Ram 2004; Short, Moss, and Lumpkin 2009; 
Weerawardena and Mort 2006) recognize that the social enterprise research field is 
in a “pre-paradigmatic state.” To date, in that sense, descriptive studies which define 
key constructs such as social entrepreneurship, and explanatory studies which 
investigate how and why key constructs are related, have mainly been conducted 
with a lack of a unified definition and concept of social enterprise (Short, Moss, and 
Lumpkin 2009). 
Moreover, research has consistently shown that most studies about the 
emergence of social enterprise focus only on cases from the United States or Europe 
(Borzaga 2004; Dart 2004; Defourny 2004; Haugh 2005; Spear and Bidet 2005; 
Kerlin 2006; Defourny and Nyssens 2010; Kerlin 2010). The top-down policies that 
the government is implementing aim to achieve its social welfare goals by promoting 
social entrepreneurship activities in some European countries (Borzaga 2004). 
Meanwhile, the emergence of European or American social enterprise is mainly 
regarded as a bottom-up process led by people from the local community to enhance 
the quality of life and the level of democracy, as Borzaga (2004) found.   
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Still, the mechanisms of integrating bottom-up social enterprise initiatives 
into public policy to solve social problems, such as unemployment and lack of social 
welfare services remain unaddressed. Therefore, in my thesis, I used both top-down 
and bottom-up approaches in order to capture the struggles over the meaning of 
various forms of social enterprises. The “top-down” approach, which originated from 
public policy studies basically considers an initial policy decision and the policy-
making body which influences the process of policy implementations (Pressman and 
Wildavsky 1984; Van Meter and Van Horn 1975; Sabatier 1986), whereas the 
“bottom-up” approach emphasizes the role of “field-level decision-making actors” 
and individuals’ and organizations’ response to problems (Elmore 1979; Lipsky 
2010). Especially when studying the emergence of Korean social enterprise under a 
strong support of the government with the legalization of the Social Enterprise 
Promotion Act from 2006 onwards, top-down and bottom-up approaches enabled me 
to explore the material consequences of discursive struggles in terms of building a 
shared understanding of social enterprise.  
Social enterprises are a new organizational form which prioritize their social 
objectives instead of the ownership of capital (Laville and Nyssens 2001). They are 
also in some cases known as grassroots emerged organizations “initiated by groups 
of citizens who seek to provide an expanded range of services and more openness 
toward the local community” (Laville and Nyssens 2001: 312). More specifically, 
social enterprises are considered to be innovative, different and part of the 
organizational alternatives to the mainstream status quo. According to the literature, 
social enterprises are not dependent on external funding, unlike NGOs or charity 
organizations, but they are able to fund their own activities and to pursue their social 
missions (Chell, Nicolopoulou, and Karatas-Oezkan 2010). Financial self-
sustainability and the profitability of social enterprises enable them to push their own 
agenda more independently (Chell, Nicolopoulou, and Karatas-Oezkan 2010).  
However, there have been several attempts to integrate social enterprises into 
the existing taxonomy of doing business in relation to objectives and ownership, as 
well as the existing public policy system, especially by placing them under the 
services of the government (Kerlin 2006; Defourny 2001; Defourny and Nyssens 
2008; Teasdale 2012). Also, the interest of the government in promoting social 
entrepreneurship is increasing, given that providing public services through social 
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enterprises is actually cost-efficient when promoting social enterprise activities 
which are ‘efficient’ (Defourny 2001; Chell, Nicolopoulou, and Karatas-Oezkan 
2010). For example, governments may finance the activities of social enterprises in 
order to make use of them as alternatives for their own purposes, such as in the case 
of providing public services. Of course, non-profit organizations and public 
corporations are often financed by governments, considering that these are types of 
public-NGO partnerships (Minow 2000; Besley and Ghatak 2001). However, social 
enterprises differ from non-profit and public corporations due to their higher 
independency in terms of financing and to the ownership of capital (Laville and 
Nyssens 2001).  
However, the government sponsorship of social enterprises is not without its 
problems. As a result of the increased government investment in promoting social 
entrepreneurship to provide public services, many social enterprises compete against 
each other to receive more government subsidies, procurements and contracts. In 
particular, the emergent process of Korean social enterprises exemplifies how 
alternatives can be co-opted by the government. As a matter of fact, in 2006 after the 
enactment of the Social Enterprise Promotion Act (SEPA), the Ministry of Labor 
(MoL) provided the subsidies to employ at least one full-time worker for each 
organization, depending on the size and needs of certified Social Enterprises 
(Ministry of Employment Labor 2006). When the policy started to be implemented, 
there were not many organizations that fitted the certification criteria which were 
necessary. However, the number of certified Social Enterprises increased very soon 
and currently in December 2016 there were a total 1,672 certified Social Enterprises 
(Ministry of Employment and Labor 2016). 
 The rapid increase in the numbers of certified Social Enterprises in Korea 
shows that it is hard for many of them to resist or ignore the opportunity of receiving 
more financial resources from public or private institutions that are supposed to be 
kept at a distance. Although the social enterprise movement started from the idea of 
self-financing, practices and reality can differ from theory especially when an 
organization is struggling with financial issues. The problems for social enterprises 
related to receiving government subsidies have to do with the risk of losing focus on 
the original motivations and changing their original social objectives to fit the given 
criteria. Throughout this process of being integrated to existing social orders, social 
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entrepreneurs have to search for compromises with reality and financial pressures. 
During this process, they take on the risk of being shaped by powerful actors and 
losing their original ideologies which had been constructed when starting social 
enterprises as alternative movements against the conventional business system.  
Once the government institutionalizes a new organizational form by 
establishing a new regulation for the existing field-level activities, this easily spreads 
throughout the country especially when policy networks, societal groups, and 
resources are centralized, as in a state like Korea (Spencer, Murtha, and Lenway 
2005). In this way, without any exceptions, in 2006 the meaning and organizational 
forms of social enterprises became dominant across the country after the Social 
Enterprise Promotion Act (SEPA). However, there are still some groups of actors 
who maintain the original motivations of social enterprises, by creating the economic 
and social value of social enterprise independently. These independent initiatives 
created alternative terms to Social Enterprise – social venture and social innovative 
enterprise which will be mainly presented in Chapter Eight. Although some of these 
have been co-opted by the government, they still have created organizations which 
reflect their motivations and views in practice and interact with other actors which 
have different views on social enterprises.  
The multiplicity of definitions, activities and organizational forms of social 
enterprise resulted in debates on existing interpretations of the concept of social 
enterprises across the world (Laville and Nyssens 2001; Mair and Marti 2006), as 
presented in Chapter One. In the Korean context, the struggles over meaning are 
more explicit because there is a strong push on certain social enterprise criteria as an 
organizational form as defined by the law in the “Social Enterprise Promotion Act 
(SEPA).” Because the government, civil society and independent social 
entrepreneurs interpret the meaning of social enterprise differently, the definition and 
criteria of Social Enterprise provided by the SEPA has often been criticized. These 
struggles show how the official meaning of social enterprise can be dominated and 
spread by powerful actors, namely the government in this context, while the meaning 
of social enterprise as presented by relatively powerless actors is neglected in the 
institutionalized field. Therefore, the struggles over the meaning of social enterprise 
between different groups of actors not only shows the different understandings of 
social enterprise, but also the power struggles over the meaning of social enterprise. 
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In short, the institutionalization process of social enterprises as a new organizational 
form in the Korean context can contribute to explaining how powerful actors keep 
their power and social positions at high levels while neglecting powerless actors.  
Unlike many other contexts, in Korea the meaning of social enterprise is 
predominantly defined by political authorities. However, other field-level bottom-up 
actors, including social enterprise support organizations, networks of social 
enterprises and individual social entrepreneurs, show a certain resistance against this 
meaning and instead they choose to provide their own definition(s)2. As a result of 
the constant interactions between different top-down and bottom-up actors who 
promote different discourses based on their experiences, knowledge and values, the 
meaning and criteria of social enterprise in the SEPA have been changed, as I 
presented in Chapter Seven. Therefore, this active involvement of bottom-up actors 
who are relatively powerless in developing a shared understanding of the meaning of 
social enterprise provides a new approach to the emergence of social enterprises, 
which has been considered to date as a top-down process.  
In my thesis, top-down and bottom-up approaches and/or actors have been 
identified during data collection and data analysis as I described in Chapter Four. 
First, the top-down approach is a governmental approach that considers social 
enterprise as a concept which emerges from the formal legalization, the SEPA. 
Accordingly, top-down actors are those who share this approach, including 
government institutions, big business groups, research institutions and intermediaries 
funded by the government. Second, the bottom-up approach is an oppositional or 
alternative approach that partly or fully rejects the governmental approach 
concerning the definition of social enterprises. Bottom-up actors are, therefore, field-
level individuals and organizations, such as civil movement organizations, social 
entrepreneurs’ networks and individual social entrepreneurs, who react to field-level, 
as well as institutional problems. Therefore, top-down actors tend to perceive social 
enterprises as an organization delivering public services instead of the government, 
while bottom-up actors perceive social enterprises as independent and alternative 
organizations solving economic, social and political problems which the government 
and traditional businesses are incapable of solving. The identification of top-down 
                                                
2 The identification of top-down and bottom-up actors is presented in Chapter Four.  
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and bottom-up actors and their discourses will be provided in greater detail in 
Chapter Four.  
 The top-down actors, the government, members of the National Assembly, 
and some intermediary organizations subsidized by the government, took the main 
role in the process of institutionalizing the meaning and concept of social enterprise 
by establishing the law known as the SEPA in 2006. In the last six years, after the 
SEPA, the number of Social Enterprises increased dramatically along with strong 
government support and policy. The government has also invested about £ 76.8 
million (1.4 billion Korean Won) from 2006 to 2011 to support Social Enterprise 
creation and its sustainable management under the act (Lee 2011). In addition, in 
2012, the government decided to run an approximately £ 96.5 Million (176 billion 
Korean Won) budget in support of Social Enterprises (Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance 2011).  
 In the meanwhile, bottom-up actors also have pushed their own discourses so 
that they can widen the government’s definition of Social Enterprise to gain 
institutional recognition and legitimacy. Bottom-up actors, who initially invented the 
concept of social enterprise using different names, such as workers’ cooperatives in 
the Korean context, have been constantly involved in the institutional-building 
project of Social Enterprise resorting to their own discourses with various strategies. 
The involvement of bottom-up actors in the institutional-building process of Social 
Enterprise has influenced top-down actors to change the institutional meaning of 
Social Enterprise and the existing institutional setting of Social Enterprise promotion 
policies.   
 Therefore, the Korean case of the emergence of social enterprises can help to 
explain the relationship between the social enterprise sector and the state, given that 
only a few scholars have presently engaged with this issue (Mulgan 2006; Munoz 
2010; Murdock 2007). While some research emphasizes the role of heroic individual 
entrepreneurs (Battilana and Dorado 2010) and the role of idea senders (Czarniawska 
and Sevón 1996) in institution-building projects, others argue that social actors 
actively engage in institution-building processes through collective action and 
contention in order to build a shared understanding of the topic (Rao, Morrill, and 
Zald 2000; Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008). The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is 
neither to look at the role of institutional social entrepreneurs in sustaining a social 
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enterprise, nor at the way in which an idea is adopted in one geographical context. 
Instead, my focus lies on how different actors actively engage in an institution-
building project of Social Enterprise, in terms of developing a shared understanding 
of social enterprise and how social enterprise as a new organizational form is 
institutionalized through the interactions between actors, even though they interpret 
the meaning of social enterprise differently according to their accumulated 
experiences, knowledge, and values. Throughout this meaning making process which 
is part of the institution-building process, my research reveals the positive outcomes 
of conflict that causes top-down and bottom-up actors to gain a greater understanding 
of each other’s ideologies and to empower themselves by gaining a higher 
institutional position that enables them to define social enterprises. 
To explore how each actor is involved in institution-building projects and 
how their activities influence specific institutional changes in the context of social 
enterprises in South Korea, I present multiple data sources. Collected data includes 
official documents, meeting and public hearing minutes, newspaper articles, but 
mainly semi- and in-depth interview data with social entrepreneurs and professionals 
from different groups working with social entrepreneurship during a six-month 
fieldwork in South Korea between March and August in 2014. I used a macro 
discourse perspective to explore how actors understand and use discourses of social 
enterprise differently in changing economic, social and political environments. Then 
I analyzed how actors use specific discursive or practical strategies in order to 
promote their own discourses of social enterprise to be accepted by other actors. 
Considering social reality to be shaped through language and historically situated 
discursive moves (Alvesson and Karreman 2000), I explore how actors take different 
strategies based on their positions and own interests in order to legitimize the claim 
they make against the existing discourse (Maguire and Hardy 2006). In this process 
of analysis, I will conclude that a dominant discourse can be contested by relatively 
powerless bottom-up actors in the institutional field through constant struggles over 
the meaning of social enterprise and these struggles can put bottom-up actors in a 
higher institutional position that can make institutional changes.  
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Definition of Social Enterprise  
 
One of the key recurring themes in my data sources, which are mostly given 
by interviews, is represented by the confusion over the official meaning of social 
enterprise. During the interviews, in order to prevent any confusion between the 
different discourses of social enterprise provided by each actor, I described the 
institutionalized meaning of social enterprise as “Social Enterprise defined by the 
SEPA.” I described the other forms of social enterprise as “uncertified social 
enterprises”, “social enterprises in broad”, “organizations which are supposed to be 
social enterprise”, or “bottom-up social enterprises.” This confusion on the meaning 
of social enterprise is due to the disagreement with the official definition of Social 
Enterprise by different actors. 
For the sake of clarity, in my thesis I identify any uncertified social 
enterprises as “social enterprises”, and certified Social Enterprises as “Social 
Enterprises.” The number of certified Social Enterprises overwhelmingly dominates 
the social entrepreneurship field, as shown in the brief statistics provided in Chapter 
Five. Social Enterprise, starting with capital letters “S” and “E”, is an 
institutionalized organizational form of social enterprise in South Korea. In 2006, the 
Ministry of Labor (MoL) established the law “Social Enterprise Promotion Act 
(SEPA)” which certifies Social Enterprises according to specific criteria such as 
objectives, legal forms, governance and activities. In South Korea, only those Social 
Enterprises certified by the government are legally allowed to be called social 
enterprises, while uncertified social enterprises are legally prohibited from using the 
name of social enterprise. The Korean government has led to the institutionalization 
of the concept of social enterprise by means of a legalization at the national level. 
The concept and meaning of certified Social Enterprises has spread over the country 
and has become the dominant and official discourse of social enterprise from the 
moment in which they were institutionalized.  
Besides certified Social Enterprises, social enterprises, starting with lower 
case letters “s” and “e”, fit the broad concept of social enterprise, which is defined as 
an organization pursuing both social and economic purposes, and tries to solve social 
problems through various business activities. In South Korea, despite the fact that the 
concept of social enterprise has been legally institutionalized by the government, 
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other actors such as NGOs and individual social entrepreneurs show resistance 
against the dominant discourse of Social Enterprise by conducting their own social 
enterprise activities and strategies continuously. In short, “social enterprise” with 
lower case letters “s” and “e” includes existing organizations which are self-
perceived as social enterprises since they have both social and economic objectives 
at the basis of their business activities.  
 
Research Questions and Approach   
 
 
Given the historical background and present circumstances of social 
enterprises, the following overarching research question has been drawn:  
 
“how do interactions between different groups of social actors shape the 
emergence of new organizational forms?”  
 
Here, interactions refers to the discursive interactions which shape social 
reality through language (Alvesson and Karreman 2000). In my thesis, discourse is a 
system of texts that brings an object into being (Parker 2014) and the foundation of 
the process of social construction upon which social reality depends (Berger and 
Luckmann 1991). Therefore, organizational forms are the results of continuous 
discursive interactions between actors who constantly produce discourses in order to 
influence in the institutional structuring process. I introduced the role of discourse 
and discursive interactions in my research in Chapter Three more specifically.  
 
This research question is further specified on the basis of the research context 
of the emergence of social enterprises in South Korea:  
 
“how do the interactions between top-down and bottom-up actors shape the 
emergence of social enterprises as a new organizational form in South Korea?”  
 
In this thesis, I analyze the emerging process of social enterprises as a new 
organizational form using macro discourse analysis by taking a neo-institutional 
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approach which views the institutional field as consisting of multiple logics, 
indeterminacy, ambiguities or contradictions (Scott et al. 2000; Stryker 1994; Seo 
and Creed 2002; Schneiberg 2007; Lounsbury and Crumley 2007; Marquis and 
Lounsbury 2007). In other words, I use the institutional approach with Greenwood 
and Suddaby (2006: 30) defining an organizational form as “an archetypal 
configuration of structures and practices given coherence by underlying values 
regarded as appropriate within an institutional context.” Accordingly, a new 
organizational form will gain legitimacy when social actors realize that it 
corresponds to their interests and values within an institutional context (Rao, Morrill, 
and Zald 2000; Tracey, Phillips, and Jarvis 2011). Therefore, organizational 
emergence, change, and its structure cannot help being influenced by existing 
institutions and institutional logics (Lawrence 2008).  
 
Given the above considerations, a set of specific research questions is drawn 
as follows.   
 
First, how do distinct social actors interpret the meaning of a new 
organizational form differently? How are the dominant discourses of social 
enterprise which emerged in government policies interpreted differently by social 
entrepreneurs?  
 
Second, how do social actors push their own discourse of a new 
organizational form to be accepted by powerful actors who can influence 
institutional changes? What are their discursive and practical strategies used to 
influence the emergence of a new organizational form?   
 
 Third, how do tensions in defining social enterprise between different social 
actors influence the institution-building process of social enterprise?    
 
These research questions will be addressed by observing and analyzing the 
emerging definitions and practices of social enterprises in South Korea, both, as a 
response to government policy and as bottom-up initiatives which emerge 
independently from such policies. Why and how this Korean case of social enterprise 
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can provide answers to the research questions raised will be explained in Chapter 
One.  
 
Contributions  
 
This thesis aims to contribute to the growing research area of social 
entrepreneurship by exploring the struggles over meaning which emerged during the 
institution-building process of social enterprises as a new organizational form.  
The first contribution of this thesis is to emphasize that seemingly and 
relatively powerless bottom-up actors can accomplish institutional changes. 
Mainstream organizational theories have not paid enough attention to those less 
powerful actors who are also interested in adjusting existing institutional 
arrangements (Seo and Creed 2002). Interestingly, Dionysiou and Tsoukas (2013) 
also found in previous research that powerless actors depend on powerful actors and 
their “interpretation, expectations, and actions”, instead of using their own in order to 
be influential (Edmondson, Bohmer, and Pisano 2001; Metiu 2006; Dionysiou and 
Tsoukas 2013). In other words, the definitions promoted by powerful actors are more 
likely to be accepted by other actors in meaning-making processes (Cast 2003). 
Howard-Grenville (2005) also show that powerful actors can make changes in 
organizational routines. Nonetheless, powerless actors in a certain context or social 
structure are possibly using powerful actors’ interpretations and intentions on 
purpose, such as to seek accurate information in order to “increase their influence or 
interests” (Fligstein 2001).  
In this thesis, I focus on the ability of the relatively powerless actors who are 
able to construct not only their own concepts, definitions and understandings of a 
new organizational form, but also to create organizations in practice based on their 
understandings. Moreover, I consider the fact that they are also able to promote their 
own understandings of a new organizational form to be accepted by other actors that 
influence the institutional-building and changes. This is in line with Seo and Creed 
(2002) who in prior research found powerless social actors to also be potential 
change agents. In this thesis, I claim that different groups of actors in lower power 
positions have different intentions. For this reason, their reactions to powerful actors 
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are different. Thus, the main contribution of my thesis is that powerless actors do not 
always depend on other powerful actors. Instead, some are able to empower 
themselves enough to be influential in the institutional fields. In addition to these 
considerations, it is important to note that the strategies used to react to powerful 
actors’ interpretations vary depending on the actors. For example, during this 
empowerment process, bottom-up actors who promote local development, 
cooperatives and self-sufficiency discourses position themselves as nascent actors 
who initially developed the concept of social enterprise and actual organizational 
forms. Instead, other bottom-up actors who promote social innovation discourses 
framed themselves as different from those actors who can achieve financial 
sustainability and gain a winning position in the capitalized market system.  
 Second, my thesis claims that conflicts between actors actually lead to the 
emergence of new institutions or institutional changes. As stated in a review by Seo 
and Creed (2002), prior research in the area of institutional studies mainly focused on 
how organizations and individuals conform to powerful actors, rather than 
contradicting them. However, institutional building or change processes are never 
easy but challenging, because each social actors’ interests differ based on their social 
positions and the context where they are located (Seo and Creed 2002).  
Early institutionalists claim that institutional changes can be achieved when 
institution-building and change processes are harmonious and peaceful, without 
conflicts between actors (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Tolbert and Zucker 1983). 
Furthermore, actors try to avoid conflicts with other actors to achieve an agreement 
on the institutional meaning and settings because they are considered “passive 
recipients of institutional frameworks” (Scott 1995; Seo and Creed 2002: 240). By 
contrast, this thesis shows that the struggles over meaning and the activities of social 
enterprises provide an opportunity to gain further understanding on each other’s 
ideologies, and that these struggles triggered the discourses of powerless actors to be 
accepted by other actors (Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence 2004). As a consequence of 
having to confront powerful actors and pushing their own discourses towards other 
actors, powerless actors (bottom-up actors) are empowered to make institutional 
changes. Actors who oppose the official discourses are, therefore, constantly pushing 
their discourses by interacting with other actors and in this way they have 
successfully brought forward institutional changes, as shown in Section 7.5.  
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 The third contribution of this thesis is to conceptualize the various forms of 
emerging social enterprises. There have been some attempts to combine the two 
different approaches, namely institutional entrepreneurship and social movement 
perspective in post-institutionalism (McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam, McCarthy, 
and Zald 1996; Rao, Morrill, and Zald 2000), but not many studies have addressed 
the relationship and the interactions between multiple actors. My research 
contributes to advancing the understanding of institutional processes at the field level 
from a multi-level perspective, by identifying multiple actors and discourses in the 
field and how they interact with each other (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008). In my 
thesis, I uncover the co-existence of multiple forms of new organizations using the 
same name “social enterprise”, by shedding light on the history of social enterprise 
from a bottom-up perspective in the Korean context. As a matter of fact, the history 
of Korean social enterprises used to be written from a top-down perspective. 
Grassroots activities of conceptualizing and building social enterprises in practice are 
often mentioned in this history but always from the top-down perspective. However, 
the history of bottom-up movements of social enterprises has been to date 
oversimplified. It is important to note that neglecting or simplifying the history of 
bottom-up social enterprise movements introduces blind spots to the cumulative 
process of the construction of the meaning of social enterprise. For this reason, this 
work retraces the progress of the development of the idea of social enterprise from 
both a top-down and a bottom-up perspective, thus illuminating the concept that 
social enterprise emerges from dynamic and complicated circumstances which are 
apart from the top-down policy implementation. This finding is novel because the 
emergence of social enterprises is assumed in general to be a bottom-up process. In 
particular, this thesis shows that this assumption does not hold in South Korea. The 
institutionalization of Korean social enterprises is considered as the result of the 
privatization of policy, rather than of bottom-up movements. In spite of the top-down 
led processes of institutionalization, bottom-up actors who initially introduced the 
concept of social enterprise continued to promote their understandings of social 
enterprise. Furthermore, bottom-up and top-down actors continue to interact with 
each other to achieve a shared understanding of social enterprise.  
Fourth, this thesis empirically contributes to extending the boundary of social 
enterprise theory in a different geographical scope, as pointed out by Peattie and 
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Morley (2008) who emphasize the importance of theory development with regard to 
geographical diversity, which has been regarded as one of the limitations of the 
social entrepreneurship research field. Furthermore, this thesis also contributes to 
explaining the general phenomena of the broad spectrum of social enterprise. Also, I 
provide some practical insights for (potential) actors in the social entrepreneurship 
field. As a matter of fact, findings show that the lack of understanding of other actors’ 
discourses and activities can cause misunderstandings in relation to intents or 
purposes. Especially from the policymaker’s perspective, gaining a greater 
knowledge of the field more closely will help to reduce the costs of policy 
implementation and the frequent amendment of laws. It will also help keep policies 
stable and effective, given that policies undergo comprehensive debate before their 
implementation.  
 
Research Structure  
  
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter One provides a 
review of the literature and identifies the various definitions of social enterprise in 
different contexts. This Chapter will therefore provide a further understanding of the 
spectrum of definitions of social enterprise, which are key to analyzing how different 
actors interpret and practice a variety of social enterprise discourses.  
Chapter Two outlines the approaches on the emergence of new organizational 
forms, which are related to institutional entrepreneurship and social movement 
approaches from the neo-institutional perspective that can in turn uncover the co-
existence of multiple actors and their interpretations of institutional logics. I will 
address the research gap of understanding institutional processes at the field-level in 
a multi-level perspective by emphasizing how different actors as political forces 
mobilize strategies to create political contexts to obtain favorable outcomes in the 
institutional fields. In this Chapter, I suggest the combination of both institutional 
entrepreneurship and social movement theories to fill the existing research gap.  
In Chapter Three I introduce how language is used to frame different 
discourses in institutional processes; it offers a useful theoretical lens to study 
socially constructed ideas through discourse, text and action. I will discuss its 
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relevance in the analysis of the emergent processes of a new organizational form as a 
result of interactions between different social actors.  
A brief history of Korean social enterprises according to both top-down and 
bottom-up perspectives is offered in Chapter Four. In this Chapter, I will outline the 
respective discourses of multiple actors in the institutional field of social 
entrepreneurship in South Korea.  
Chapter Five moves on to consider the grounded theory approach as a 
research method used to address the research questions of this project and the 
management of the research process. This Chapter also re-emphasizes discourse 
analysis as a research tool to analyze and frame my dataset. I then describe my data 
sources and the process of collecting data during the 6 months of fieldwork in South 
Korea.  
In Chapter Six I describe the initial stage of the institution-building process of 
Social Enterprises in Korea between 2006 and 2010. This Chapter will unpack the 
conflicting processes of meaning making between social actors who are located in 
different social positions. Three instances of conflict between actors in the policy and 
civil society area, and between the government and civil society illustrate the 
political struggle for the institutionalization of the concept of social enterprise and its 
institutional setting. This Chapter outlines how the powerful top-down actors create 
and take the leading role in an institution-building project and how bottom-up actors 
instantly react to contribute to the project.  
Chapter Seven focuses on the emergence of oppositional discourses as a 
reaction to the emergence of official and dominant discourses of social enterprise. 
Two instances of emerging oppositional discourses from intra and extra-institutional 
entrepreneurs illustrate how the two different groups of actors react differently even 
though they promote a similar discourse in order to conceptualize the different 
meanings and activities of social enterprise.  
With Chapter Eight I introduce the emergent process of alternative discourses 
of social enterprise – social innovation and entrepreneurship discourses. In this 
Chapter, I will illustrate how alternative actors interpret the meaning of social 
enterprise differently and how they attracted other actors to their own discourses and 
organizations by being innovative, different and financially productive.  
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Chapter Nine discusses these findings by revisiting the theoretical 
background and with the empirical findings. In this Chapter, I demonstrate that new 
organizational forms can be understood in different ways by actors who occupy 
different positions of power. By generating greater inclusivity for multiple actors and 
discourses, we can see the positive outcomes of conflict, given that top-down and 
bottom-up actors start to further understand each other’s ideologies and empower 
themselves by gaining a higher institutional position that enables them to define 
social enterprise. I argue that these seemingly powerless bottom-up actors are 
empowered by promoting their discourses and institutional logics in the complex 
process of institution-building. I then provide another instance of bottom-up 
alternative reactions to the top-down institution-building process of Social Enterprise, 
which takes different positions and strategies from other actors who promote official 
and oppositional discourses.  
In the Conclusion Chapter, I will summarize and conclude my thesis with 
implications, contributions and limitations of my research. I will discuss how future 
research can help fill the gap and overcome the limitations of my thesis. 
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1 Background  
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Despite having a relatively short history, social enterprise and social 
entrepreneurship are increasingly being acknowledged as legitimate fields, 
warranting substantial research on the topic, as discussed in the Introduction Chapter. 
However, given the diversity of social enterprise research there is no shared 
understanding of definitions, concepts of social enterprise and other related notions. 
As a matter of fact, several scholars (Gergen and Thatchenkery 1998; Lehner 2011; 
Perren and Ram 2004; Short, Moss, and Lumpkin 2009; Weerawardena and Mort 
2006) recognize that the social enterprise research field is currently in a “pre-
paradigmatic state.” The criteria for a successful and sustainable social enterprise, in 
that sense, have barely been discussed, even though the identification of such criteria 
might provide practitioners with suggestions as to which strategies are likely to lead 
to greater success. 
Besides the variety of definitions, it is important to recall that the nature of 
social enterprises requires their success to be measured differently from the cases of 
big corporations or small-medium-sized enterprises in the traditional business sector. 
Johnson (2001) and Stevenson (2011) claim that a social enterprise entails two 
different concepts of sustainability: social and economic as shown in Figure 1-1. 
These concepts are derived from the characteristics of a social enterprise, which 
includes financial and social objectives at the same time – also known as a “double 
bottom line” (Emerson and Twersky 1996; Johnson 2001; Alter 2004). According to 
Alter (2004: 16), “social objectives aimed at mission accomplishment (social value 
creation) vary widely depending the organization’s mission and sector and financial 
objectives focused on financial sustainability (economic value creation) vary 
according to funding needs and business model.”  
Thus, the characteristic “duality of objectives” introduces a strong difference 
of social enterprises in comparison to traditional not-for-profit organizations and for-
profit corporations. The term “double bottom line” indicates that economic and 
social objectives of social enterprises are non-separable. However, it is also true that 
 	 21 
according to innovative views of social entrepreneurship, economic objectives are 
nevertheless prioritized, and therefore firms focus on making profits, rather than on 
meeting social objectives. This is the contrary of the view of not-for-profit social 
entrepreneurship, where the establishment and achievement of social objectives are 
considered to be the most important. To illustrate these three perspectives on social 
entrepreneurship better, I have presented a Venn diagram as Figure 1-1. As shown 
here, not only are financial gains to be considered as indicators of success in the field 
of social enterprises but there are also non-financial, or social factors, which imply 
an important and fundamental differentiation from traditional entrepreneurship.  
   
Figure 1-1 Different Perspectives on Social Entrepreneurship and Its 
Characteristics 
 
 
 
According to Desa (2007: 6), three are the research objectives which emerge 
in the field of social entrepreneurship:  
 
“1) To review the definitions and the early conceptualizations of social 
entrepreneurship, 2) To highlight the emerging streams of social entrepreneurship 
research, and 3) To suggest pathways to link social entrepreneurship to existing 
fields of research.” 
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On the basis of an analysis of the existing literatures (Bornstein 2007b; 
Anderson, Dana, and Dana 2006; Barendsen and Gardner 2004; Thompson 2002; 
Pastakia 1998; Lasprogata and Cotten 2003; Shaw and Carter 2007), Desa (2007: 8) 
also clarified that “resource-mobilizing actions can form, sustain or grow a social 
venture base.” The ability of social entrepreneurs to undertake such actions can also 
be supported by external factors, such as government laws and constitutions, or 
behavioral norms developed within certain socioeconomic and cultural environments. 
In summary, existing literatures show that there are two factors that 
determine concepts, definitions and performance measures of social enterprises: 
external and internal factors. Institutional effects viewed as external factors of social 
enterprise emergence can be divided into two groups: formal and informal 
constraints. Formal constraints include rules, laws and constitutions, while informal 
constraints include norms of behavior, conventions, and self-imposed codes of 
conduct (Desa 2007). Given these considerations, Korean social enterprises can be 
discussed from the view of institutional effects given that they have actively 
flourished after the establishment of the Social Enterprise Promotion Act in 2006.  
Another primary research issue in the field is the measurement of the 
performance of social enterprises. The relevance of this problem is central, given that 
funders such as governments, foundations, and venture capitals need to know and 
analyze the effectiveness of their economic and social investments. Also, the picture 
may be quite complex given that external actors have different objectives and 
intentions which can be achieved through social enterprise activities. Besides this, it 
is also important to remember that the level of social enterprise sustainability is not 
highly developed yet. For this reason, shaping the concept of sustainability in terms 
of social entrepreneurship and social enterprises is especially important at this time 
in history in order to analyze and identify the success factors of social enterprises 
which contribute to the development of more sustainable social enterprises in the 
near future.  
The following annotated map (Figure 1-2) shows the current key papers 
which are relevant to the main research issue of social entrepreneurship and social 
enterprise.  
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Figure 1-2 Annotated Illustration of Social Entrepreneurship Research 
 
 
  
To conclude, different concepts, origins, and socioeconomic factors of social 
enterprises are influential in the measurement of the performance, growth, success 
and sustainability of social enterprises. Substantial factors of growth, success, and 
sustainability of social enterprise may vary in different countries characterized by 
different socioeconomic and cultural environments. Understanding social enterprise 
in different socioeconomic and cultural perspectives, in that sense, is necessary in 
order to identify the factors or criteria of success social enterprises.  
 
1.2 Definition of Social Enterprise in Different Contexts  
 
1.2.1. Definition of Social Enterprise by Country 
  
The term social enterprise has become relatively common in recent years. 
Definitions, origins, organization types and characteristics, however, differ according 
to each socioeconomic background. Nevertheless, overall there are two main 
approaches towards social enterprises. The first is an “innovative approach” while 
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the second is the so-called “non-profit approach” (Defourny and Nyssens 2012; 
Kerlin 2006). More specifically, innovative approaches place major emphasis on new 
combinations in at least one of the following ways: new services, new quality of 
services, new methods of production, new production factors, new forms of 
organizations or new markets (Defourny and Nyssens 2012). The non-profit 
approach is on the other hand regarded as a “mission-driven business approach” 
since it embraces all forms of business initiatives with social purposes or missions 
(Austin, Stevenson, and WeiSkillern 2006).  
These definitions and approaches have been adopted in various manners in 
different time and places. Even though some scholars (Munoz 2010; Peattie and 
Morley 2008) have emphasized the importance of social enterprise research with 
diverse geographical scopes, most social enterprise studies on these geographical 
differences have been carried out in Europe, the UK and US so far. More importantly, 
even though the UK and US have similar views on commercial enterprises, they 
strongly differ when it comes to the field of social enterprise and to the nature of 
social entrepreneurship (Peattie and Morley 2008). For this reason, it is worthwhile 
looking at different definitions of social enterprise in each individual approach and 
country in order to understand the diverse characteristics of social enterprise and its 
geographical origin, as shown in Table 1-1.   
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Table 1-1 Definition of Social Enterprise by Approach and Region/Country 
 
Approach on 
SE 
Region/ 
Country Definition 
Innovative 
Approach 
Europe 
Firms who seek to enhance the social impact of their productive activities (Kerlin 2006). 
Tackling social needs that are developed as businesses are fostered (Grenier 2003), mainly through nonprofit 
organizations but also in the for-profit sectors (Nicholls 2006). 
UK 
An enterprise ran by a social entrepreneur, an individual who is committed to providing an innovative lasting 
solution to an unmet social need (UnLtd 2012). 
US 
Playing the role of change agents in the social sector by adopting a mission to create and sustain social value, 
recognizing and relentlessly pursuing new opportunities to serve that mission, engaging in a process of 
continuous innovation, adaptation and learning, acting boldly without being limited by resources currently in 
hand, and finally exhibiting a heightened sense of accountability to the constituencies served and for the 
outcomes created (Dees 1998: 4). 
South 
Korea 
An enterprise seeking an opportunity to solve social problems through business activities. It is called “social 
venture” since only government certified social enterprises can call themselves social enterprise (Korea Social 
Enterprise Promotion Agency 2013a). 
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Non-profit 
Approach 
Europe 
Organizations with an explicit aim to benefit the community, initiated by a group of citizens and in which the 
material interest of capital investors is subject to limits. They place a high value on their independence and on 
economic risk-taking related to ongoing socio-economic activity (EMES 2012). 
UK 
A business with primarily social objectives whose surpluses are principally reinvested for that purpose in the 
business or in the community, rather than being driven by the need to maximize profit for shareholders and 
owners (Department of Trade and Industry 2012). 
US 
Mission oriented revenue or job creating projects undertaken by individual social entrepreneurs, nonprofit 
organizations, or nonprofits in association with for-profits (Social Enterprise Magazine Online 2012). 
Any earned income business or strategy undertaken by a nonprofit to generate revenue in support of its 
charitable mission (Social Enterprise Alliance 2012). 
South 
Korea 
An enterprise certified in accordance with Article 7 as one that pursues a social objective aimed at enhancing the 
quality of life of community residents by providing vulnerable social groups with social services and job 
opportunities while conducting its business activities, such as the production and sale of goods and services 
(Ministry of Employment and Labor 2006). 
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1.2.2. Origins and Characteristics of Social Enterprise by Country 
  
The exploration of the origins of social enterprises can explain why the 
definitions and characteristics of social enterprises are so different in each 
socioeconomic background. Table 1-2 shows the divergences in the economic, 
political and social backgrounds of social enterprises by region and country. The 
term social enterprise mainly appeared during the 1990s in Europe and the UK. Alter 
(2002), however, argues that the term social enterprise was first developed in the 
1970s in the US to define those nonprofit business activities which had been started 
as a way to create job opportunities for disadvantaged groups.  
Social enterprises have been supported by government policies in Europe, the 
UK and South Korea. More specifically, governments adopted policies or acts in 
order to promote social enterprises because economic growth and employment rates 
had decreased during this time. Nevertheless, specific strategies and the response of 
civil societies still differed from country to country. For instance, in the U.S., the 
social enterprise movement has been promoted by civil society and not by the 
government.  
More specifically, a first notable divergence among countries is given by the 
amount of public expenditure devoted to promoting social enterprises. Only the 
Korean government increased its public expenditure to reinforce the social services 
market in 2006, while in the UK and the US cutbacks were carried out (Department 
for Work and Pensions 2004; Kerlin 2006). Consequently, social enterprises in South 
Korea have been hugely developed by the government since 2006. In other countries 
civil society and voluntary sectors have promoted its emergence, instead. The history 
of social enterprise from the point of view of governments and civil society will be 
explained in greater detail in Chapter Four.  
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Table 1-2 Economic, Political and Social Background of Social Enterprise Origins by Region/Country 
 
 Europe UK US South Korea 
Time Period 1990s 1990s 1970s~1990s Late 1990s~2000s 
Main Advocate EU Government Civil Society Government 
Former Organizational 
Structure Co-operative 
Voluntary 
Organizations 
Non-profit 
Organizations 
1. One-stop Service 
Center for the 
Unemployed 
2. Self-sufficiency 
Assistance Policy  
Purpose of Promoting SE 
Providing 
1. Employment 
2. Specific Care 
Services 
1. Neighborhood 
Regeneration 
2. Reducing 
Dependency on state 
welfare (Department for 
Work and Pensions 
2004) 
Revenue Generation 
by Nonprofit 
Organizations 
Job Creation 
Economic 
Influences 
Economic 
Growth Decreased 
Unemployment 
Rate Increased 
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Political 
Influences 
 
Key 
Government 
Initiative/ 
Policy 
European 
Social Fund 
(Nyssens 
2006) 
1. Third Way Policy 
Initiative (1997) 
2. Enterprise & Exclusion 
(1999) 
3. Charity Law (2002) 
- 
1. National Basic 
Livelihood Security 
Act (1999) 
2. Social Enterprises 
for Self-sufficiency 
(SEsS) Initiatives 
3. SEPA (2006) 
Legal Body EU, European 
Commission 
Department of Trade and 
Industry, Social Enterprise 
Coalition, Social 
Enterprise Unit (2002) 
- 
Ministry of 
Employment and 
Labor 
Social 
Influences 
Public 
Expenditure of 
Government 
Various by 
Country Decreased in the late 1990s 
Large cutbacks in federal 
funding for non-profits in the 
1980s 
Increased to enforce 
the social services 
market in 2006 
Civil Society 
EMES 
Research 
Network 
Establishment of Social 
Enterprise London (1998) 
Private foundation supported 
development of SE in the 
1980s and 1990s Role of civil society 
was limited Longer tradition of 
voluntary action (Borzaga 
2004) 
Social Enterprise Initiative 
(Harvard Business School 
2014) 
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 The origins and economic, political and social backgrounds of social 
enterprises have been reflected and discussed also on the basis of this information. 
Table 1-3 is a revised table from Kerlin (2006) that compares the characteristics of 
social enterprises by region/country. 
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Table 1-3 Comparative Overview of Social Enterprise by Region/Country  
(Revised from a Table in Kerlin (2006: 259)) 
Characteristics Europe UK US South Korea 
Emphasis Social Benefit Social 
Benefit 
Revenue 
Generation Job Creation 
Common 
Organizational 
Type 
Cooperative 
Association 
All Kinds of 
Organizations 
Nonprofit 
(501(c)(3)) Nonprofit 
Focus Human Services All Nonprofit 
Activities 
All 
Nonprofit 
Activities 
Human 
Services 
Types of SE Few Many Many 
1. Employment 
Model 
2. Social 
Service Model 
3. Local 
Community 
Model 
4. Combination 
Model 
5. etc 
Recipient 
Involvement Common Common Limited Common 
Strategic 
Development 
EU 
Government 
Voluntary 
Sectors 
Government 
Foundations Government 
Context Social Economy Market 
Economy 
Market 
Economy 
Market 
Economy 
Legal 
Framework 
Underdeveloped 
but Improving Developed Lacking 
Developed but 
has limitations 
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1.3 Conclusion  
 
This chapter introduces various definitions and organizational forms of social 
enterprises in different contexts including South Korea, United States, United 
Kingdom and Europe. The comparison of definitions, origins and characteristics of 
social enterprises by country shows that the notion of social enterprise emerges as 
different organizational types with varying emphasis on social and economic 
objectives and activities under the influence of located contexts and of the main 
actors’ key motivations within different historical backgrounds. The literature review 
on the variety of social enterprises in different contexts already provides us with a 
hint, suggesting that a harmonized meaning of social enterprise is hard to achieve 
regardless of the efforts in achieving a consensus on what social enterprise actually is. 
Nonetheless, the diversified backgrounds and characteristics of social enterprises 
leave us with the following research question. How do historical, social, and 
economic contexts influence the emergence of social enterprise? To this end, I will 
review how institutional entrepreneurship and social movement can be used in order 
to elaborate and address this question.  
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2 An Approach on the Emergence of New Organizational 
Forms 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter will first explore the theoretical backgrounds of the emergence 
of an organizational form and of the institutional field by relying on a neo-
institutional perspective. I will review how previous research tried to integrate social 
movement theories into an institutional approach in order to study the emergence of 
a new organizational form through the interactions between different social actors in 
a changing environment. 
In this chapter, I discuss how social actors are influenced by the contexts they 
are embedded in and compete against each other with their own discourses on the 
meaning of a specific organizational form in the institution-building process. 
According to the integrated view of institutional entrepreneurship and social 
movement theories, institution-building processes are political (Beckert 1999; Levy 
and Scully 2007). More specifically, the political sides of institution-building 
processes are explained by focusing on the roles and activities of different social 
actors, who locate their social positions differently according to their ideology which 
is in turn influenced by the social conditions they are embedded in. Building on these 
considerations, I suggest that the integrated view of the institutional entrepreneurship 
and social movement theories according to a neo-institutional perspective offers an 
opportunity to analyze institution-building processes which contain multiple socially 
constructed views, positions and strategies of each actor in the institutional field.  
 
2.2 The Emergence of New Organizational Forms  
 
Although organization theorists have been trying to understand “why and 
how a new organizational form emerges?”, not many studies have been carried out to 
answer this question (Romanelli 1991; Palmer, Benveniste, and Dunford 2007; 
Powell, Packalen, and Whittington 2010). The literature on the topic presents a 
variety of approaches to study the emergence of new organizational forms. However, 
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the focus of this thesis relies on institutional approaches, as suggested by Jepperson 
(1991: 145) who saw institutions as “patterns of social practices for which 
departures from the pattern are counteracted in a regulated fashion, by repetitively 
activated, socially constructed, controls – that is by some set of rewards and 
sanctions.”  
Greenwood and Suddaby (2006: 30) referred to the institutional approach to 
define an organizational form as “an archetypal configuration of structures and 
practices given coherence by underlying values regarded as appropriate within an 
institutional context.” This definition implies that an organizational form emerges or 
is created by institutional logics (Tracey, Phillips, and Jarvis 2011). Accordingly, a 
new organizational form will gain legitimacy when social actors realize that it 
corresponds to their interest and values within an institutional context (Rao, Morrill, 
and Zald 2000; Tracey, Phillips, and Jarvis 2011). Therefore, organizational 
emergence, change, and organizational structures cannot avoid being influenced by 
existing institutions and institutional logics (Lawrence 2008). Then, this begs the 
following question: “why and how do institutions emerge and change? And how are 
they related to organizations?” 
Previous studies have reported that the origins of institutions or the way in 
which they emerge have not been fully studied. According to Powell, Packalen, and 
Whittington (2010), even traditional approaches to institutional studies – such as the 
economic and sociological literature – have not focused on the origins of institutions 
or the way of organizing institutions. Kreps (1990: 530) states that even though the 
economic literature has investigated the effects of institutions, it still “leaves open 
the question, where did institutions come from?” Similarly, Barley and Tolbert (1997) 
mention that the sociological literature has not looked at how institutional 
arrangements are created. Moreover, in a comprehensive review of organization 
research, Greenwood et al. (2008: 26) conclude that “institutional studies have not 
been overly concerned with how institutions arise.” 
Nonetheless, there have been a number of studies on institutional emergence 
and change that have attempted to fill this research gap. As a matter of fact, a number 
of institutionalists have developed the term institutional entrepreneurship to this end 
(Beckert 1999; Hwang and Powell 2005; Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence 2004; 
Hardy and Maguire 2008). Some authors have introduced social movement theories 
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into neo-institutionalism in order to investigate how institutions emerge and change 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). Institutional 
entrepreneurship explains the institutional process by focusing on the role of 
institutional entrepreneurs and their activities with their own strategic objectives. 
Similarly, institutionalists who integrated social movement theories into neo-
institutionalism also emphasize the role of institutional entrepreneurs and their 
strategies as a new organizational form emerges through the collective actions and 
contentions of actors (Rao, Morrill, and Zald 2000). 
In the upcoming sections, I will introduce how institutional entrepreneurship 
and social movement theories explain the emergence of a new organizational form 
based on the neo-institutional perspective. I will also explain the strengths, 
weaknesses and differences between the two approaches in order to emphasize the 
potential theoretical effect of the combined approaches.   
 
2.1.1. Institutional Entrepreneurship  
     
The origins of the term institutional entrepreneurship are rooted in the neo-
institutional perspective. For this reason, this section first describes how 
institutionalists have changed their research interests over time and how institutional 
entrepreneurship presents views on institutional emergence and changes which differ 
from other approaches.  
In earlier institutional research, the main research interests of institutionalists 
were represented by the theories of isomorphism, diffusion, or path dependence. 
These authors would often provide ad hoc explanations to the emerging process of a 
new organizational form in order to increase the consistency of their theories with 
their explanations (Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Clemens and Cook 1999; 
Campbell 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005; Schneiberg 2007). However, more 
recently researchers have revised “their conception of fields and their views of action” 
(Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008: 650). For example, according to some recent 
scholars, institutional fields consist of multiple logics, indeterminacy, ambiguities or 
contradictions (Scott et al. 2000; Stryker 1994; Seo and Creed 2002; Schneiberg 
2007; Lounsbury and Crumley 2007; Marquis and Lounsbury 2007). Other scholars, 
instead, focus on agency, that is the social actions that create, reproduce, and change 
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institutions (Zilber 2002: 236), and have developed the terms institutional 
entrepreneurship (Beckert 1999; Hwang and Powell 2005; Maguire, Hardy, and 
Lawrence 2004; Hardy and Maguire 2008) and institutional work (Lawrence and 
Suddaby 2006). 
Among these works, the term “institutional entrepreneurship”, which is the 
theoretical basis of my thesis, explains how institutional work occurs in the emergent 
process of a new organizational form. More precisely, institutional entrepreneurship 
has been defined as:  
“the activities of actors who have an interest in particular institutional 
arrangements and who leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform 
existing ones”  (Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence 2004: 657).  
The institutional entrepreneurship approach contributes to explaining the fact 
that institutionalization processes can vary depending on which actors are involved 
and with what kind of interests, activities and strategies. This approach, which allows 
for the existence of multiple actors and institutional logics, has been developed on 
the basis of the neo-institutional perspective with the purpose of addressing the 
limitations of early institutionalism. In the following section, I will compare early 
and neo-institutionalism in order to outline and explain the background in which 
institutional entrepreneurship emerged.  
First of all, it is important to highlight that the institutional entrepreneurship 
approach emphasizes the role of individuals and organizations, which are known as 
institutional entrepreneurs, in the structuring of institutional work (Lawrence and 
Suddaby 2006). Unlike early institutionalism studies which emphasized the way in 
which institutional mechanisms influence organizational structures and activities, 
according to the neo-institutional perspective the role of actors is central to legitimize 
the theory and values of a new organization form. Institutional entrepreneurs more 
specifically identify in the institutional structures themselves an opportunity for the 
emergence of a new organizational form with sufficient resources (DiMaggio 1988: 
18). Moreover, according to Lawrence and Suddaby (2006: 215) institutional work 
occurs when individuals and organizations need to establish a new type of 
organization from consolidated logics by creating, maintaining and disrupting 
institutions (Tracey, Phillips, and Jarvis 2011: 60). 
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The role of institutional entrepreneurs within institutional entrepreneurship is 
crucial because they are the main actors of the institutional process of a new 
organizational form which is affected by their own strategic objectives. More 
specifically, institutional entrepreneurship emphasizes that organizations emerge 
when an institutional entrepreneur combines multiple institutional logics (Tracey, 
Phillips, and Jarvis 2011: 60). Similarly, Suchman (1995: 574) states that the 
legitimization of an organizational form is “a generalization process of perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper and appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.” 
Therefore, a new organizational form can be legitimated by institutional 
entrepreneurs within an institutional context where the new form can be viable 
(Greenwood and Suddaby 2006: 30).  
Secondly, the activities performed by actors are also important according to 
the institutional entrepreneurship approach. As a matter of fact, both neo-
institutionalism and early-institutionalism highlight the importance of the “activities” 
of actors. Yet, in the institutional entrepreneurship approach, the activities of actors 
can be diversified on the basis of the actors’ interests and resources. 
Thirdly, because neo-institutionalism acknowledges the existence of various 
actors and activities, it also makes a distinction with regard to conflict. Early 
institutionalism emphasizes conflicts of interest within organizations because it 
focuses on the institutionalization of organizations. On the contrary, neo 
institutionalism places greater emphasis on “how organizations respond to such 
conflicts by developing highly elaborate administrative structures” (DiMaggio 1991: 
11). According to DiMaggio (1991: 12), early institutionalism identifies the sources 
of constraints as outcomes of “the vesting of interests within organizations as a result 
of political trade-offs and alliances” of. By contrast, neo-institutionalism considers 
the relationship between stability, legitimacy and the power of “common 
understandings that are seldom explicitly articulated” as sources of constraints 
(Zucker 1983: 5). Therefore, more importantly, a new form needs to be legitimated 
and taken-for-granted as a social factor by other powerful actors in order to attract 
resources and gain power (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio 1988; Hannan and 
Carroll 1992; Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Baum and Powell 1995; Fligstein 1996; Powell 
1998).  
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The institutional processes of a new organizational form in which different 
actors involved are considered as a political process because actors have different 
objectives, strategies, and perceptions and compete against each other in order to 
gain power (Beckert 1999; Levy and Scully 2007). During this process of 
legitimation, conflicts can occur while institutional entrepreneurs need to blend the 
key elements of different logics (Tracey, Phillips, and Jarvis 2011). However, the 
presence of conflict and of a diversity of organizational forms between different 
actors can also represent a positive way of triggering changes in the way institutional 
entrepreneurship is perceived (Romanelli 1991). As mentioned by Rao and Kenney 
(2008), conflict is a precursor of the institutionalization of new organizations because 
it de-institutionalizes existing forms of organizations. Therefore, a maintained or 
increased diversity determined by conflicts introduces a new organizational form in a 
changing environment (Romanelli 1991: 80).  
Neo-institutionalists explain the presence of struggles as competing 
institutional logics (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). Institutional entrepreneurship, in 
particular, states that these struggles are enacted during the institutional-building 
process when actors take actions over their interests, recourses, and norms (Rao, 
Morrill, and Zald 2000). Because actors’ interests, norms and resources in 
themselves differ in their social positions, struggles are frequent in the process of 
connecting each other’s interests and activities (Maguire, Hardy, and Lawrence 
2004).  
Prior institutional studies focused on discourse to investigate the struggles 
between actors in different social positions while trying to build institutional 
arrangements. However, the discourse literature often looks only at one aspect of the 
relationship between power and discourse to explain how particular discourses 
produce systems of power (Hardy and Phillips 2004). Not much literature has 
focused on how a dominant discourse can be contested by social actors who do not 
partly or fully agree with the dominant discourse. More details on how discourse and 
discourse analysis can be used to study struggles between actors in the institutional 
fields are reviewed in Chapter Three.  
Finally, an organization form is not always created as a new form, but it may 
develop from the transformation or imitation by existing organizational forms when 
external contingencies change (Scott 1987). Therefore, this view highlights the role 
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of historical continuities in an organizational form that retains a shared 
understanding from previous organizational forms. Consequently, institutional 
entrepreneurs’ strategies which compete and legitimate institutions and their 
development have also been considered to be an important research topic (Zilber 
2002; Maguire and Hardy 2006).  
 
2.1.2. The Integration of Social Movements into Neo-institutionalism  
 
Many scholars have recently tried to combine social movement and 
organization research in order to address the question “to what extent, do social 
movements promote institutional diversity and alternative organizational forms?” 
(Clemens and Cook 1999; Davis and Thompson 1994; Davis and Zald 2005; 
Fligstein 2001; Haveman, Rao, and Paruchuri 2007; Lounsbury, Ventresca, and 
Hirsch 2003; Minkoff 1994; Rao 1998; Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008: 635). The 
attempt to combine social movement theory and institutionalism is relatively new as 
it emerged mainly in the early 2000s in order to explain institution building, 
deinstitutionalization, and reinstitutionalization in organizational fields (McAdam 
and Scott 2005; Rao, Morrill, and Zald 2000). The key link between social 
movements and neo-institutionalism is that they both consider institutional processes 
as political processes. In other words, different actors in different social positions 
compete with one another by means of different strategies in order to gain more 
power in the institutional field (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008).  
Fligstein (1996) and Rao (1998) argue that the emergence of new forms 
resembles social movement processes. According to Fligstein (1996), movements 
arise within institutions or fields. These movements occur when actors try to diffuse 
alternative practices by using established networks and resources and to create new 
systems by relying on existing institutional elements and models. For institutionalists, 
an organizational form emerges or is transformed when movements are engaged in 
institutional processes or when they oppose existing schemes, generating legitimacy 
crisis, or disrupting existing institutions (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008). 
According to this view, movements are regarded as channels to articulate and 
combine new projects with dominant models and which drive organizational 
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emergence or change through the “diffusion, theorization, recombination and other 
institutional processes within fields” (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008: 654).  
The role of actors and institutional entrepreneurs3 is important in the social 
movement approach as well as in the institutional approach. Rao, Morrill, and Zald 
(2000) posits that a new organizational form emerges through collective actions and 
contentions while institutional entrepreneurs push their own definitions and schemata 
in order to build a shared understanding of an emerging organization. Similarly 
organizational institutionalism emphasizes the role of institutional entrepreneurs who 
“define, justify and push the theory and values underpinning a new form” (DiMaggio 
1988: 18). Meanwhile, the social movement perspective highlights the existence of 
“certain conditions” that enable the emergence of a new organizational form (Rao, 
Morrill, and Zald 2000). Thus, activists form collective actions only under certain 
conditions in order to achieve the goals of their activities and to construct the 
boundaries around such activities (Rao, Morrill, and Zald 2000: 241). 
Consequently, the role of institutional entrepreneurs has taken the form of a 
bridge linking social movements and neo-institutional perspectives with politics and 
collective mobilization acting as triggers of change. Both social movements and neo-
institutional perspectives have in common the importance placed on “agency, 
strategic action, and self-conscious mobilization around alternatives” (Schneiberg 
and Lounsbury 2008: 649). Also, they both try to address the role of actors 
embedded within institutions, of how institutions can drive change and of how actors 
use the elements or contradictions of existing institutions to craft new organizational 
forms (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008: 649).  
Social movement theories, such as framing and bricolage, have been adopted 
in organizational studies to explain how institutional entrepreneurs mobilize 
resources, such as personnel and finances, and recombine the existing elements of an 
institution in order to form a new organization (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; 
Rao and Kenney 2008). Although the social movement perspective emphasizes the 
conditions promoting the collective actions which create or change the situation of 
the organizational field, the role of institutional entrepreneurs is also important in 
framing theory. The reason for this is due to their mobilization of resources and the 
                                                
3 Not every actor becomes an institutional entrepreneur according to this view.  
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development of frames which construct the boundaries and purposes of their 
activities (Rao 1998).  
More specifically, institutional entrepreneurs develop frames when they find 
a niche space which is still undefined or defined by a broad range of definitions of 
situation (Rao 1998). Institutional entrepreneurs typically bring with them 
incompatible frames (Bogaert, Boone, and Carroll 2006) that can compete with 
existing frames depending on their own strategies to exercise power and influences 
(Pfeffer 1992). Therefore, the selection of a frame is a political activity especially 
when multiple frames have been formed (Rao and Kenney 2008). Conflict occurs 
while these multiple frames and forms compete with each other to be selected. When 
the state and practitioners are involved in this process, these conflicts and struggles 
between frames in order to produce a shared meaning and new social structure can 
trigger social changes (DiMaggio and Powell 2000).  
Given that struggles are explained as competing institutional logics in 
institutional studies (Thornton and Ocasio 2008), a social movement perspective has 
also been adopted to explain the institutional changes which take place throughout 
these struggles. Schneiberg and Soule (2005: 122) claim that institutionalization is a 
“product of constitutional struggles.” For example, Rao, Monin, and Durand (2003) 
present how existing institutional logics can be contested and reinstitutionalized. By 
defining social movements as “collective challenges to authority in political and 
cultural domains that endeavor to affect change at various levels of social life” as 
emphasized by Snow (2004), Rao, Monin, and Durand (2003) show how social 
movements affect reinstitutionalization especially in the French culinary world in the 
1970s.  
 
2.1.3. Role of Social Movements in Institutional Fields  
 
According to Schneiberg and Lounsbury (2008), there are two approaches 
regarding the role of social movements in institutional change as shown in Table 2-1. 
Schneiberg and Lounsbury (2008) differentiate between movements as an extra-
institutional force and movements as an intra-institutional force. In summary, they 
highlight that movements against institutions are from the outside when the field has 
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recently emerged, while in the case of mature institutional fields they arise from 
within (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008). 
These approaches bring the assumption that institutional entrepreneurs 
change their views and strategies against each other in ongoing institution-building 
processes. Another related assumption is that extra-institutional entrepreneurs 
possibly become intra-institutional entrepreneurs as the fields have matured. 
Therefore, these two approaches are useful to analyze how institutional entrepreneurs 
change their views, interests and strategies over time especially when outside actors 
as extra-institutional forces become the inside actors as intra-institutional forces 
while institutional fields mature over time.  
The first approach considers movements as forces from the outside against 
institutions, which directly contest existing institutional arrangements for change or 
new path creation (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008). This approach is at the basis of 
the two-stage model of institutionalization which considers new paths or fields as 
emerging from a ‘bottom-up’ process (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008: 653):  
“1) organizations or states adopt structures or policies in response to local 
problems, politics or characteristics, which then spark 2) processes of mimesis, 
theorization and diffusion, eventually crystallizing a broader community of practice 
around a core set of principles or models” (Tolbert and Zucker 1983; Baron, Dobbin, 
and Jennings 1986; Galaskiewicz and Wasserman 1989; Strang and Chang 1993).  
 Although these models offer some important insights into studies on 
institutional processes, very little is known about the origins of new ideas and 
practices, the sources of disruption, and the key players and processes which are 
involved (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008).   
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Table 2-1 Extra and Intra-institutional Force Approaches 
 
 Extra-institutional force 
approach 
Intra-institutional force 
approach 
Problems 
Local problems, politics or 
characteristics 
Existing institutions or taken-for-
granted understandings 
Process of 
institutionali
zation 
Interaction between contestation 
and mobilization around 
alternatives 
Mobilizing insiders and 
outsiders, using established 
networks and resources 
Movements 
start from Outside fields Inside fields 
Actors Multiple Multiple 
View on 
institutions Political settlements Bricolage 
Outcome 
Theorization and diffusion, 
eventually crystallizing a broader 
community of practice around a 
core set of principles or models 
(Tolbert and Zucker 1983; 
Baron, Dobbin, and Jennings 
1986; Galaskiewicz and 
Wasserman 1989; Strang and 
Chang 1993). 
New path creation (Schneiberg 
and Lounsbury 2008). 
Theorization, articulation and 
combination of new projects or 
practices with prevailing models 
and arrangements (Greenwood et 
al. 2008). 
Path creation or change as 
reconfiguration, recombination 
or layering (Schneiberg and 
Lounsbury 2008: 657). 
 
The second approach considers movements arising within institutions or 
fields (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008). In this case, movements make use of 
already established networks and resources as well as mobilizing insiders and 
outsiders in order to diffuse alternative practices (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008: 
656). According to this approach, since movements are seen as agency embedded in 
institutional fields, they can emerge in order to not only directly contest existing 
institutions and taken-for-granted understandings, but also “to theorize, articulate and 
combine new projects or practices with existing institutional arrangements” 
(Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008: 656). Thus, multiple practices or collective actions 
can emerge in this process, blurring boundaries between “‘extra-institutional’ and 
‘institutional’, ‘mobilization’ and ‘self-reproducing’ process, or ‘contentious’ versus 
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‘conventional politics’” (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008: 656). The 
acknowledgement of multiple logics or models in the field implies that actors from 
the outside or the inside can take on different strategies for mobilizing resources, 
collective actions, negotiation, and framing issues to claim their views.  
 Schneiberg and Lounsbury (2008)’s efforts on connecting institutional theory 
and social movements together influenced other researchers who started to study 
how different actors interact with each other to bring new logics into the existing 
institutional field. Moreover, their research provides valuable insights for 
institutional researchers to study politics, collective actions, and power in institutions 
(Micelotta, Lounsbury, and Greenwood 2017). For example, some studies found that 
not only powerful actors, but also powerless actors can make institutional changes by 
disrupting powerful institutions (Maguire and Hardy 2009; Zietsma and Lawrence 
2010; Furnari 2016). Moreover, some scholars investigated the role of extra- and 
intra-institutional actors in institutional changes by using the framework developed 
by Schneiberg and Lounsbury (2008). Furnari (2016) claims that institutional 
changes led by powerless actors who come from the outside of the field are likely to 
be radical, because dominant actors in the field would be de-legitimated.  
Meanwhile, Carberry et al. (2017) focused more on whether external or 
internal institutional forces are more influential for firms when adopting field-level 
challenges. They found that Corporate Social Innovation (CSI) emerges through the 
interactions between actors with “conflictual and collaborative (p.5)” relationships. 
Moreover, they found that contested practices raised by activists are often adopted at 
the early stage of legitimation, but later adopters of the field look for alternative 
practices or pressures. In other words, extra-institutional forces tend to become more 
influential while extra-institutional actors become less influential when they are 
intra-institutional actors.  
 
2.3 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I reviewed the literatures and discussions on the emergence of 
new organizational forms by using both institutional entrepreneurship and social 
movement theories integrated into neo-institutionalism. This review found that the 
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emergence of new organizational forms as institution-building processes are by 
nature political since they emphasize the struggles between dominant and 
subordinated social actors to sustain or push their social positions higher by 
strategically presenting their own understandings on an organization or institutional 
field. Social actors – individuals and groups – who identify a need to build a new 
organizational form or transform the previous organizations are influenced by the 
social conditions they are in. Therefore, changes of social conditions are key to 
analyzing how each social group and their activities related to institutional building 
processes differ one from the other. Moreover, changes of social conditions influence 
social actors who go through different experiences and have different understandings 
on the social issues that in turn shape ideologies. Thus, socio-political conditions 
work as triggers of change that influence actors in the shaping of their ideologies 
based on their experiences, knowledge and understanding of the world.  
However, there are some research gaps to be filled. First, although many 
researchers have studied either how movements or existing dominant institutional 
structures as political forces promote a new organizational form (Lounsbury, 
Ventresca, and Schneiberg 2002; Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008; Soule 2012), 
research has not focused to date on their relationships and interactions between 
multiple actors. Research on how different actors as political forces mobilize 
strategies to create political contexts in order to obtain favorable outcomes in 
institutional fields will provide an advanced understanding of institutional processes 
at the field-level according to a multi-level perspective.  
Second, there is a lack of studies on the role of extra/intra actors or 
movements in the institutional building processes from a historical perspective 
(Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008). Studying how extra/intra actors interact with each 
other, how they articulate each other’s ideologies and discourses, and how these 
movements affected changes of the institutional fields, are all questions which will 
lead to the identification of historical trajectories of change (Schneiberg and 
Lounsbury 2008).   
Third, although studies on social movements and neo-institutionalism have 
mainly relied on qualitative and historical methods, attention has not been adequately 
paid to the multiple factors that influence, disrupt and create the new paths of the 
structuring of institutions (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008). In order to fill this 
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methodological gap and to cover multiple perspectives on institutional building 
processes, I will use multiple data resources such as newspaper coverage, public 
hearings, meeting minutes and interviews.  
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3 How Language Works in Institutional Processes - 
Meaning, Discourse and Institutionalization  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I described why and how this thesis considers 
institutional processes as political processes where different actors compete against 
each other in order to gain more power by legitimating their social positions. In 
doing so, another relevant question arises: “how then do we know that the institutions 
or institutional fields have gained legitimacy?” 
Many scholars have tried to answer this question by relying on discourses, 
which are “socially structured collections of texts that exist in a particular field and 
that produce the social categories and norms that shape the understandings and 
behaviors of actors” (Phillips and Hardy 2002: 638). The first to do so was Astley 
(1985: 497) who claims that “knowledge is the product of social definition”, 
influenced by institutional mechanisms. Later, inspired by Wittgenstein, Astley and 
Zammuto (1992) and Mauws and Phillips (1995) raised the issue of our knowledge 
of organizations being the result of linguistic conventions. This view implies that 
“the language helps to bring the phenomena into being”: “researchers see the world 
through the lenses of social theories, and social theories are built borrowing actors’ 
categories and meanings” (Ferraro, Pfeffer, and Sutton 2005: 8). Therefore, for these 
authors, knowledge is socially constructed (Brown and Duguid 1991, 2001; Tsoukas 
1996), which means that the institutional, social and political process influences the 
construction of knowledge (Calas and Smircich 1999). 
Zilber (2002) emphasizes the fact that institutions can be understood through 
“the development of shared definitions or meanings that are linked to habitualized 
actions developed and adopted by actors” (Tolbert and Zucker 1996: 180), 
influenced by Dobbin (1994: 228): “social practices become institutionalized only 
insofar as they achieve collective meaning.” Similarly, according to the neo-
institutionalist view, institutions are the products of social interactions between 
different actors who negotiate their understandings. Therefore, actors who 
successfully forced their understanding into truth gain more power and dominance 
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(Zald 2002: 237). This truth can be shown as the dominant or official meaning, and 
the meaning and actors’ understandings obviously appear on the texts they produce 
(Phillips and Hardy 2002; Zald 2002). Therefore, in this chapter I will introduce 
what discourse can accomplish in the institution-building processes by focusing 
mainly on how discourse and discursive strategies reflect actors’ understandings of 
the society.   
 
3.2 Discourse and Discourse Analysis in Organizational 
Studies  
 
Discourse and discourse analysis are useful to examine how a new 
organizational form is produced, maintained and transformed as an 
institutionalization phenomenon on the basis of social movements integrated within 
the institutional perspective. Discourse analysis can explain how socially constructed 
ideas and objects constitute organizations, institutions, and the social world (Phillips, 
Lawrence, and Hardy 2004). Therefore, the theoretical framework of discourse 
analysis is useful to understand socially produced organizational and inter 
organizational phenomena (Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy 2004).   
Research interests concerning discourse and discourse analysis in 
organizational studies have increased since 1990s. However, some authors (Grant, 
Keenoy, and Oswick 1998; Keenoy, Oswick, and Grant 1997) mention that there is 
no agreed upon definition of discourse. As a matter of fact, many scholars have tried 
to explain different approaches to discourse in organization studies depending on 
domains, methodological and epistemological perspectives or discursive perspectives 
(Keenoy, Oswick, and Grant 1997; Potter 1997; Alvesson and Karreman 2000; 
David Grant 2004).  
For instance, Keenoy, Oswick, and Grant (1997) distinguished discourses 
depending on how authors use and see discourses. According to Keenoy, Oswick, 
and Grant (1997), researchers use discourses as a device to make linguistic sense of 
organizations and organizational phenomena, and they present a narrow focus on the 
text per se. Alternatively, some researchers see discourses in contexts where the 
ambiguities of social constructions and the indeterminacy of organizational 
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experiences are revealed, and researchers in this position try to include social and 
political dimensions in addition to the discursive ones.  
Interestingly, as presented in Table 3-1, Potter (1997) suggested the existence 
of five versions of discourse analysis depending on different views: generic view, 
linguistic view, cognitive view, standard Foucauldian view, and institutional view. 
The first three versions of discourse analysis focus more on the text per se, while the 
latter two versions place greater emphasis on social structures and on the use or 
effect of discourse in social reality (Alvesson and Karreman 2000). Therefore, 
generic, linguistic and cognitive views on discourse analysis barely attract 
organization theorists since they are more interested in understanding various 
organizational phenomena (Alvesson and Karreman 2000).   
 
Table 3-1 Potter’s Five Versions of Discourse Analysis (1997)  
 
Generic view All research concerned with language 
in its social and cognitive context. 
(Brown and Yule 1983; 
Van Dijk 1985; Coulthard 
2014) 
Linguistic 
view 
A description for studies focusing 
only on the linguistic units above the 
level of the sentence. 
(Stubbs 1983) 
Cognitive 
view 
The correct term for research 
concerned with cohesion and 
connectedness across sentences or 
turns of talk. 
(Tannen 1984; Van Dijk, 
Kintsch, and Van Dijk 
1983) 
Standard 
Foucauldian 
view 
To cover developments stemming 
from structuralism and semiotics. 
(Foucault 1971; Pêcheux 
and Nagpal 1982) 
Institutional 
view 
Analysis of what people do with 
language in specific social 
(institutional) settings.  
(Potter 1997) 
 
In addition, Alvesson and Karreman (2000) define two major approaches to 
discourse in organization studies as shown in Table 3-2: the study of the social text 
and the study of social reality. Researchers, who approach discourse in organization 
studies as the study of the social text, consider discourse as talk and written text in its 
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social action contexts. Therefore, they focus on the talked and textual nature of 
everyday interactions in organizations. Other researchers, who consider discourse in 
organization studies as the investigation of social reality, explored how discourse 
shapes social reality through language. For them, since social reality is discursively 
constructed and maintained, the emphasis is very much “on the determination of 
social reality through historically situated discursive moves” (Alvesson and 
Karreman 2000: 1126).    
 
Table 3-2 Two Major Approaches to Discourse in Organization Studies 
adopted from Alvesson and Karreman (2000) 
 
 The study of the social text The study of social reality  
Discourse Talk and written text in its social 
action contexts. 
The shaping of social reality 
through language. 
Emphasis The talked and textual nature of 
everyday interactions in 
organization. 
The determination of social reality 
through historically situated 
discursive moves.  
View on 
discourse 
 
General and prevalent systems 
for the formation and articulation 
of ideas in a particular period of 
time.  
Local achievements, analytically 
distinct from other levels of social 
reality, and with little or no general 
content. 
 
Alvesson and Karreman (2000)’s two major approaches to discourse in 
organization studies show that organizational studies can be valuable also in the field 
of linguistics. When organization theorists study discourse as social text, their 
research interest concerns how individuals position themselves and interact based on 
their social roles in a certain institutional setting (Agar 1985; Silverman 1997; 
Thornborrow 2014). This research area is included in the field of institutional 
discourse. Although there is no agreement on the definition of institutional discourse 
yet (Thornborrow 2014), task-, role-, or goal-based activities are mainly involved 
when at least one participant who represents a formal organization encounters 
another person who seeks its services (Agar 1985; Heritage and Sefi 1992). This kind 
of discourse is characterized as institutional discourse that is usually analyzed using 
conversation analysis method (Thornborrow 2014).  
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Maguire and Hardy (2006) focused on the role of discourse in the 
institutional structuring process. According to Maguire and Hardy (2006), a new 
discourse creates new opportunities for actors, enabling them to be involved in 
institution-building activities. Actors as institutional entrepreneurs produce and 
distribute texts using legacy and new discourses in order to influence the institution-
building process and its outcomes (Maguire and Hardy 2006). Therefore, for them, 
discourse is a system of texts that brings an object into being (Parker 2014) and the 
foundation of the process of social construction upon which social reality depends 
(Berger and Luckmann 1991). 
 
3.3 Discursive Strategies in Institution-building Processes 
 
I adopt a discursive approach on discourse in order to capture the struggles 
over the meaning of social enterprise between different actors. According to this 
approach, different social actors can implement different strategies based on their 
positions and own interests in order to legitimate the claim they made against the 
legacy discourse (Maguire and Hardy 2006). Discursive approach is useful to explain 
the struggles between different actors in order to sustain their social positions or to 
negotiate the meaning of an organization by integrating social movement theories 
into neo-institutionalism.  
Maguire and Hardy (2006) discuss institution-building activities with an 
approach on discourse – also known as discursive strategies. Actors adopt discursive 
strategies with their discourse in order to take power or occupy a dominant position. 
Hardy and Phillips (1999: 6) explained discursive strategies as follows: “that actors 
in a particular institutional field draw strategically on broader discourses in ways 
that contribute to the production, modification and dissemination of field-specific 
discourse.” 
More specifically, larger institutional and societal contexts influence actors 
when building or taking on a discursive strategy (Hardy and Phillips 1999). This is 
related to the view according to which discourse is produced within the context and 
therefore has to be understood within such context (Fairclough 1997; Van Dijk 1997). 
As a matter of fact, different discourses shape meanings differently based on their 
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elements: object; key concepts; key subject positions; and conditions of possibility, 
along with the social conditions which affect the construction of elements of 
discourses (Maguire and Hardy 2006). Therefore, this discursive strategy approach 
enables researchers to look at the “moments” in the history of a certain institution-
building or meaning-making process.  
Actors strategically use discourses that are consistent with their interest and 
use different strategies to push their own discourses by authoring texts (Hardy, 
Palmer, and Phillips 2000; Maguire and Hardy 2006). Importantly, they do not 
completely reject other discourses, but they try to challenge, reconcile or invoke 
other discourses (Maguire and Hardy 2006). Therefore, Maguire and Hardy (2006) 
argue that actors involved in the meaning making process in order to construct 
sustainable and preferred meanings, use different strategies and different discourses 
to achieve their ends but not to reject others.  
This institution-building process is an ongoing process where actors 
discursively struggle especially when power relations are fixed (Van Dijk 1997). 
This is related to the characteristic of dominant discourses which are unchallengeable. 
Dominant discourses always try to keep their power and dominance regardless of the 
claims raised by other competing discourses (Van Dijk 2008). This characteristic 
implies struggles between different actors who are pushing different meanings, and 
allows social actors to develop strategies in order to continuously negotiate the 
meaning (Van Dijk 2008).  
With regard to the previous point, Karim (1993)’s five kinds of discourses 
can be useful to identify discourses in power relations and social actors’ strategies 
when taking on different discourses in an institutional building process. Karim 
(1993)’s division of discourses: dominant discourse; official discourse; oppositional 
discourse; alternative discourse and populist discourse was inspired by Schlesinger, 
Elliot, and Murdock (1984) and Williams (1985).  
Dominant discourse is not monolithic and static but reflects the “ever-
changing structure of power” (Karim 1993: 192). Therefore, a dominant discourse is 
shaped by the interactions between actors in power relations that are changing over 
time. A dominant discourse reflects the dominant definitions of the situation where 
the existing structures of power and social conditions are embedded. However, a 
dominant discourse does not necessarily need to be an official discourse (Williams 
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1985). An official discourse represents the views, arguments, explanations and 
policy suggestions provided by the state, which appears for instance in legislations 
and in other government regulations (Schlesinger, Elliot, and Murdock 1984). 
An oppositional discourse criticizes a dominant discourse and its viewpoints, 
and resists against the hegemony of the dominant discourse. Differently from 
oppositional discourses, a discourse is considered to be alternative when it does not 
share the same viewpoint with dominant discourses (Karim 1993). Lastly, a populist 
discourse has a conservative tendency similar to dominant discourses, but its voice, 
manners, and viewpoints are much more extreme, such that is not usually adopted by 
the state (Schlesinger, Elliot, and Murdock 1984). 
 
3.4 How Ideology is Reflected in Discourse  
 
In the previous sections, I have reviewed how institutional entrepreneurs’ 
interests and objectives are represented through the discourses they push throughout 
the institutional building processes, and how they discursively but strategically use 
discourses which integrate social actors’ knowledge and understandings on social 
issues. As emphasized in the earlier sections of this thesis/chapter, the role of actors 
such as social groups are important in both institutional entrepreneurship and social 
movement theories, because they are the actants who perceive the social issues 
which need to be sorted out and who act on the basis of their perception and 
decisions.  
The theory of ideology, which is the key to explaining how and why actors 
perceive, understand, and interpret social conditions and social issues and take 
different social positions, cannot be ignored when exploring the backgrounds of the 
struggles between actors located in different social positions. Ideologies are 
organized by “social and personal cognitions, accumulated experiences, personal 
beliefs and principles, motivations and emotions” (Van Dijk 1995: 142). These 
characteristics of groups or people, constructed within socio-political contexts and 
the positions they are located in, can be expressed through text or talk in order to 
defend or legitimate their positions.   
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Therefore, I am able to state that ideologies are reflected in text or talk 
because language users such as communities, groups, or organizations’ members 
from a certain social position actually produce the language they use. Van Dijk (1995: 
136) emphasizes that these discourse production activities may take place in order to 
“sustain or challenge social positions.” During this process of sustaining or 
challenging, groups discursively exchange their opinions by developing and pushing 
their own discourses. Hence, ideologies are key to explaining why different actors 
take different social positions on certain social issues. 
Although this study focuses on the role of social groups consisting of 
individuals who share the same purpose and the sense of solidarity, I also focus on 
personal experiences as an important factor which influences social groups’ 
ideologies. Because social groups’ ideologies are basically a collection of personal 
ideologies but with people who share the same purpose and a similar view on social 
issues. Different ideologies may overlap in a group as it is the outcome of the 
combination of different personal ideologies (Van Dijk 1995). Therefore, the 
ideologies of each social group may not be completely different or contest each other 
since there may be some overlapping features between them. In the next section, I 
will review the theory of ideology and make a theoretical link between ideology and 
discourse based on the combined view of institutional entrepreneurship and social 
movement theories according to a neo-institutionalist perspective.  
 
3.4.1 Discourse, Ideology and Power  
 
Many scholars in social science have discussed what ideologies are by 
relying on different approaches. One of the traditional approaches to ideologies is 
influenced by Marxism and has been mostly developed by Larrain (1979). Larrain 
(1979) divided ideology into two conceptions, a positive and a negative one. The 
negative conception of ideology emerges from Marx’s “language of real life” which 
explains ideology as false consciousness. According to Marx’s view, subordinate 
classes develop and express their ideas not on the basis of their own interests, but of 
the dominant material relations and interests. This, however, also entails a possible 
misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the social reality in which they are actually 
embedded in. Moreover, Purvis and Hunt (1993: 478) named the negative conception 
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of ideology as a critical conception of ideology because “negative sounds too value 
laden” and the directionality of ideology which favors some over others related to 
social relationships between dominant and subordinate classes or groups.  
On the other hand, Purvis and Hunt (1993) described the positive conception 
of ideology as the sociological conception of ideology which emphasizes the 
struggles and contentions between different social position of classes, groups or 
agents. Both conceptions of ideology consider past experiences as important since 
they shape the notion of common sense and conscious.  
Although these conceptions of ideology focus on the different notions of 
ideology, all ideologies are defined based on the assumption that they are shaped 
within social and political circumstances and groups or personal knowledge and 
experiences. Researchers define ideologies simply on the basis of these assumptions 
that ideologies are “some kind of ideas” which are “belief systems that are at the 
basis of the socio-political cognitions of groups” (Lau and Sears 1986; Rosenberg 
1988; Van Dijk 1995: 116).  
Therefore, different social groups with a different basis of the socio-political 
cognition present different opinions on social issues and take up different social 
positions. According to this conception of ideology, both dominant and subordinated 
groups have ideologies whose attitudes and knowledge are organized on the basis of 
their experiences and of the socio-political conditions they are located in.  
These different positions, opinions, or interpretations can cause conflicts 
between different groups because they present different goals, norms and values, 
resources, identity and activities (Van Dijk 1995: 140). They may also entail 
resistance and changes initiated by the dominated groups. Spicer and Böhm (2007) 
explained that resistance takes place in multiple ways by means of social movements 
in their research on how discourses of management are resisted. Here, social 
movements take the role of “central agents of resistance” (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). 
More specifically, the most broadly accepted definition of social movement is given 
by Tarrow and Tollefson (1994: 3-4): “collective challenges by people with common 
purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and 
authorities.” This definition differs from the Foucauldian approaches on resistance 
which emphasize informal micro-politics (Spicer and Böhm 2007). According to 
Foucauldian approaches, resistance, which is “the constant process of adaptation, 
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subversion and re-inscription of dominant discourses”, takes place as “individuals 
confront, and reflect on, their own identity performance, recognizing contradictions 
and tensions and, in so doing, pervert and subtly shift meanings and understandings” 
(Thomas and Davies 2005: 687).  
Social movements emphasize the following key notions: 1) collective 
challenges over individuals’ confrontations; 2) chains of equivalence, defined by 
Laclau and Mouffe (2001) as those which engage different groups in struggles based 
on common purposes and senses of solidarity; 3) long term interactions with 
dominant groups rather than short and sporadic interactions. The emphasis of social 
movement is on the analytical framework provided by Laclau and Mouffe (2001) 
influenced in turn by Gramsci, Nowell-Smith, and Hoare (1971)’s work on 
hegemony. More specifically, Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 7) consider resistance as a 
hegemonic struggle defining hegemony as a “unity existing in a concrete social 
formation.” When hegemony is achieved by a particular social force which 
represents totality, struggles and also possible collective activities can take place 
between different groups (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). According to Laclau and 
Mouffe (2001), these different groups can share the same purposes and build 
solidarity between them. Social movements can articulate or connect different groups 
who struggle against each other over hegemony (Laclau and Mouffe 2001). However, 
different groups may take on different strategies to contest hegemony because they 
may have different ideologies shaped by different cognitions and past experiences.  
Spicer and Böhm (2007) connect Laclau and Mouffe (2001)’s framework on 
resistance and power to discourse based on Parker (2002)’s work. According to them, 
a discourse can replace a group in Laclau and Mouffe (2001)’s work as follows: “the 
single discourse of management has been articulated or linked with a remarkable 
range of other discourses ranging from medicine to public administration to 
development. The result is that this particular discourse has assumed a certain 
hegemonic totality” (Spicer and Böhm 2007: 1672). That is, discourses developed by 
different social groups collaborate or compete against each other in opposition to 
hegemonic discourses. These discourses can be articulated in diverse struggles 
(Willmott 2005: 772) and previous studies have acknowledged this process as social 
movements (Willmott 2005; Laclau and Mouffe 2001; Spicer and Böhm 2007).  
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With regard to the notion of ideology, typical concepts are related to the ways 
in which forms of consciousness in people are identified and how these forms of 
consciousness generate conflicts of interests and struggles between different people 
or groups (Purvis and Hunt 1993). Therefore, ideology reflects certain people’s or 
groups’ interests and forms of consciousness. 
More specifically, ideologies are organized by “social and personal 
cognitions, accumulated experiences, personal beliefs and principles, motivations 
and emotions” (Van Dijk 1995: 142). These characteristics of groups or people are 
constructed within the socio-political contexts and positions they are located in and 
can be expressed through text or talk in order to defend or legitimate their positions. 
Therefore, we can say that ideologies are reflected in text or talk because language 
users such as communities, groups, or organizations’ members from a certain social 
position produce the language they use. Van Dijk (1995: 136) emphasizes that these 
discourse production activities may take place to “sustain or challenge social 
positions.” Throughout this process of sustaining or challenging, groups discursively 
exchange their opinions by developing and pushing their own discourses.  
Given the above considerations, the discursive structures and strategies 
reflecting group members’ ideologies are involved in this process of structuring 
discourses and exchanging discourses (Van Dijk 1995). For this reason, in order to 
analyze the discursive structures and strategies, Van Dijk (1995) developed a 
theoretical framework influenced by intergroup theory, theories of stereotyping and 
social cognition research (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Hamilton 1981; Semin and Fiedler 
1992; Turner, Turner, and Giles 1981).  
According to Van Dijk (1995)’s framework (1995), social groups develop 
and push their discourses by distinguishing between US (ingroup) and THEM 
(outgroup) as shown in Table 3-3.   
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Table 3-3 Describing/Attributing Positive Action  
Imported from Van Dijk (1995) 
 
Ingroup Outgroup 
Emphasis De-emphasis 
Assertion Denial 
Hyperbole Understatement 
Topicalization  
- Sentential (micro) 
- Textual (macro) 
De-topicalization 
High, prominent position Low, non-prominent position 
Headlining, summarizing Marginalization 
Detailed description Vague, overall description 
Attribution to personality Attribution to context 
Explicit Implicit 
Direct Indirect 
Narrative illustration No storytelling 
Argumentative support No argumentative support 
Impression management No impression management 
 
This framework, which is well-known in social psychology, however, can 
only examine the micro level of actions embodied in sentences. In order to analyze 
ideologies structured by group cognition, Van Dijk (1995) developed another 
framework that can analyze discourse meanings influenced by ideologies as shown 
in Table 3-4.  
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Table 3-4 The Framework Analyzing Discourse Influenced by Ideologies (Van 
Dijk 1995) 
 
 
Self-identity 
descriptions 
Who are we 
Where do we come from  
What are our properties  
What is our history  
How are we different from others  
What are we proud of  
Who will be admitted  
What are the criteria of admission  
Who may immigrate, etc  
Activity-
descriptions 
What are our tasks 
What do we do 
What is expected of us  
What are our social roles, etc  
Goal-
descriptions Goals of activities  
Norm and 
value 
descriptions 
What is good and bad, right or wrong  
What our actions and goals try to respect or 
achieve  
Position and 
relation 
descriptions  
Identity, activities and goals in relation to 
other groups  
Focus on group relations, conflict, 
polarization, and negative other presentation  
Resource 
descriptions Access to general or specific resources  
 
The frameworks suggested by Van Dijk (1995) are useful to distinguish 
ideologies of movements as extra-institutional forces and intra-institutional forces by 
analyzing their discourses.  
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have reviewed the role of discourse in institution-building 
processes. Actors’ ideologies are reflected in the discourses that actors use which are 
in turn socially constructed and discursively constituted and managed by actors. 
Social actors use discourses in order to sustain or gain higher social positions by 
legitimating their discourse as true in the social world. This thesis on the 
development of the concept of social enterprise in South Korea relates to the 
approach to discourse in the study of social reality, rather than the social text in 
organization studies. The reason for this is given by the focus on how the concept of 
social enterprise (social reality) has developed as an ongoing institution-building 
process through socially or historically situated discursive moves of different social 
actors, rather than the texts per se. During this research process, I will analyze how 
social actors position themselves differently based on what kind of discourses they 
are using and the elements of their discourses (object; key concepts; key subject 
positions; and conditions of possibility), and how the socio-political conditions affect 
the construction of the elements of discourses (Maguire and Hardy 2006). Moreover, 
this research aims to explain how different social actors struggle in the process of 
constructing their claims and their strategies to engage meaning making process as 
an institutional process, in order to make institutional changes in power relations 
based on social movement theory integration into the neo-institutionalism.  
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4 The History of Korean Social Enterprises 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
A new organizational form emerges as a reaction to the limitations of 
previous organizational forms and of the socio-political context in which they are 
located. This chapter will introduce and outline the dynamics of the development of 
Korean social enterprises where multiple actors were involved over time. First, the 
current certification system under the SEPA will be introduced as a standard 
organizational form of social enterprise in South Korea. Second, multiple actors who 
have been involved in the institution-building project of social enterprise will be 
defined. Third, social enterprise discourses promoted by multiple actors will be 
identified based on Karim (1993)’s discourse identification. Fourth, the dynamics of 
changes in the meaning of social enterprise over time will be described from three 
different perspectives: government, non-profit and innovative perspectives. Finally, I 
will briefly introduce how social actors are currently competing with each other over 
the meaning of social enterprise.  
 
4.2 Certification System  
 
The certification system of social enterprise falls under the law “Social 
Enterprise Promotion Act (SEPA)” enacted by the Ministry of Employment and 
Labor (MoEL) in 2006. According to the SEPA, Social Enterprise is defined as “an 
enterprise certified in accordance with Article 7 as one that pursues a social 
objective aimed at enhancing the quality of life of community residents by providing 
vulnerable social groups with social services and job opportunities while conducting 
its business activities, such as the production and sale of goods and services” 
(Ministry of Employment and Labor 2006). This definition of Social Enterprise 
limits the extent of the social objectives. As a matter of fact, the overarching purpose 
is to enhance the quality of life of community residents, the goals are to provide 
social services and job opportunities, the target is represented by vulnerable social 
group and the strategies adopted are given by any kind of business activities. It is 
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clear that the government aims to solve field level problems – unemployment and 
limitations of social welfare services/policies – using Social Enterprise.  
The aim of the SEPA is even more clearly described in the “Enforcement 
Decree of the Social Enterprise Promotion Act (No. 22520, 09th Dec. 2010)” which 
defines the criteria of Social Enterprise in detail. A social enterprise has to meet 
certain criteria in order to be certified as a Social Enterprise and the SEPA defines 
the social dimensions which a Social Enterprise has to achieve: first, the primary 
objective of the organization is to enhance the quality of life of community residents 
by providing vulnerable social groups with jobs or social services or to otherwise 
realize social objectives; second, it shall have a structure under which the 
beneficiaries of services, employees, and interested parties can participate in 
decision-making (Ministry of Employment and Labor 2006). 
The SEPA identifies five different models of Social Enterprise: 1) Work 
integration model; 2) Social welfare service model; 3) Community development 
model; 4) Mixed model; and 5) etc model.  
The main objective of the working integration model is to create jobs and 
only when an organization employed vulnerable social groups for more than 30% 
can it fit this model. The social welfare service model aims to provide social welfare 
services and the ratio of the vulnerable social groups receiving social services should 
be more than 30%.  
The community development model has been added in 2010 as a result of the 
interactions between the government and civil society groups. According to the 
revised version of the SEPA, a community development model implies a 
contribution to the local community by using local resources to employ local 
vulnerable social groups and provide social services to them. The ratio of employing 
local vulnerable social groups and providing social services to them should be at 
least 20% of the total. The main objective of the mixed model, instead, is to provide 
work opportunities and social services at the same time in one organization. With 
regard to the community development model, this has to employ and provide social 
services to vulnerable social groups for more than at least 20% of the total. The last 
model includes the Social Enterprises that do not fit any of previous models. 
According to the SEPA, a Social Enterprise of the “etc” model has to promote other 
social values apart from employment and the provision of social services. However, 
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there is no clear description of which social objectives can be considered valuable to 
identify the social enterprises that fit the etc model. For this reason, during the 
certification process the social objectives of an organization which apply for the etc 
models are reviewed by an intermediary organization first and then by a judging 
committee.  
According to the “Enforcement Decree of the Social Enterprise Promotion 
Act”, five types of social services are identified: 1) Childcare service; 2) Art, tourism 
and sporting service; 3) Forest conservancy and management service; 4) Nursing and 
housework assistance service; and 5) Other services recognized by the Minister of 
Employment and Labor after the deliberation of the Social Enterprise Support 
Committee (hereinafter referred to as “the Support Committee”).  
Besides the social objectives, a Social Enterprise also has to meet certain 
economic requirements. Economic dimensions include: first, that it employs one or 
more paid workers and conducts business activities involving the production and sale 
of goods or services; second, that the revenue generated through its business 
activities meets or exceeds the standards prescribed by Presidential Decree (at least 
two-thirds of earnings); third, that if its distributable profits occur during a fiscal year, 
more than two thirds of the profits are reinvested for social purposes (Ministry of 
Employment and Labor 2006). 
 
4.3 Multiple Actors Involved in the Institution-building 
Project of Social Enterprise in South Korea  
 
 
In this section, I introduce the actors who are involved in the institution-
building project of Social Enterprise in South Korea. I have categorized these actors 
into three groups: top-down and bottom-up actors, and actors who emerged after the 
SEPA. The analytical strategy adopted to identify the group for each actor is 
explained in Section 5.3. devoted to Research Methods. However, I present the 
identification of multiple actors here, rather than in the finding chapters in order to 
provide a better understanding of how the Korean social entrepreneurship field is 
constructed.  
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4.3.1 Top-down Actors  
 
4.3.1.1 The Blue House  
 
The government established the “Presidential Committee on Job Strategy” in 
order to establish the plans to implement social welfare policies. The Presidential 
Committee then launched the “Task Force Team of Social Work” in order to review 
field level problems and discuss policy plans with the relevant ministries and experts 
in the field of social services.  
The Participatory government of the President Noh, Moo-hyun identified 
“Social Work Policy” as a core policy agenda of the government. The issue of 
providing social services through employment became important because the 
government had acknowledged the limitations of the previous employment policy, 
the public work program. This program provided work opportunities to those who 
were in conditions of extreme poverty until they get a full-time job. Work 
opportunities provided by the public work program were meaningful for the training 
of unskillful workers, and for the provision of work opportunities and of income for 
vulnerable social groups.  
Despite the benefits of the program, at the same time, the level of most of the 
jobs which were included was mostly of low-quality, such as cleaning tasks, while 
the work places of the public work program were mainly public areas, such as public 
parks, streets, and public buildings. Moreover, the regulation of the public work 
program stipulated that one person can benefit from being employed only for a 
maximum of two months. In such a short time, workers tended to lose their interests 
in the job not only because of the short period time of being employed, but also 
because they were paid the same amount regardless of their performance. From this 
previous experience, the government became aware also of the limitations of 
providing unconditional subsidies for beneficiaries, no matter what outcome in terms 
of performance they achieve. Therefore, the government started to look for another 
way of providing sustainable work opportunities rather than giving money to the 
vulnerable only because they are poor.  
According to the government report “The Planning Strategy for Employment 
and Society Cohesion” (Presidential Committee on Job Strategy 2006), “social work” 
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is given by work places/opportunities created by providing social services to the third 
sector. Until 2006, work opportunities for the vulnerable social groups had been 
provided as part of public work program that does not make any profit from the 
activities. Instead, the government subsidized the beneficiaries when they achieve a 
minimum level of work in public areas such as government buildings, public parks 
and streets. Unlike the public work program, the social work program allows 
intermediaries/agencies to generate extra income by organizing and managing 
business activities to then invest in and promote social entrepreneurial activities. As 
a consequence, the Presidential Committee on Job Strategy organized the “Task 
Force Team for Social Enterprise Promotion Act” which included multiple actors 
who worked in the field of social entrepreneurship or relevant fields, such as that of 
self-sufficiency enterprises and of social welfare services. The Task Force Team, 
government officers from eight different government departments such as the 
Ministry of Employment and Labor, Ministry of Welfare, Ministry of Culture, 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance, and Ministry of Planning and Budget are also 
included here as well as representatives from NGOs, such as the Working Together 
Foundation, and researchers from the Korea Labor Institute which is a government 
funded national research institute. 
 
4.3.1.2 Government Departments  
 
In the “Task Force Team for Social Enterprise Promotion Act”, eight 
different government departments were included, namely the Ministry of Labor4, 
Ministry of Welfare, Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Strategy and Finance, and 
Ministry of Planning and Budget. Although they share a common identity as a 
government body, they have struggled to achieve consensus on the SEPA since they 
have different objectives, backgrounds, interests, and strategies towards employment 
and welfare policies. These struggles between government departments during the 
law-making process will be analyzed in Chapter Six devoted to the findings of this 
thesis.  
 
                                                
4 Ministry of Labor changed its name to Ministry of Employment and Labor in 5 July 2010 when 
“employment policy” was added to its organizational objectives (Presidential Archives 2010).   
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4.3.1.3 Political Parties  
 
Political parties also have been involved in the institution-building project of 
social enterprises because in South Korea only the members of the national assembly 
have the right to introduce a new legislative bill. In 2006, the Uri Party was the 
ruling party while the Hannara Party represented the leading opposition. The 
legislative bill of the Uri Party reflected the government’s approach on social 
enterprises, while the bill of the Hannara Party reflected to a greater extent the 
oppositional discourse. The struggles between two parties with their discourses 
included in each legislative bill will be analyzed in Chapter 6, where the Findings are 
presented.  
 
4.3.1.4 Korea Labor Institute (KLI) 
 
The Korea Labor Institute (KLI) is one of national research institutes funded 
by the government. The KLI played an important role in the development of a blue 
print of the SEPA. Researchers at the KLI carried out pre-research on social 
enterprise phenomena and policies in South Korea and other countries, and collected 
opinions from the field. As a result, the KLI had developed a very close relationship 
with both top-down and bottom-up actors in the field. 
 
4.3.2 Bottom-up Actors 
 
 
4.3.2.1 National Movement Committee for Overcoming 
Unemployment (NMCOU) 
 
The “National Movement Committee for Overcoming Unemployment 
(NMCOU)” a former organization of the Working Together Foundation was 
established in June 1998. It changed its name to the “Korea Foundation for Working 
Together: Working Together Society” in 2003 when the financial crisis was 
considered at an end. The NMCOU was established originally to overcome the Asian 
currency crisis of 1997 based on the nationwide citizens’ movement known as the 
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“Gold-gathering Campaign” After campaigning, the NGOs, who were involved, 
established the NMCOU in order to distribute the collected money to help homeless 
and jobless people. In 2003, when the members of the committee considered the 
financial crisis at its end, they organized the “Task Force Team of Social Work” 
which comprised seven civil society organizations, including the NMCOU, Society 
Solidarity Bank, Senior Club, Self-sufficiency Association, Women Workers 
Association, and others in order to discuss the future plans of the committee. One of 
the core managers at NMCOU participated in the “Task Force Team of Social 
Enterprise Promotion Act” as a representative of NGO members of the “Task Force 
Team of Social Work.”  
  
4.3.2.2 Civil Society Solidarity for Social Enterprise Development 
(CSSSED) 
 
While the Working Together Foundation participated in the law-making 
process of the SEPA as one of core members of the “Task Force Team for Social 
Enterprise Promotion Act”, other non-profit organizations which were not included 
as members of the Task Force Team started to speak up about the SEPA and the 
characteristics of social enterprise, on the basis of their experiences and 
understandings. This group of actors was made up of self-sufficiency enterprises, 
which provided work opportunities to the vulnerable even before the enactment of 
the SEPA, and introduced the term of social enterprise or social economy earlier in 
the 1990s, mainly from European countries and Japan.  
 
4.3.3 Actors Who Emerged after the SEPA  
 
4.3.3.1 Intermediary Organizations   
 
As a result of the establishment of the SEPA, several intermediary 
organizations who are promoting government policies on social entrepreneurship 
have emerged. A few of these, such as the Korea Foundation for Working Together, 
existed even before the establishment of the SEPA. They started to work as a Social 
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Enterprise intermediary organization. After the introduction of the SEPA, at least one 
intermediary organization has been founded in each region. In total, in 2016 there 
were 16 intermediary organizations across the country, one in each metropolitan city 
and province.  
Generally, the main roles of intermediary organizations are as follows: 
provision of information and consulting services in relation to obtaining a Social 
Enterprise certification, organization of a judging committee to screen potential 
preliminary applications and certified Social Enterprises. Intermediary organizations 
also constitute a bridge between the government – MoEL and Korea Social 
Enterprise Promotion Agency (KOSEA) – and certified Social Enterprises, as well as 
those social enterprises which present the potential to be certified. As a matter of fact, 
consulting and educational programs provided by intermediary organizations are 
funded by MoEL. However, usually intermediary organizations are not solely 
dependent on the government funding but they carry out other financial activities to 
maintain the organization.  
 
4.3.3.2 Korea Central Council of Social Enterprise (KCCSE) 
 
 
The Korea Central Council of Social Enterprise (KCCSE) was established in 
2008. The members of the Council all work in a certified Social Enterprise. More 
specifically, the KCCSE consists of social entrepreneurs who joined the regional 
councils of social enterprises. The KCCSE promotes a discourse on local 
development that considers the development of a sustainable local community as the 
core objective of social enterprises. They also promote a cooperative discourse and a 
social economy discourse. The KCCSE, as an advocacy group, works with various 
actors in the field, such as private companies, intermediaries and NGOs, by 
organizing regular meetings with members, with the government officers of the 
Ministry of Employment and Labor, and with political parties. The KCCSE also 
delivers education and training courses for social entrepreneurs in order to spread 
their discourses. 
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4.3.3.3 Social Enterprise Network (SEN) Korea  
 
 
The Social Enterprise Network (SEN) Korea has influenced people to accept 
the social innovation discourse of social enterprise broadly in South Korea. In 2003, 
the SEN introduced the term social entrepreneurship based on the US approach. In 
other words, the social innovation discourse of social enterprise, which is well-
known in the US, was first imported by the SEN. In Chapter Eight, I shall discuss in 
greater detail the social innovation discourse of social enterprise and its process of 
introduction by the SEN are explained.   
 
4.3.3.4 Social Innovation Support Organizations  
 
 
Besides the previous categories of actors, an important role is also played by 
groups of organizations that support the social innovation discourse of social 
enterprise. These organizations support individual social entrepreneurs financially or 
educationally in the establishment of social ventures or social innovative enterprises 
besides the certified Social Enterprise. Angel investors, crowdfunding for social 
entrepreneurs, consulting groups, and social finance organizations are all included in 
this group of actors.  
 
4.3.3.5 Individual Social Entrepreneurs  
 
 
Here, individual social entrepreneurs are social entrepreneurs who are not 
interested in obtaining a Social Enterprise certification. They promote social 
innovation and entrepreneurship discourses. Individual social entrepreneurs call their 
organizations “social innovative enterprise” or “social venture” alternatively, since 
they are legally prohibited to call themselves as Social Enterprise.  
 
During the institutionalization process of social enterprise, multiple actors 
emerging from top-down or bottom-up with different backgrounds, objectives, 
understandings have been involved. Different experiences and understandings of 
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social enterprise characterize even the actors within the same group, such as the 
government or civil society both of which have different approaches to social 
enterprise and to the SEPA. In this context, actors struggle against each other and as 
a result they promote their own discourses with various strategies in order for them 
to be accepted by the other actors.  
 
4.4 Social Enterprise Discourse Identification 
 
 
This chapter posits that the term social enterprise carries multiple discourses 
and that social enterprise is referred to in various ways by different actors. In this 
section, various discourses which exist in the field of social entrepreneurship in 
South Korea will be introduced and discussed with a focus on the time in which each 
discourse emerged, the groups of actors promoting each discourse, and the emphasis 
of each discourse. Although the concept of social enterprise has been officially 
institutionalized by the SEPA, some discourses of social enterprise provided by other 
actors are not included in this institutionalized meaning. Therefore, some actors have 
been pushing their discourses to be accepted by other actors, especially by the 
government who has the dominant power in this institutionalized field. Moreover, 
alternative discourses of social enterprise which resist against the dominant 
institutionalized concept continuously emerge from the field.  
In order to compare discourses, the actors promoting each discourse, and 
their relationships and strategies, I have identified social enterprise discourses in 
South Korea using Karim (1993)’s framework, as shown in Table 4-1. Some 
discourses overlap and do not completely oppose each other. Also, it is important to 
recall that a group of actors can promote more than one discourse at the same time.  
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Table 4-1 Discourse Identification of Korean Social Enterprise   
using Karim’s (1993) Discourse Identification 
 
 Discourse Main Actors  
Dominant 
and official 
discourse 
 
Certified Social Enterprise 
(Work-related, welfare-related 
and CSR discourse) 
Top-down actors (The Blue 
House, Ministry of Labor, 
Members of the National 
Assembly, Big Corporations, 
NMCOU)  
Oppositional 
discourse 
Local development Bottom-up actors (NMCOU and 
CSSSED) 
Cooperative CSSSED, KCCSE 
Social economy CSSSED, KCCSE 
Alternative 
discourse 
Social innovation and 
entrepreneurial  
SEN Korea, Social Finance 
Organizations, Ashoka, 
Beautiful Store, Individual 
Entrepreneurs  
Populist 
discourse 
None None 
 
According to Karim (1993), dominant discourse is not monolithic and static 
but it reflects the “ever-changing structure of power” (Karim 1993: 192). Therefore, 
a dominant discourse is shaped by the interactions between actors in power relations 
that are changing over time. A dominant discourse comprises the dominant 
definitions of the situation in which the existing structures of power and social 
conditions are embedded. However, a dominant discourse is not necessarily an 
official discourse (Williams 1985). An official discourse represents the views, 
arguments, explanations and policy suggestions provided by the state, which appear 
in legislations and in other government regulations (Schlesinger, Elliot, and Murdock 
1984). An oppositional discourse criticizes a dominant discourse and its viewpoints, 
and resists against the hegemony of the dominant discourse. An alternative discourse, 
instead, is considered to be a discourse that does not share the same viewpoint with 
dominant discourses, unlike oppositional discourses (Karim 1993). Lastly, a populist 
discourse has a conservative tendency similar to dominant discourses, but its voice, 
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manners, and viewpoints are much more extreme so that it is not usually adopted by 
the state (Schlesinger, Elliot, and Murdock 1984). 
In South Korea, the official discourse of social enterprise is the dominant 
discourse. When the state, including the Ministry of Employment and Labor, the 
Members of the National Assembly, the Big Corporations, and intermediary 
organizations, such as the NMCOU, promoted an official discourse of social 
enterprise as a certified social enterprise, they combined work-related, welfare-
related and CSR discourses which represent their views, explanations and policies 
and this discourse spread very quickly over the entire country. During my fieldwork, 
many interviewees emphasized the fact that the official meaning of social enterprise 
is dominant in South Korea as follows:  
 
“The organizational form that we call Social Enterprise is only given to those 
organizations that are certified by the SEPA. People will be confused if we call 
uncertified organizations Social Enterprises although they share similar 
characteristics of Social Enterprises. (BJ7, CEO, G SE, 16 June 2014, 14:04PM-
16:00PM)”  
 
 Oppositional discourses and alternative discourses emerged during and after 
the SEPA legislation. Bottom-up actors, such as the Civil Society Solidarity for 
Social Enterprise Development (CSSSED) and the Korea Central Council of Social 
Enterprise (KCCSE), promoted local development, workers’ cooperative, and social 
economy discourses against the official discourse. However, they basically agreed on 
the need for an institutionalization of social enterprise and of the basic concept of 
Social Enterprise, as described in the SEPA.  
Social innovation and entrepreneurship discourses of social enterprises are 
considered as alternative discourses which do not share the same viewpoint of the 
official discourse. Alternative discourses are mostly promoted by private 
organizations, such as the SEN Korea, Social Finance Organizations, Ashoka, 
Beautiful Store and individual social entrepreneurs. These groups of people do not 
consider having a Social Enterprise certification as something which is necessary and 
they do not want to be included in the institutionalized meaning of Social Enterprise 
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as defined by the law. They prefer to draw a line between Social Enterprise and the 
social entrepreneurial activities that they do, as EC1 highlighted:  
 
“Social Enterprise defined by the SEPA is completely different from the social 
entrepreneurship activities that we are promoting. Social Enterprise activities 
supported by the state should be known as activities of “social service enterprises”, 
not as “social enterprise.” (EC1, Deputy Director, D SV, 13 May 2014)” 
 
Moreover, many interviewers including DH7 who are in the social venture 
sector added that:  
 
“I am not interested in getting a Social Enterprise certification. And I am not 
interested in the Social Enterprise promotion policies delivered by the MoEL. (DH7, 
CEO, Z SV, 18 June 2014, 11:06AM-12:17PM)” 
 
No populist discourse of social enterprise can be included in the official 
discourse because it is far too extreme by nature. According to BD3:  
 
“The MoEL considers all the different discourses and actors which can be included 
in the institutional setting. (BD3, Manager, C Government Department, 15 June 
2014, 18:09PM-17:44PM)” 
 
Despite the diversity of discourses presented in section 4.4, the history of the 
emergence of social enterprises is often described from the government perspective. 
In Section 4.5, after outlining the history of Social Enterprises from a top-down 
perspective, I shall introduce their history from the bottom-up non-profit and 
innovative perspective.  
 
4.5 From Bottom-up to Top-down  
   
From the interviews which I have carried out, it has become clearer and 
clearer that people have different perspectives on the history of social enterprises and 
their background. Various discourses of Korean social enterprise compete against 
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each other throughout their history until current days. These discourses have taken 
different forms following social, economic, political and cultural dynamic changes. 
In this thesis, I assume that the concept of social enterprise existed in Korean society 
from the early 1920s, although social enterprises were not called so at that time given 
that it is a relatively new word. Nonetheless, considering that the word ‘social 
enterprise’ has emerged with the government’s Social Enterprise promotion policy – 
Social Enterprise Promotion Act (2006), I will firstly look at the current dominant 
and minor but challenging definitions of Korean social enterprise and their histories.  
 
4.5.1 Dominant Discourse of Social Enterprise: a Top-down Approach 
 
4.5.1.1 Definition of Social Enterprise: The Government’s Approach 
 
The Korean government defines social enterprise as “an enterprise certified 
in accordance with Article 7 as one that pursues a social objective aimed at 
enhancing the quality of life of community residents by providing vulnerable social 
groups with social services and job opportunities while conducting its business 
activities, such as the production and sale of goods and services” (Ministry of 
Employment and Labor 2006).  
According to the law, a social enterprise can be certified as such by the 
government, the Ministry of Employment and Labor (MoEL), if it has achieved 
certain economic and social requirements. Economic dimensions are the following: 
first, it has to employ one or more paid workers and conduct business activities, such 
as the production and sale of goods or services; second, the revenue generated 
through its business activities has to meet or exceed the standards prescribed by 
Presidential Decree (at least two-thirds of earnings); third, if distributable profits are 
generated during a fiscal year, more than two thirds of the profits have to be 
reinvested for social purposes (Social Enterprise Promotion Act 2006). With regard 
to social dimensions first, the primary objective of the organization needs to enhance 
the quality of life of the residents in the community by providing vulnerable social 
groups with jobs or social services or to otherwise realize social objectives. Second, 
the social enterprise needs to have a structure which enables the beneficiaries of 
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services, employees, and interested parties to participate in decision-making 
processes (Social Enterprise Promotion Act 2006).  
The law also identifies different organizational types for social enterprises: 
work integration model, social welfare service model, community development 
model, mixed model and etc model. If a social enterprise would like to have a social 
enterprise certification, it has to fit one of these models. The main objective of the 
work integration model is job creation. In this model the employment ratio of 
vulnerable social groups should be over 30%. The social welfare service model’s 
main objective is to provide social welfare services. Here the ratio of vulnerable 
social groups receiving social services is over 30%. In the case of the community 
development model, the objective is to contribute to the local community. More 
specifically, it should use local resources to employ local vulnerable social groups 
and provide them with social services. Moreover, the ratio of each of these figures 
should be at least 20%. The objective of the mixed model combines both the work 
integration model and the social welfare service model. We refer to a mixed model 
when a social enterprise’s main objectives are both job creation and the provision of 
social services. In this case, the ratio of each figure should be at least 20%. Any other 
social enterprises that aim at promoting other social values besides employment and 
the provision of social services can be certified as an etc model. However, not every 
enterprise that has social objectives can be certified as a social enterprise. As a 
matter of fact, the social objectives are reviewed by an intermediary organization 
first and then by a judging committee as part of the certification process.   
 
4.5.1.2 The History of Social Enterprises: The Government’s 
Approach 
 
The history of Korean social enterprises has been written from a top-down 
perspective which mainly explains the process of institutional change of social 
enterprises in light of changes in the legal frameworks. As stated by the Korea Social 
Enterprise Promotion Agency (KOSEA) and on its website 
(http://socialenterprise.or.kr/eng/info/act.do), “social enterprise in Korea began as a 
way to solve the problem of unemployment among vulnerable social groups and 
expand supply of social services” (Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency 
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2013a)” and the history of social enterprises can be traced following policy changes 
related to unemployment and social welfare services issues.   
According to the government website of the Korea Social Enterprise 
Promotion Agency (2015a) and interviews carried out with top-down and some 
bottom-up actors, the Korean financial crisis in 1996 strongly affected social policies 
aimed at solving unemployment problems and the lack of social welfare services. As 
a matter of fact, the unemployment rate rose rapidly in 1996 and it led to a huge gap 
between the rich and the poor.  
As a result, there was an increasing need for social welfare supports for the 
poor and for unemployed people. However, policy makers believed that spending the 
government budget to provide social welfare services for vulnerable people was not 
sustainable in the long run. The reason for this is that the social policy of that time 
consisted in subsidizing them in an easy and simple job, and not to train them or help 
them enter the job market. Meanwhile, some researchers and social activists 
suggested that the Ministry of Welfare started to support the workers of production 
cooperatives, namely production community movements in poor regions, which in 
1996 took the form of self-sufficiency organizations (enterprise).  
In 1996 the government began to support self-sufficiency activities by 
introducing the National Basic Living Security Act (NBLSA). The Self-Sufficient 
Project of the Ministry of Welfare is the first government policy with social welfare 
goals achieved by promoting and supporting the activities of civil society. The 
Ministry of Health and Welfare has also provided support to Self-Sufficiency 
Assistance Centers (SSAC) with the help of the Self-Sufficiency Assistance Policy 
(SSAP) from 1996 onwards (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2013). The vision and 
objectives of the SSAP are similar to that of the SEPA which “aims at promoting 
self-reliance for the working poor by encouraging employment and welfare-to-work 
programs” (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2013). The Ministry of Health and 
Welfare (2013) announced that the objectives of SSAP are: first, to expand stable 
jobs; second, to increase incentives to work; third, to reorganize the SSAP processes; 
and fourth, to expand infrastructures with the aim of self-sufficiency. Moreover, the 
Ministry has promoted self-sufficiency enterprises; one of the programs promoted 
under the SSAP, is “a type of producer’s co-op operated by more than one welfare 
recipient or the working poor” (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2013). 
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Meanwhile, the Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs 
(MoGH) also started the “Public Work Project” 1998 under the “Master Plan for 
Tackling unemployment” (Kwon 2002). The Public Work Project provided work 
opportunities to people who do not benefit from the Employment Insurance Program 
and the Public Assistance Program because they do not meet the poverty criteria 
(Kwon 2002).   
However, although it is thought that South Korea overcame the crisis 
successfully and the unemployment rate started to decrease in 1999, these policies 
have been criticized in terms of their efficiency and sustainability (Korea Social 
Enterprise Promotion Agency 2015a). According to Kwon (2002), the Public Work 
Project presents the following criticisms: first, this project allowed beneficiaries 
(mainly students, housewives and the elderly over 65) to earn money easily by not 
working hard despite still being able to find other work opportunities; second, it did 
not help beneficiaries maintain a positive work spirit and acquire the necessary skills 
and experiences, which would eventually help them find jobs in the future; and third, 
although this project was defined as a work program, it was a “social assistance 
program with a condition of work attached” (Kwon 2002: 11). 
After acknowledging these criticisms, the Social Work Project was launched 
by the Ministry of Labor in 2003. The main objectives of this project were to 
eliminate class-unemployment and polarization by providing vulnerable people with 
work opportunities in the public/social sector. The Social Work Project was run by 
either the government or NGOs on contract. NGOs on contract to the government 
had to create social work ideas on their own in order to generate work opportunities 
for the vulnerable. A project which started under the government’s contract had to be 
a legal enterprise registered under the law in three years. In that way, the government 
could benefit financially and socially from supporting NGOs facing financial 
challenges and vulnerable people facing unemployment. 
According to some interviews, the government tested the Social Work Project 
as a pilot project for the SEPA. The Ministry of Labor had the idea of social 
enterprises already in mind when the Social Work Project was launched. Then, in 
2005, the Ministry of Labor formed a task force team including researchers, social 
entrepreneurs, social activists, and government officers to develop the Social 
Enterprise Promotion Act.      
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4.5.2 Minor Discourses of Social Enterprises: A Bottom-up Approach 
 
4.5.2.1 Definition of Social Enterprises: A Non-profit Approach  
 
Another definition of social enterprise, which I identify as the “bottom-up" 
approach, originated within the cooperative movement and was driven by civil 
society actors. As mentioned above, current government and civil society actors 
consider workers’ cooperatives as the origin of social enterprise. This cooperative 
movement of workers started from the civil society with the aim of supporting and 
empowering people in poor regions by embracing the overseas concept of 
cooperative movement of workers. Thus, the definition of social enterprise for some 
activists, who were involved in this movement from the 1970s, is broader compared 
to the government’s definition. They emphasize to a greater extent the participatory 
governance of social enterprises where workers have the right to participate in 
decision-making process as in the case of cooperatives.  
 
4.5.2.2 History of Social Enterprises: A Non-profit Approach  
 
The field of Korean civil society basically agrees with the government’s view 
on the history of social enterprises. According to this view, Korean social enterprises 
originated from the cooperative movement in poor regions which in the 1990s aimed 
at improving the quality of life and overcoming unemployment problems (Kim 2009). 
However, one strong point of differentiation is that actors in civil society believe that 
they have created social enterprises from their own approach.   
At this point, the role of researchers and social activists was crucial in order 
to identify the concept of social enterprise. Most interviewees mentioned that they 
tried to elaborate the concept and definition of Korean social enterprise on the basis 
of foreign cases, such as the Workers’ Cooperative known as Mondragón from Spain 
and the Social Cooperative Law in Italy. The International Forum on Social 
Enterprises in 2000 played an important role in spreading the term of social 
enterprise and its concept throughout Korea. This Forum is considered to be the first 
international event where Korean researchers and social activists heard the term 
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social enterprise and social economy. Soon after this, they started to study the 
definition, the concept and the cases of overseas social enterprise activities. 
According to some interviewees, for example, some researchers and activists formed 
a private study group on social enterprises in order to bring the concept and apply it 
to the Korean context. Moreover, the Work Together Foundation, an NGO which 
was founded with people’s donations during the financial crisis of 1996, sent 
researchers overseas, mainly in Europe, to visit actual social cooperatives.  
Many interviewees agreed that once a new term is introduced by the civil 
society, in Korea the government takes initiative very quickly. This has occurred also 
in the history of social enterprises as well. Although civil society firstly came across 
the concept of social enterprise, the government took the initiative and established 
the law in a just cause, to support both civil society and the vulnerable people. 
However, civil society also tried to keep their social enterprise initiative by co-
working with the government on solving employment and social welfare problems 
since 1996.  
Kim (2009) divides social enterprises related to non-profit organizations 
between advocacy groups and organizations that have contributed to creating job 
opportunities. Self-sufficiency related organizations and unemployment support 
centers are organizations that have contributed to creating job opportunities in Korea. 
As mentioned before, SSACs provide the vulnerable with job opportunities. These 
jobs consist mostly in social services such as cleaning, house repairs, material and 
food recycling, and nursing (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2013). These social 
business activities were started and supported by the government in order to deliver 
social services and improve the employment rate.  
An important aspect that needs to be recalled is that these self-sufficiency 
related organizations in Korea originated from civil society, and not from 
government policy. Therefore, in order to determine the origins of social enterprise 
related movements from the point of view of civil society in Korea, the grassroots 
practices of community organizations from the 1970s to the 1980s need to be 
reviewed.  
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Table 4-2 The History of Employment-related Civil Society Activities  
(Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency 2013a) 
1970s Intellectuals went down to urban slums (haebang). 
1980s People’s (minjung) churches in slums were built.  
Mid-1980s 
Nationwide associations of community organizers were founded: 
Christian Association for Community Organizing (CACO, 1984), 
Catholic Organizations for the Urban Poor (COUP, 1985), and 
Anglican Sharing Homes (ASH, 1985).  
1990s Self-Sufficiency Programs in governmental partnerships were 
started.  
 
While the military government ruled the country during the 1970s and 1980s, 
intellectuals, mostly university students, began to support socially disadvantaged 
people following the introduction of Sartre’s book “A Plea for Intellectuals” (1974) 
in Korean society (Kim 2012). Some intellectuals even “went down (haebang)” to 
poor regions and lived with disadvantaged people (Kim 2012). Members of the 
Catholic Organization Urban Poor (COUP) in particular believed that “a complete 
identification with poor people is the prerequisite of social movements, that is 
necessary to become the same residents of slums, to see problems through their eyes, 
and solve them from their viewpoints” (Catholic Organizations for the Urban Poor 
(COUP) 1999: 59).  
According to Kim (2012), these activities are directly linked to building 
“populace (people’s, minjung in Korean)” churches in slums. Churches represented 
suitable organizational forms in order to deliver social services in poor regions since 
authorities such as the military government and other dictatorships did not control 
them. For these reasons, religious organizations played an important role in 
empowering people in poverty in the 1970s and 1980s. During the mid-1980s, these 
churches began to gather opinions from each other and they established nationwide 
associations of community organizations, such as the Christian Association for 
Community Organizing (CACO, 1984), COUP (1985), and the Anglican Sharing 
Homes (ASH, 1985) (Kim 2012).  
The activities of these community-building organizations at first were 
opposed to the state. As a matter of fact, the states forced the demolition of many 
shanty towns in the late 1980s, which can be considered a good example of this 
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conflict. More specifically, during the late 1980s, the government intended to 
demolish an area where shanty houses were located in order to develop an urban 
environment in Seoul. However, the community organizers successfully pointed to 
the poverty issues of the urbanized regions and, as a result, the government decided 
to support vulnerable people, especially those in poverty, through SSACs. At this 
point in time, a relationship between the government and the civil society as a policy 
maker and policy provider started to develop. 
A crucial step in the history of social enterprises is given by the SSAP, which 
was implemented under a partnership between the government and the SSACs. The 
Self-Sufficiency Work program, a sub-program of the SSAP, supported the creation 
of job opportunities for working poor people with a view to introduce increasing 
levels of empowerment. This program was organized by SSACs mostly originating 
from the community building organizations which aimed to eradicate poverty in 
urban areas in the 1980s. According to the Ministry of Health and Welfare (2013), 
SSACs “play an important role as a key infrastructure of SSAP”, showing that the 
government acknowledges the important role of civil society in terms of providing 
social welfare service-related policies to local communities. As a result, the number 
of SSACs is now at a total of 247 after the pilot program was run by the self-
supported sponsor organizations in 1996 (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2013). 
Given these considerations, the question, therefore, is what exactly do SSACs 
do in partnership with the government and local communities? The Ministry of 
Health and Welfare defines the key functions of SSACs in the community as follows: 
first, they provide training to participants to motivate them towards work activities; 
second, they also give information, counselling, job training and job placement; third, 
they offer financial support, support for business start-up, and management skills; 
fourth, they contribute to the start-up and operation assistance of Self-Sufficiency 
Enterprise; and fifth, other kinds of support for self-sufficiency are included, such as 
educational programs for the children of welfare recipients or for lower income 
families (Ministry of Health and Welfare 2013). It is worth noting that the SSAP has 
supported business start-ups and Self-sufficiency Enterprise, “a type of producers’ 
co-op operated by more than one welfare recipient or by the working poor” (Ministry 
of Health and Welfare 2013). At this point, this shows that the government has 
started to support local communities by building self-sufficiency enterprises with 
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community building organizations as part of social welfare service policies aimed at 
eradicating poverty and providing more job opportunities. 
Self-sufficiency enterprises and social enterprises look very similar in terms 
of the support they provide business start-ups for the working poor and 
disadvantaged people with. However, the switch ratio of self-sufficiency enterprises 
to social enterprises is not as high as expected. Kim (2009) insists that this shows 
that self-sufficiency enterprises are the forefront organizations which promote and 
support social entrepreneurial activities. This still needs to be confirmed by further 
research since community SSACs which manage self-sufficiency enterprises are 
considered to be controlled by the government, as mentioned by Kim (2009). 
SSACs have also received criticisms from the community because of their 
bureaucratization (Kim 2012). Despite the fact that the SSAP was considered to be 
“an icon of ‘participatory governance’ by both the government and community 
organizations” (Kim 2012), community organizations seem to have lost their original 
objectives and plans aimed at empowering poor people in certain regions. As a 
matter of fact, welfare policies inevitably require a certain level of “bureaucratic 
assessment” to establish which recipients deserve the benefits (Dailey 1971); since 
the state only seeks to spend money essentially on the “legitimate” poor, determining 
who is truly deserving represents a crucial part of welfare administration (Howe 
1990). The SSAP is involved in precisely this kind of selection process. Interestingly, 
Kim (2012) studied the bureaucratization of community organizations and 
determined that the informal and intimate relationship between people from local 
communities and community organizers had disappeared.  
Some scholars emphasize that Korean social enterprises have emerged as the 
result of a good relationship between the government and the civil society (Bidet 
2002; McCabe and Hahn 2006). However, there are still not enough studies which 
provide an independent view of the impact of civil society on social enterprises and 
their own activities. Although Kim (2009) mentioned that the institutionalization of 
social enterprises in Korea means that the government has partly accepted civil 
society’s social entrepreneurial activities and its arguments relating to the importance 
of social entrepreneurship in the field. Nonetheless, civil society has reacted to the 
government policy on social enterprises on the basis of their own perceptions. The 
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interactions between the government and civil society are outlined in Section 7.4 in 
greater detail along with a timeline.  
 
4.5.2.3 Definition of Social Enterprise: An Innovative Approach  
 
As the concept of social enterprise has been imported mainly from the United 
States, some social entrepreneurs criticize the fact that the concepts of social 
enterprise coming from the government and the traditional civil sector are too narrow 
and not sustainable. An innovative approach places greater emphasis on the 
characteristics of “enterprise” rather than on the “social” side of “social enterprise” – 
in other words, it is better for a social enterprise to make profits through innovative 
business activities and be financially independent from government funding. Also, 
social entrepreneurs with an innovative approach focus more on social changes by 
solving fundamental social problems rather than the issues related to work 
integration. 
 
4.5.2.4 The History of Social Enterprises: An Innovative Approach  
 
This approach was mainly introduced by an association called the “Social 
Enterprise Network (SEN) Korea” and a book entitled “Social Enterprise” written by 
Jung (2006). SEN Korea is a partnership organization of the Global Social Venture 
Competition (http://gsvc.org). It was established in 2005 after the Chairman of SEN 
Korea took on the concept of social enterprise and social venture from the Columbia 
Business School. The SEN held the first social venture competition for university 
students in 2006. In this same period of time, the government brought the SEN’s 
concept of social venture competition into the policy area. Moreover, the government 
also started to promote young social entrepreneurs and social ventures because they 
could not avoid the criticism related to the limited definition and roles of social 
enterprise as explained in the SEPA.  
As a result, the introduction of public support to the “Social Venture 
Competition” and of the “Young Social Entrepreneur Promotion Project” was taken 
as a complementary measure to strengthen the innovative aspect of the SEPA. The 
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government considers social ventures for youth as a kind of preliminary social 
enterprise eligible for the pre-certification or the certification as social enterprises. 
More specifically, the Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency (KOSEA) defines 
social ventures as a business which is more creative and innovative compared to 
social enterprises and which does not necessarily meet the criteria of certified social 
enterprises. The government supports young people in the establishment of social 
ventures by means of promotion programs such as the “Social Venture Competition” 
and the “Young Social Entrepreneurs’ Promotion Project.”  
Meanwhile, in some other cases, individuals have also launched separate 
initiatives. These initiatives consist in the founding and growth of businesses 
independently from existing public schemes or from the financial support of big 
companies. The role played by these companies within the social enterprise 
phenomenon emerges in several private social entrepreneur support programs, such 
as the Ashoka Fellowship, the Beautiful Fellowship or other social investment 
programs. These social entrepreneur support programs supported by private 
organizations usually look for social enterprise initiatives with innovative, ethical or 
ecological characters, but which can barely meet the criteria of certified social 
enterprise. For example, the Beautiful Fellowship supports “Social Innovation 
Entrepreneurs” who can solve social problems in the field of environment, human 
rights, education, culture, and community with innovative social ideas, while the 
Ashoka Fellowship provides support to social entrepreneurs who present five 
characteristics: a new idea which can change society, creativity, entrepreneurship, 
social impact of business idea, and ethics.   
As mentioned previously, the government’s social enterprise promotion 
policies which pay the employees of preliminary or certified social enterprises have 
been criticized due to its unsustainability. For this reason, in 2011 Beautiful Store 
decided to launch the Beautiful Fellowship in order to support social entrepreneurs 
who have innovative ideas which are able to change society. Beautiful Store was 
established in 2002 by People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, a civil rights 
movement organization which has contributed to improving the culture of sharing in 
Korea. As an extension of its philosophy and history, Beautiful Store supports the 
development of ethical and ecological concepts of social enterprise. 
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Unlike the Beautiful Fellowship, the Ashoka Fellowship has been imported 
from the US where the Ashoka Foundation was founded. Ashoka Fellowship started 
in South Korea after the establishment of its Korean office in 2012. Compared to the 
government and big companies, it is important to note that these private fellowships 
do not look at how much profit a social enterprise makes, or how many employees 
are employed. 
 
4.6 The Current Competition between Actors over the 
Meaning of Social Enterprise 
 
Actors in the field of social entrepreneurship in South Korea are also 
involved in another debate on the enactment of the Social Economy Act. The need to 
establish the Social Economy Act has emerged as a reaction to the limited definition 
and scope of certified Social Enterprises according to the SEPA. This debate 
represents one of the results of the conflicts over the meaning of social enterprise.   
The social economy discourse emerged on the basis of complicated struggles 
between the actors who were involved in the institution-building project of social 
enterprises. After the enactment of the SEPA, actors who were working in the field 
of social entrepreneurship, such as government officers, policy makers, social 
entrepreneurs and civil activists, realized that the current institutionalized concept of 
Social Enterprise does not cover the various existing discourses on the topic. This 
acknowledgment came also from those actors who gained the Social Enterprise 
certification given that the SEPA actually limited their activities.  
The concept of social economy was introduced especially in a bottom-up 
fashion by those actors who used to be excluded or ignored by the institution-
building project of social enterprises. Within this context, the Solidarity of 
Cooperative – formerly known as Solidarity of Social Enterprise – changed its 
organizational name to the Solidarity of Social Economy in order to emphasize the 
importance of promoting social economy. Based on the increasing needs for an 
institutionalization of a social economy, the government already started to carry out 
research on what social economy is and how it can be promoted. As a result, Moon, 
Jae-in, a member of the parliament of the Democratic Party, submitted a legislative 
bill on the social economy. However, the discussion on the issue is still ongoing 
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given that this act and the meaning of social economy is still not clear as in the case 
of the concept of social enterprise.  
The social economy discourse can cover different discourses emerging from 
the non-profit approach, but not from the innovative approach. However, it is 
important to note that social enterprises (social ventures) in the business sector are 
not keen to be included in the institutional field of Social Enterprise because of the 
negative images of social enterprise. For social entrepreneurs taking the innovative 
approach, Social Enterprises work only for poor people, and have no expertise in 
business management and innovation. 
However, in this research, I will focus only on the struggles over meaning of 
social enterprise related to the SEPA between 2006 and 2012. Most importantly, the 
meaning of social economy has not been institutionalized yet but it is under 
discussion. Although actors who are involved in the institution-building project of 
Social Enterprise are involved in the discussion of the establishment of a Social 
Economy Act, the direction of social economy policies has not been clarified yet. 
The main concern is whether the Social Economy Act would be an extended policy 
of the SEPA or a separated policy promoting a social economy in general. For this 
reason, it is too early to consider the current debate on social economy polices as a 
future policy of the SEPA.   
Second, because the debate on the meaning of a social economy is still 
ongoing and has not been institutionalized yet at all, the scope of the time and the 
topic of research would be too broad if also the social economy debates were to be 
included. The term “social economy” has started to be increasingly used since 2010, 
at least five years later when the SEPA had been established by groups of people 
who basically acknowledged the fact that the SEPA limits the scope and activities of 
social enterprises.    
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Table 4-3 A Timeline of Korean Social Enterprise Development 
 
  Government Non-profit approach Innovative approach 
1970-
1980’s 
- 
Urban poor movement started mainly by 
religious organizations (CACO, COUP, ASH) 
in order to tackle poverty problems in urban 
area undergoing rapid industrialization. 
  
1990’s 
Worker’s production cooperative movement 
promoted by researchers within close 
relationship with community building 
organizations. 
1994 
KDI researched on worker’s production 
cooperatives and community movement 
as a self-help movement for poverty 
alleviation.  
- 
1996 
The Ministry of Health and Welfare 
have supported self-supported sponsor 
organizations as a pilot program. 
Community building organizations became 
self-supported sponsor organizations that 
providing social welfare service-related policy 
to local communities. 
1997 
Financial crisis (Unemployment rate increased & social welfare services needed) 
- 
National Movement Committee for 
Overcoming Unemployment was established 
by a group of NGOs.  
Employment-related organizations joined the 
worker’s production cooperative movement. 
Some researchers and social activists 
suggested the Ministry of Welfare to support 
workers’ production cooperative. 
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1998 
Ministry of Government Administration 
and Home Affairs (MoGH) started the 
‘Public Work Program’ under the 
Master Plan for Tackling 
unemployment. 
Public Work Program has been criticized in 
terms of its efficiency and sustainability.  
1999 
Self-Sufficient Program of the Ministry 
of Welfare introduced under the 
NBLSA. 
Many employment-related organizations and 
community building organizations became 
SSACs. The SSAP is the first government 
policy aiming to achieve its social welfare 
goals through promoting and supporting the 
activities of civil society.  
2000 - 
After the International Forum on Social 
Enterprise, the first international event on 
social enterprise, researchers and social 
activists discussed the word social enterprise 
and social economy, and they soon started to 
study the definition, concept and cases 
focusing on overseas cases.  
2003 
President Roh Moo-hyun’s Participatory Government started. 
The government was searching for 
alternative policies to solve the 
unemployment and welfare problems at 
the same time. 
National Movement Committee for 
Overcoming Unemployment changed its name 
to Working Together Foundation and set new 
objectives to promote social enterprise as a 
solution to unemployment and welfare issues.  
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Social Job Creation Program launched 
by the Ministry of Labor. 
Social Job Creation Program was run by 
either the government or NGOs on contract 
(Lee, 2013). NGOs on contract to the 
government had to create social work ideas 
itself in order to provide work opportunities to 
the vulnerable. 
2005 
March. Established ‘social work’ task 
force team.   
SEN established and innovative 
approach of social enterprise 
introduced. 
August. The Grand National Party, 
prepared for the legislation of the 
SEPA. 
August. Established the Council of Social 
work and Social Enterprise Civil Society 
Organizations.  
- December. The Grand National Party, 
proposed a legislative bill of 
‘Establishment and Promotion of Social 
Enterprise’.    
- 
2006 
March. The Our Open Party, proposed a 
legislative bill of ‘Support Social 
Enterprise’. 
March. Submitted a report about the problems 
of the SEPA to the National Assembly. 
Muhammad Yunus and Grameen 
Bank were awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize. 
April. The National Assembly, held a 
public hearing about legislative bills of 
‘Establishment and Promotion of Social 
Enterprise’ and ‘Support Social 
Enterprise’.  
April. Indicated the Civil Society’s position to 
a public hearing of the National Assembly. 
SEN organized the first Social 
Venture Competition for university 
students. 
May. The Ministry Employment and 
Labor, implemented follow-up projects 
to prepare the Act. 
May. Held a meeting between heads of 
relevant organizations.  
Individual social entrepreneurs 
criticized that definition and types 
of social enterprise provided by the 
government is very limited and not 
financially sustainable.  
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- 
June. Launched the Civil Society solidarity 
for Social Enterprise Development.  
  
August. Urged to establish an act that fits the 
current Korean society situation and can 
develop social enterprise.  
December. Established the SEPA.  
- 2007 April. Promulgated an enforcement ordinance on the SEPA.  
2008 - Korea Central Council of Social Enterprise established. 
2009 
The Ministry of Employment and Labor 
started to organize Social Venture 
Competition. 
- 
2010 
Community development model has 
been included as a social enterprise 
model in the SEPA. 
2011 
The Ministry of Employment and Labor 
launched Young Social Entrepreneurs 
Promotion Project. 
Beautiful Fellowship launched by 
the Beautiful Store. 
Definition of social venture firstly 
appeared on the KOSEA website.   
2012 
  
Framework on Cooperative established.  Ashoka Korea established and Ashoka Fellowship launched. 
SEPA has been revised as considering 
cooperatives as an organizational form 
of social enterprise.   
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2013 
Community development model has 
been specified into community based 
work integration model, community 
based social welfare model, and social 
enterprise for social enterprise model. 
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4.7 Conclusion  
 
 The brief history of Korean social enterprises shows the dynamics of the 
interactions between multiple actors concerning the development of the concept of 
social enterprise. The process of building the institutional meaning and the settings 
of an organizational form does not always lead peacefully to an agreed-upon 
consensus. The institutionalized definitions and settings of an organizational form 
sometimes neglect other concepts and ideas which are striving to be integrated into 
institutional fields.  
 Furthermore, the case of Korean social enterprises shows that history is often 
written mainly from the perspective of powerful actors. Although previous 
organizational forms of social enterprise have existed with different names 
throughout Korean history, the official history of the institution-building project of 
social enterprises has simplified its long history and diversities by taking on 
exclusively a top-down government perspective. The simplified history of social 
enterprise mainly written with the top-down perspective has therefore confused other 
actors who joined the field of social entrepreneurship recently.  
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5 Methodology and Research Design  
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The aim of this methodology Chapter is to provide the link between the 
theoretical perspective adopted and the empirical field, in other words the level of the 
actual data emerging from my research. This Chapter, therefore, presents 
philosophical approach, research design process and methods, pilot study methods, 
fieldwork and data sources, and limitations of my research.  
 
5.1.1 Philosophical Approach  
 
I adopt the social constructionist view and the interpretivist paradigm to 
support my chosen analytical approach, namely, macro discourse analysis, in order to 
understand the phenomenon of the emergence of social enterprises in South Korea. 
Among the various social constructionist views, this research builds on macro social 
constructionism which “acknowledges the constructive power of language, but sees 
this as derived from, or at least related to, material or social structures, social 
relations and institutionalized practices” (Burr 2003: 22). 
The sociology of knowledge approach to discourse developed by Keller 
(2006) based on social constructionism suggests that discourse analysis is the 
preferred method when focusing on “the social processes of knowledge production 
and circulation to symbolic structure and back to actors’ orientation and practices in 
historical worlds of knowledge and meaning.” According to this approach, the 
historical and collective dimensions of knowledge and knowledge-making practices 
are considered of fundamental importance because “social actors are embedded in 
the historical, a priori of established symbolic orders and institutionalized 
power/knowledge-regimes and their performance are beyond their control” (Keller 
2006). 
In my thesis, the interpretive paradigm will be employed because it enables 
me to gain a deeper understanding of how different values and the views of different 
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social groups and in a variety of social settings (Locke 2001) influence the 
emergence of different organizational forms of Social Enterprise in South Korea. As 
a matter of fact, according to interpretivists, meaning is not standardized from place 
to place or person to person. For this reason, this position is associated with a critical 
view depending on the discursive field. More specifically, a critical perspective in 
organizational discourse studies emphasizes “how discourse is used to produce, 
maintain or resist power, control and inequality through ideology and hegemony” 
(Mumby and Clair 1997). Therefore, dominant meanings in place are structured by 
multiple actors in a variety of positions, and not by a single actor (Hardy and Phillips 
2004). These actors sometimes are involved in struggles against each other and 
actors may consequently produce a text and take actions in order to resist the 
dominant discourses which they are surrounded by (Hardy and Phillips 2004).   
 
5.2 Research Site  
 
5.2.1 Why Social Enterprises in South Korea?  
  
Social enterprise is an interesting research topic for a variety of reasons. First 
of all, social enterprises are hybrid organizations that combine social and economic 
objectives. Because of the duality of organizational objectives, social enterprises are 
characterized by a broad spectrum of activities. Some social enterprises place greater 
emphasis on economic objectives rather than their social objectives, while others 
may instead emphasize more their social objectives.   
Because of this duality within social enterprises, I often found from the start 
the idea of “social enterprise” to be confusing. Every time I attended conferences on 
social entrepreneurship, there was always a discussion on the definition of social 
enterprise. People usually ask one another “are we really sharing the same thoughts 
on the concept and definition of social enterprise? Are we really talking about the 
same thing (social enterprise)?” Nonetheless, most studies in the literature on the 
topic focus on the economic and social outcomes of social enterprises rather than on 
the conflicting meaning of the concept, even though many researchers in the field of 
social entrepreneurship come from different disciplines.  
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Back in 2006, when the government announced the definition of social 
enterprise in the Social Enterprise Promotion Act, I was already very confused about 
the meaning of social enterprise. This was due to the fact that the official definition 
of social enterprise was very different from what I had understood at that time. 
Although social enterprise had not been institutionalized as a new organizational 
form yet, it was understood to be an innovative business that can empower a certain 
group of people before the enactment of the SEPA. More specifically, following the 
global success of fairtrade and microcredit organizations, there was a tacit 
understanding concerning social enterprises. At that time, social enterprises were 
mostly seen as innovative businesses which were achieving social objectives 
neglected by businesses operating in a conventional way.  
This is an interesting point for the following reason. In the SEPA, the official 
definition of Social Enterprise focuses limitedly on the employment of vulnerable 
people, subsidizing certified social enterprises for a certain period time – 3 to 5 years. 
Therefore, this limited official definition of Social Enterprise led to a certain 
confusion especially with the people who used to refer to the deinstitutionalized term 
of social enterprise before the enactment of the SEPA.  
Nonetheless, the emergence of an official definition of Social Enterprise is 
one of the main reasons why South Korea represents a useful research site, because 
of the dynamic and co-existing diverse discourses of social enterprises. Until recently, 
in 2016, South Korea was the only country that had established a law to promote 
Social Enterprises and had provided specific criteria for the certification of Social 
Enterprises. During this institutionalization process, other social enterprises, which 
do not fit the criteria established by the government, have been officially precluded 
from calling themselves social enterprises. Consequently, alternative terms, such as 
social ventures, social innovative enterprises, or global social enterprises, have 
emerged in order to identify organizations pursuing both economic and social 
objectives at the same time, but which do not meet the certification criteria. As a 
matter of fact, the certification system for social enterprises provides a clear 
definition and specific criteria for Social Enterprises, which facilitates the 
comparison of the official discourse of social enterprises to other oppositional and 
alternative discourses in this national context.  
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5.2.2 Current State of Social Enterprise in South Korea  
 
The following section will provide an overview of the current state of social 
enterprises in South Korea, by looking at the number of certified and uncertified 
social enterprises, and other forms of social enterprises. The number of certified 
social enterprises has been officially registered by the Ministry of Employment and 
Labor (MoEL) during the last ten years by location, sector, previous organizational 
forms, legal organizational forms and organizational model. As soon as the Ministry 
of Strategy and Finance established the Framework Act on Cooperatives in 2012, the 
official statistics on cooperatives also became available.  
However, the official statistics on uncertified social enterprises (social 
ventures and social innovative enterprises) are still unavailable, because these firms 
are not registered as Social Enterprises under the act of the government. For this 
reason, I have collected the numbers for uncertified social enterprises from the 
ground mainly through newspapers and company websites. Uncertified social 
enterprises labeling themselves as social ventures, social enterprises, or social 
innovative enterprises have all been included in these statistics regardless of their 
founding year, business sector, and financial resources. The statistics show that 
uncertified social enterprises promoting oppositional or alternative discourses of 
social enterprises actually exist in the field, although they are not included in the 
institutionalized setting of social enterprises. The importance of the statistics of 
uncertified social enterprises is related to the fact that they contribute to providing an 
answer to the question “how do you know they exist when they are not 
institutionalized?”   
Moreover, these statistics show us the dynamics of the field of Korean social 
enterprises and that different actors promoting different forms of social enterprise are 
competing against each other, although the field of social entrepreneurship appears to 
be dominated only by the official discourse of the government. 
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5.2.2.1 Social Enterprises Certified by the Ministry of Employment 
and Labor 
 
Table 5-1 Number of Social Enterprises by Location  
(Updated date: 2013. 12) 
No. Location Number of SEs 
1 Seoul 212 
2 Incheon 55 
3 Daejeon 28 
4 Daegu 44 
5 Gwangju 46 
6 Ulsan 33 
7 Busan 61 
8 Sejong 3 
9 Gyeongi 171 
10 Kangwon 46 
11 Chungnam 38 
12 Chungbuk 46 
13 Jeonnam 41 
14 Jeonbuk 64 
15 Gyengnam 42 
16 Gyengbuk 58 
17 Jeju 24 
 Total 1012 
(Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency 2013b) 
 
As shown in Table 5-1, certified Social Enterprises are highly concentrated in 
the areas of Seoul and Gyeongi (37.8%). Gyeonggi is a province surrounding Seoul 
and it is the most populated area in South Korea. Because most culture and health 
facilities, government agencies, and business services are heavily concentrated in 
Seoul, the culture of social entrepreneurship has developed mostly within these 
metropolitan areas.  
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Table 5-2 Number of Social Enterprises by Social Service Sector  
(Updated date: 2013. 12)  
No. Social Service Sector Number of SEs 
1 Nursing / housekeeping service 71 
2 Education 67 
3 Culture/Art 161 
4 Health care service 11 
5 Child care service 21 
6 Social welfare service 102 
7 Environment 159 
8 Forest preservation 1 
9 Others 419 
 Total 1012 
(Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency 2013b) 
  
Social Enterprises in Korea are mainly concentrated in the culture, 
environment and social welfare services sectors. However, the specific social service 
sector of almost half of the social enterprises is unclear. The above table shows that 
419 social enterprises are not categorized under any of the following social service 
sectors: 1) Nursing/housekeeping services, 2) Education services, 3) Culture/art 
services, 4) Health care services, 5) Child care services, 6) Social welfare services, 7) 
Environment services, or 8) Forest preservation services. This shows that certified 
Social Enterprises are concentrated on certain sectors such as culture and art, 
environment, and social welfare services.   
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Table 5-3 Number of Social Enterprises by Previous Organizational Form 
(Updated date: 2012. 11)  
No. Previous Organizational Form Number of SEs 
1 Organizations supported by social work programs 471 
2 Organizations supported by self-sufficient programs 87 
3 Vocational rehabilitation center for the disabled 78 
4 Cooperatives 13 
5 Others 67 
 Total 716 
(Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency 2013b) 
 
A social enterprise that wants to obtain a government certification needs to 
have at least 6 months of business experience (Korea Social Enterprise Promotion 
Agency 2013b). In that regard, every social enterprise, therefore, presents a previous 
organizational form, such as that of a vocational rehabilitation center for the disabled 
or a cooperative. Most of the certified social enterprises previously were 
organizations supported by social work programs, self-sufficient programs, or 
vocational rehabilitation centers for the disabled of the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare. This implies that most certified social enterprises had been previously 
supported and promoted by the government, even when they were not certified social 
enterprises.   
 
Table 5-4 Number of Social Enterprises by Legal Organizational Form 
(Updated date: 2012. 11)  
No. Legal Organizational Form Number of SEs 
1 Company/limited partnerships 335 
2 Corporations/associations 158 
3 Non-profit, non-governmental organizations 112 
4 Social welfare corporations 82 
5 Living cooperatives 13 
6 Agricultural cooperatives 16 
 Total 716 
(Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency 2012) 
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Article 8 of the SEPA defines the requirements and procedures for the 
certification of Social Enterprises. The first requirement that a social enterprise 
should meet to obtain certification is related to the form of the organization. The act 
requires social enterprises to have a certain legal organizational form which is “a 
corporation or association as defined in the Civil Act, a company or limited 
partnership as defined in the Commercial Act, a corporation established under any 
Special Act, or a non-profit, non-governmental organization” (Social Enterprise 
Promotion Act 2006). 
An interesting fact about these statistics is that some cooperatives have 
actually obtained the social enterprise certification from the government. Even 
though the Korean Social Enterprise Promotion Agency (KOSEA) stated that the 
cooperative movement in the 1960s is at the origin of the current Korean social 
enterprise, the SEPA does not consider all cooperatives to be social enterprises. This 
implies that the SEPA is a legal framework which oversees certain social 
entrepreneurship activities across the country, but it does not include all the various 
possible forms of social enterprise.  
 
Table 5-5 Number of Social Enterprises by Organizational Model 
(Updated date: 2012. 11)  
No. Organizational Model Number of SEs 
1 Job-creation model 433 
2 Social service provision model 49 
3 Mixed model 122 
4 Local community contribution model 8 
5 Others 104 
 Total 716 
(Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency 2012) 
 
In 2012 more than half of the Social Enterprises had taken the job-creation 
model as their organizational model. This shows that most certified social enterprises 
aim to create job opportunities for the vulnerable, rather than achieving other social 
values. The other types of social enterprise amount to 104 out of 716, which does not 
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represent a small number of social enterprises at all. Large numbers of the other 
types of social enterprise show that many social entrepreneurs still take into 
consideration other social objectives besides the aims of providing job opportunities 
or social services.  
 
5.2.2.2 Social Venture / Social Innovative Enterprise (Updated date: 
2014. 01)  
 
From the previous discussion, it is clear that the government acknowledges 
the existence of social ventures and social innovative enterprise in South Korea. The 
KOSEA describes social ventures as businesses which have the merits of being able 
to operate with a more challenging spirit and greater levels of creativity through 
various types and shapes which are free from the established standards (Korea Social 
Enterprise Promotion Agency 2013c). Also, some social ventures have actually 
emerged thanks to the government’s support, such as the “Social Venture 
Competition” and “Young Social Entrepreneurs Project.” 
Nonetheless, there are no official statistics on the number of social ventures 
or social innovate enterprises in South Korea, because these are alternative terms 
which are used interchangeably to identify uncertified social enterprises. For this 
reason, I collected a more complete set of data on Korean social ventures and social 
innovative enterprises from online news, reports and social ventures/social 
innovative enterprises’ websites to analyze their characteristics and differences in 
comparison to government certified social enterprises. 
Google and the most popular Korean search engine Naver 
(http://www.naver.com) have been used as online document searching tools. First, I 
used for both search engines the keywords “social venture” and “social innovative 
enterprise.” Then I made a list of these with references to their webpages or the 
newspaper which had introduced their activities as social ventures or social 
innovative enterprises. Afterwards I accessed each of their webpages to collect the 
relevant data about their business sectors, founding year, and if they had received 
support from the government or private foundations.  
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Table 5-6 Number of Social Ventures and Social Innovative Enterprises 
 
Social Ventures Social Innovative Enterprise Total 
112 15 127 
 
The online data collection led to the identification of a total of 127 social 
ventures and social innovative enterprises. Social venture seems to be a more 
familiar and usual term than social innovative enterprise. This is because of the 
government’s social venture promotion policies, such as the Social Venture 
Competition and the Young Social Entrepreneurs Project, which have been 
mentioned previously. 
However, 11 out of 112 social ventures identify themselves as both social 
ventures and social innovative enterprises. This shows that these two terms have 
been used by people vaguely and randomly without a clear definition.  
 
Table 5-7 Number of Social Ventures/Social Innovative Enterprises by 
Founding Year 
 
No. Founding Year Number of Social Ventures 
1 2000 1 
2 2002 1 
3 2005 1 
4 2006 2 
5 2007 2 
6 2008 3 
7 2009 10 
8 2010 8 
9 2011 20 
10 2012 43 
11 2013 29 
12 2014 1 
13 None 6 
 Total 127 
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The first social venture was established in 2000, 6 years before the SEPA 
emerged. It is not clear, however, whether this company called itself a social venture 
from its founding or after the SEPA was introduced. A total of 3 social ventures were 
established before the SEPA and none of them are certified as social enterprises.  
 
Table 5-8 Social Ventures Established before the SEPA 
 
No. Sector Name Founding Year 
Preliminary 
Certification 
Government 
Support 
1 IT/Sharing Blue Gale 2000 
2012 
Preliminary SE 
- 
2 Investment 
Crevisse 
Partners 
2002 - - 
3 Culture Nanum Now 2005 - 
Seoul Sharing 
Economy 
Enterprise 
 
Nevertheless, it is important to recall that in 2012 Blue Gale became a 
preliminary social enterprise and Nanum has now been promoted as one of the 
sharing economy enterprises in Seoul, as shown Table 5-8.    
 
Figure 5-1 Number of Social Ventures/Social Innovative Enterprises by 
Founding Year 
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The number of social ventures has greatly increased between 2011 and 2012. 
As a matter of fact, since 2011 the Young Social Entrepreneurs’ Promotion Project 
hosted by the KOSEA started to promote social entrepreneurial activities among 
young people by providing financial and business management support. This project 
may have contributed to the increase in the number of social ventures. More 
specifically, 10 out of 63 social ventures have actually been established through this 
project in either 2011 or 2012.   
 
Table 5-9 Number of Certified Social Enterprises and Preliminary Social 
Enterprises  
 
No. Category Number of Organizations 
1 Certified SE 9 
2 Preliminary SE 12 
 Total 21 
 
Some social ventures/social innovative enterprises became certified social 
enterprises or preliminary social enterprises after a few months or years of social 
venture experience. Currently, 21 out of 127 social ventures are officially 
government certified (preliminary) social enterprises.  
 
Table 5-10 Number of Social Ventures who Received Government Support 
(among uncertified social ventures) 
No. Government Support Number of Social Ventures 
1 Received (more than once) 17 
2 Not Received 89 
 Total 106 
 
There are also social ventures which have not yet received any government 
support after their establishment. As a matter of fact, 89 out of 106 uncertified social 
ventures have not received any government funding or other forms of support, as 
opposed to 17 which have.  
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Table 5-11 Number of Social Ventures who Received Non-governmental 
Support  
(among uncertified social ventures) 
No. Non-governmental support Number of Social Ventures 
1 Received 6 
2 Not Received 100 
 Total 106 
 
A total of 6 out of 106 uncertified social ventures have received non-
government support or an overseas certification. Among these, it is important to 
recall the case of Delight which has obtained a B Corp Certification, given by the 
non-profit B Lab to those corporations who “meet the standards of social and 
environmental performance, accountability, and transparency” (B Corporation 2014). 
Other 5 social ventures have been supported by the Beautiful Store, which is 
a certified social enterprise. The Beautiful Store has been supporting social ventures 
since 2011 and they call the CEOs of their selected social ventures “beautiful 
fellows.” A total of 9 social entrepreneurs have been promoted as “beautiful fellows”, 
and 3 of their social ventures are actually Seoul preliminary social enterprises 
(Beautiful Store 2014). 
This Beautiful Fellowship, which is the only non-governmental social venture 
promotion program, started when Won-soon Park, the current mayor of Seoul, was 
the CEO of the Beautiful Foundation. Since he has implemented many social 
entrepreneurship promotion policies as the mayor of Seoul, he represents a key 
person who has encouraged social entrepreneurship in Korea, mainly in Seoul as a 
civil activist and an administrator.    
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Table 5-12 Social Ventures which Have Imported their Business Model from 
Overseas  
 
No
. Social Venture Imported Country 
1 Hub Seoul UK 
2 Quest Runner Australia 
3 Seoul Social Innovation Camp UK 
 
Three social ventures have imported their business model from other 
countries, mainly the UK. The head offices of Hub Seoul and Seoul Social 
Innovation Camp are actually located in the UK, while Quest Runner’s head office is 
in Australia.  
 
Table 5-13 Number of Social Ventures by Location  
 
No. Location Number of Social Ventures 
1 Seoul 95 
2 Busan 4 
3 Chungnam 1 
4 Daegu 2 
5 Daejeon 4 
6 Gwangju 1 
7 Gyeonji 10 
8 Jeju 2 
9 Jeonbuk 1 
10 Jeonnam 1 
11 Gyengbuk 1 
12 N/A 5 
 Total 127 
 
Similar to certified social enterprises, social ventures and social innovative 
enterprises are mainly located in metropolitan area of Seoul. This is because of the 
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fact that opportunities to access information are limited in other provinces because 
the main social entrepreneurs’ networks and universities are highly concentrated in 
Seoul. Also, the concepts of social ventures and social innovative enterprises are 
quite new, compared to that of social enterprises, so people in other provinces might 
not be very familiar with these terms. 
 
Table 5-14 Number of Social Ventures by Business Sector  
 
No. Sector Number of Social Ventures 
1 Consulting 3 
2 Crowd funding 7 
3 Culture/Art 27 
4 Education 23 
5 Design 6 
6 Sharing economy 18 
7 Employment 2 
8 Environment 21 
9 Investment 4 
10 IT/Technology 13 
11 Manufacturing 1 
12 N/A 2 
 Total 127 
 
Social ventures are mostly involved in the cultural, educational, or 
environmental sectors. Interestingly, there are comparatively many social ventures in 
the crowd funding, IT, or sharing economy business sector, whilst only a few are 
certified social enterprises. This clearly implies that social ventures are more 
innovative and creative, while placing a greater emphasis on entrepreneurship rather 
than on delivering social welfare services.   
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5.2.2.3 Government Registered Cooperatives (Updated Date: 2013. 12) 
 
In 2012 the Ministry of Strategy and Finance established the Framework Act 
on Cooperatives, which promotes and supports the establishment and operation of 
cooperatives. The law defines a general cooperative as “a business organization that 
intends to enhance its partners’ rights and interests, thereby contributing to local 
communities by being engaged in the cooperative purchasing, production, sales, and 
provision of goods or services” (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2012). A social 
cooperative is “a cooperative that carries out business activities related to the 
enhancement of rights, interests, and welfare of local residents or provides social 
services or jobs to disadvantaged people, among cooperatives, but that is not run for 
profit” (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2012). Interestingly, the definition of social 
cooperative is very similar to that of social enterprise, since both of them are 
business organizations aiming to achieve social objectives, such as providing social 
services or work opportunities to disadvantaged people. Moreover, also the 
characteristics of certified social enterprises and registered social cooperatives are 
very similar to one another, as shown in Table 5-15.  
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Table 5-15 Main Characteristics of Certified Social Enterprises and Registered 
Social Cooperatives 
 
 Certified Social Enterprise Registered Social Cooperative 
Legal 
Organization
al Form 
Company/limited partnership, 
corporation/association, non-
profit organization, cooperative 
Non-profit Association 
Main 
Business 
Activities 
Business activities should aim to 
enhance the quality of life of 
community residents by 
providing vulnerable social 
groups with social services or 
job opportunities, or by 
contributing to the communities.  
More than 40% of the entire 
business activities of a 
cooperative should contribute to 
the local community, to provide 
disadvantaged people with 
social services or jobs in the 
areas of welfare, medical 
services, or the environment, or 
to enhance public interest. 
Legal 
Reserves 
Only cooperatives certified as 
social enterprises set legal 
reserves. 
A surplus after the settlement of 
accounts for a fiscal year. 
Distribution 
of Surplus 
Shall use at least 2/3 of profits 
for social objectives. 
Prohibited 
(Ministry of Employment and Labor 2006; Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
2014) 
 
However, unlike the Social Enterprise Promotion Act, the Framework Act of 
Cooperatives includes a registration system, and not a certification system. Therefore, 
obtaining the registration as a cooperative is not a competitive process, unlike the 
case of a certified social enterprise.  
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Table 5-16 Number of Registered Cooperatives by Organizational Type 
(Updated date: 2013. 12) 
No. Organizational Type Number of Cooperatives 
1 General Cooperatives 3,210 
2 Federation of General Cooperatives 14 
3 Social Cooperatives 111 
4 Federation of Social Cooperatives 1 
 Total 3,336 
(Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2014) 
 
After the establishment of the Framework Act on Cooperatives, the number 
of registered cooperatives has increased enormously. Most of them are general 
cooperatives and social cooperatives that have similar characteristics to social 
enterprises and amount to only 111 out of 3,336. Some of the registered social 
cooperatives are also certified social enterprises.   
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Table 5-17 Number of Registered Cooperatives by Competent Local 
Government  
(Updated date: 2013. 12) 
No. Competent Local Government Number of Approved Cooperatives 
1 Seoul 967 
2 Busan 193 
3 Daegu 129 
4 Incheon 95 
5 Gwangju 270 
6 Daejeon 118 
7 Ulsan 58 
8 Gyeng-gi 459 
9 Kangwon 111 
10 Chungbuk 96 
11 Chungnam 108 
12 Jeonbuk 188 
13 Jeonnam 131 
14 Gyeongbuk 116 
15 Gyeongnam 112 
16 Jeju 46 
17 Sejong 13 
 Total 3,210 
(Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2014) 
 
According to the law, each cooperative has to report its founding to the 
competent local government which has jurisdiction over its main business location 
(Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2012). Similar to certified social enterprises, 
cooperatives are highly concentrated in the metropolitan area of Seoul and the 
province area of Gyeong-gi.   
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Table 5-18 Number of Registered Social Cooperatives by Related Central 
Administrative Agencies  
(Updated date: 2013. 12) 
No. Related Central Administrative Agency Number of Registered Social Cooperatives 
1 Ministry of Strategy and Finance 21 
2 Ministry of Education 16 
3 Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning - 
4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1 
5 Ministry of Security and Public Administration 2 
6 Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism 6 
7 
Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries 
7 
8 Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy 4 
9 Ministry for Health and Welfare 13 
10 Ministry of Environment 3 
11 Ministry of Employment and Labor 27 
12 Ministry of Gender Equality and Family Affairs 5 
13 Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport 1 
14 Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries - 
15 Small and Medium Business Administration 3 
16 Korea Forest Service 2 
Total 111 
(Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2014) 
 
According to the law, the establishment of social cooperatives should be 
authorized by the related central administrative agency. Most social cooperatives are 
related to the Ministry of Employment and Labor, which also has the right to certify 
social enterprises, and the Ministry of Strategy of Finance, which is the head 
administrative agency which authorizes cooperatives. This shows that social 
cooperatives mainly aim to promote job opportunities to the vulnerable, as in the 
case of certified social enterprises.  
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5.3 Data Collection   
 
5.3.1 Getting Access  
 
Although I worked in the field of social entrepreneurship in South Korea 
mostly between 2010 and 2012, I was aware that it would be difficult to recruit 
interviewees. I knew that individuals and social entrepreneurs were already tired of 
participating in surveys and interviews. Even during my fieldwork, some 
interviewees complained about too many surveys and interviews going on in the field:  
 
“We are so sick of having to do surveys and interviews. I understand that it is 
necessary to know the field correctly and closely, but too many surveys and 
interviews distract social entrepreneurs from their work. As a matter of fact, most 
social enterprises are struggling with overstretched workload and lack of workforce. 
Actually, not asking social entrepreneurs to participate in surveys and interviews is 
helping them to focus on their work more and achieve greater outcomes. (BC1, CEO, 
A SE, 19 June 2014, 17:49PM-19:20PM)”  
 
Clearly, outlining the current status of social enterprises and the outcomes of 
governments’ investments promoting Social Enterprise all represent hot research 
issues not only for scholars but also for government bodies. More specifically, while 
in the field, I needed to explain what my research was about and how my research 
differs from other works in order to convince potential interviewees to participate. 
When I sent initial emails to potential interviewees, I emphasized that my research 
approaches the development of social enterprise in South Korea differently, as I 
wanted to explore bottom-up approaches rather than top-down approaches, which 
has already been done by many researchers and by the government. In particular, 
many social entrepreneurs who have been working in the field even before the 
enactment of the SEPA expressed strong interests, and they agreed to take part in my 
research.   
In order to organize interviews, I first selected the names of people who in 
2006 participated in the legislative process of the SEPA. Among them, I started to 
contact the people who I had already met when I worked in the field. Because I had 
not kept in touch with most of them over one or two years, I had to explain when, 
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where and how we met in the past, how I started my Ph.D. and what was the focus of 
my research. Almost all of them immediately agreed to have an interview with me, 
and at the end of the interview they also gave me the names and contacts of other 
potential interviewees I wanted to meet. When I contacted a person introduced by 
previous interviewees, I mentioned the name of the person who gave the contact 
details to me. In most cases, I contacted them by phone or email and asked them to 
participate in my research. All of them, again, agreed to participate in my research 
immediately. As a result, I was able to interview almost everyone I had planned to by 
the end of the fieldwork.  
Nonetheless, it was difficult to find social entrepreneurs who are running an 
independent social venture or a social innovative enterprise. As discussed in Section 
5.5.2.2, the vast majority of social ventures and social innovation enterprises are not 
large. Also, because they are not institutionalized, it was also hard to identify which 
organizations to interview. For this reason, I contacted the Deputy Director of an 
organization which in 2006 held the “Social Venture Competition” for the first time 
in South Korea. I also got in touch with the CEO of a social venture which was to 
first called themselves so in 2002. At the end of both interviews, I asked them to 
introduce me to any social ventures which are contributing to the development of the 
field.   
Despite continuous efforts to meet and interview more people in the non-
institutionalized field of social enterprise, it was hard to increase the number of 
interviewees who are promoting bottom-up discourses. Justifying who are the 
bottom-up actors promoting alternative discourses was even more difficult especially 
because these actors do not generally define themselves as being involved in social 
entrepreneurship by clearly using the term social enterprise, social venture, or social 
innovation enterprise. Nevertheless, there are some bottom-up organizations and 
activities who have potential to be considered as a social enterprise or social 
entrepreneurship. Most of them have been self-defined as a social movement or 
alternative organizations, but I believe that my role as a researcher is not to judge and 
inform these independent organizations if they actually qualify as a social enterprise 
or not. For this reason, in this research, organizations or actors who do not officially 
and explicitly call themselves as social enterprise were not included at this stage of 
data analysis.   
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Although, many interviewees replied to my invitation immediately, it was 
quite a struggle to arrange interviews with politicians and government officers. For 
example, I have contacted a member of the National Assembly who proposed a 
legislative bill and a revised bill of the SEPA in 2006 and 2010 through his personal 
aide. The aide agreed to ask the member of the National Assembly to have at least an 
email interview, but I did not hear back from this person even after sending the 
interview questionnaire and calling him more than five times. Likewise, it was 
almost impossible to obtain the contact details of government officers who were 
mostly responsible for developing and organizing the policy plan of the SEPA: first, 
the contacts of senior officials are kept confidential; and second, tracking the current 
positions of key government officers who participated in the initial legislative 
process of the SEPA was hard because officers are rotated to different teams almost 
every year in order to increase the transparency of the government.  
Apart from politicians and government officers, in many cases interviewees 
accepted a participation invitation as soon as I called or emailed them and agreed to 
have an interview with me in person. Moreover, some interviewees invited me to 
informal meetings, such as dinner out or having a coffee. Due to confidential reasons, 
I did not include the informal conversations we had for data analysis. However, such 
opportunities helped me greatly to increase my understanding of the field.   
I have recorded all the conversations I had with interviewees. However, a few 
interviewees asked me not to record our conversation. Therefore, instead of 
recording the conversation, I took a note of the interviewees’ answers.   
I knew that some researchers do not like to be identified as a researcher based 
in an overseas university because they are concerned that their interviewees may see 
them as disconnected. However, my identity as a doctoral researcher at Warwick 
Business School, UK, actually helped me a lot to gain access during my fieldwork. 
The reason for this is that in South Korea people who are studying or have studied 
overseas, especially at a high ranked international university, usually have a better 
reputation for research excellence.  
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5.3.1.2 Atmosphere of the Field  
 
During my fieldwork in South Korea between March and August in 2013, 
there was increasing tension between government-related actors and bottom-up 
actors, such as civil activists and the solidarity groups, in relation to the 
establishment of the Social Economy Act. Interestingly, I was able to observe some 
formal and informal meetings which focused on the enforcement of the Social 
Economy Act. In 2013, the government announced that they were discussing the 
legislation of the Social Economy Act. More specifically, they were considering the 
term social economy as a broader legislative framework over the SEPA and over the 
Framework Act on Cooperatives, as a result of the constant criticisms from the field 
concerning limited scope of definition, of business activities and of organizational 
forms of Social Enterprise.  
Although the enactment plan of the Social Economy Act was based on the 
criticisms received from various actors in the field, not all actors agreed with the 
legislative plan of the Social Economy Act. Similar criticisms which actors had 
previously put forward with regard to the SEPA emerged again, such as the 
following: “the field has not matured yet to adopt a new policy”, “The Social 
Economy Act is another name of the SEPA, but the government is trying to rename it 
for a political reason in order to present it as an achievement of the current 
presidency”, and “research on the actual field of social economy or enterprise is still 
lacking.”   
The generation gap between people promoting different discourses in the 
field was also a big issue, especially with regard to actors who have been constantly 
promoting social economy or cooperative discourses since 1990s, and actors who are 
promoting a social innovative discourse. For those actors who have been in the social 
entrepreneurship field since the 1990s, the term social venture or social innovative 
discourse represents something new which popped up from the middle of nowhere. 
For example, one interviewee asked me about young social entrepreneurs who are 
promoting social innovative discourse: 
 
“I still do not understand where they come from. I haven’t met any of them even 
though I am active in the social entrepreneurship field since early 2000s. And they 
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never communicate with us. But they are promoting themselves as social 
entrepreneurs. That sounds so weird to me. Could you please explain how their 
social entrepreneurial activities have started and what led them to start social 
enterprise activities? I guess you have greater experience on the modes in which the 
social entrepreneurial activities of the younger generations take place. (DH3, 
Researcher, V University, 11 July 2014, 10:15AM-12:20PM)” 
 
During the interviews, most of the young social entrepreneurs who were 
promoting social innovative discourses also mentioned that they feel quite distant 
from the older generation. One of my interviewee pointed out that the gap between 
the old and young generation derives from a misunderstanding of each other in the 
field, as follows:  
 
“Promoting social entrepreneurship activities is more important than the 
development of the concept of social entrepreneurship. I personally think that the 
gap between the old and young generations emerged due to issues related to 
legitimacy. The old generation considers the social entrepreneurship activities and 
discourses they have been promoting as the legitimated and recognized form of 
social enterprise. (EJ0, CEO, C Investment, 2 June 2014, 10:35AM-12:00PM)” 
 
As testified in the previous quotes, it was clear from the interviews that the 
old and young generations have different understandings, backgrounds and opinions 
on social entrepreneurship. However, during my fieldwork I also observed the 
possibility of understanding each other and working together, as pointed out by EJ0:  
 
“The old generation is interested in how we keep our organizations so that they are 
financially sustainable. Other forms of social enterprises, including certified social 
enterprise, cooperatives and self-sufficient enterprise, have been struggling with 
financial sustainability and independence from government subsidies. So the old 
generation, including the KOSEA, intermediary organizations and certified social 
enterprises, are starting to approach us and communicate with us to work together 
in order to scale up their businesses. (EJ0, CEO, C Investment, 2 June 2014, 
10:35AM-12:00PM)” 
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5.3.2 2-Stage Approach in Line with Grounded Theory  
 
 
In this section, I introduce my pilot study and detailed study in line with 
grounded theory. I used qualitative research methods for this project in order to 
capture the interactions between actors during the emergence process of Korean 
social enterprise. I inductively analyzed multiple data sources which were collected 
during my fieldwork following a strategy developed on the basis of grounded theory 
as a research methodology. Macro discourse analysis was used in order to analyze 
the patterns of interactions between actors who are located in different social 
positions who promote different discourses to be accepted in the institutional field. 
Why and how the research methods are adopted is explained in the following 
sections in greater detail. 
  
5.3.2.1 Qualitative Research  
 
To date, explanatory and descriptive research has mostly been developed 
through conceptual studies which measure the definitions and basic concepts in the 
field of social enterprise (Muñoz 2010). Qualitative methods, rather than quantitative 
studies, have often been adopted to analyze the relationships between major 
stakeholders and social enterprise (Muñoz 2010). Above all, a lot of case studies 
have been conducted, since they contribute to developing theories in an emerging 
research field with regard to its validity (Eisenhardt 1989). Case studies on social 
entrepreneurship have helped to verify the existence of social enterprises and their 
important role in changing business culture (Short, Moss, and Lumpkin 2009). 
However, to date there is no theory that can explain the phenomena of the emergence 
of social enterprise.  
Since this research focuses on the emergence process of social enterprises in 
Korea on the basis of different social actors’ perspectives and activities with regard 
to the concept of social enterprise, data needs to be gathered by “talking directly to 
people and seeing them behave and act within their context” (Creswell 2009: 175). 
Moreover, this research aims to identify the patterns of the emergence of 
organizations by focusing on the case of social enterprises in Korea, and to build a 
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theory of these patterns, thanks to categories and themes which emerge from the data, 
taking an inductive process for data analysis. Therefore, in this research, qualitative 
research will be conducted with multiple sources of data including interviews, 
documents, and observations.  
 
5.3.2.2 Grounded Theory  
 
In my research, grounded theory has been used as a research methodology 
while discourse analysis represents the research method. More specifically, grounded 
theory has been used as a systematic guideline in order to design the whole inductive 
research process (Charmaz 2001). 
Strauss and Corbin (1994) state that “grounded theory requires that the 
interpretations and perspectives of actors on their own and others’ actions become 
incorporated into our own interpretations.” On the basis of this consideration, 
grounded theory, as developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967), will be adopted to 
generate the theory of the emergent process of social enterprise by focusing not only 
on the influencing factors but also on how they affected the different concepts and 
social actors in play. According to Creswell (2009: 13), grounded theory is “a 
qualitative strategy of inquiry in which the researcher derives a general, abstract 
theory of process, action, or interaction grounded in the views of participants in a 
study.” Similarly, Corbin and Strauss (1990: 24) define the grounded theory 
approach as “a qualitative research method that uses a systematic set of procedures to 
develop an inductively derived grounded theory about a phenomenon.” On the basis 
of the previous considerations, grounded theory, in short, is “the discovery of theory 
from data” according to Glaser and Strauss (1967) and it is different from other 
research methods in terms of discovering theories, instead of verifying existing 
theories (Reijonen and Komppula 2007). 
More specifically, Locke (2001) emphasizes that grounded theory can 
contribute to the development of organizational theories since it can reflect the 
development processes of human actions and perceptions over time. In addition to 
this, grounded theory can also help to develop and analyze the reciprocal 
relationships between data and theory. Also, Simpson, Tuck, and Bellamy (2004: 
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482) mentioned that it “also permits investigation into new areas of significance as 
they emerge from the data.”  
Taking grounded theory as a research method, phenomena were observed and 
studied to draw generalized theories in an emerging research field. The data which 
was collected helped me to describe and interpret new phenomena of new theories. 
This proposed process represents an inductive way of theory building, since a theory 
is generalized and developed through observations and empirical evidence based on 
the real world (Locke 2001). 
Grounded theory, in that sense, can be used in social enterprise research even 
though De Burca and McLoughlin (1996) mention that grounded theory as a research 
method is not commonly used in business management research. However, this 
approach is particularly appropriate for this research due to the characteristics of 
social enterprise, considering that the socio-economic environment influenced the 
emergence of each individual type of social enterprise in different ways, and that 
social enterprise research is still at a fundamental level and lacks a clear theoretical 
framework.  
 
5.3.2.3 Pilot Study  
 
Aim of the Pilot Study  
 
The aims of the pilot study are divided between methodological and 
theoretical purposes. From a methodological point of view, I conducted the pilot 
study mainly to minimize the problems that can occur during any stage of research, 
as discussed by Vaus (2001: 54): “Do not take the risk. Pilot test first.” As a matter 
of fact, the pilot study helped me to develop ideas on how to recruit interviewees and 
communicate with them. Moreover, the results of the pilot study also provided an 
opportunity to revise questionnaires.  
 Second, as a first user of grounded theory, I relied on the pilot study as an 
opportunity to understand the research process in greater depth. More specifically, 
the pilot study helped me in particular to understand the data collection and data 
analysis process further and to develop data analysis skills.  
 	 121 
Third, the pilot study provided me with an idea of time management for the 
entire research process. No responses from interviewees and long intervals of time 
for responses to email questionnaires enabled me to estimate how long recruiting and 
interviewing would take in the field.   
From a theoretical point of view, the aim of this pilot study was to confirm 
the diverse emergence processes of Korean social enterprises and their co-existence. 
Luckily, social entrepreneurs running uncertified social enterprises showed their 
interests in participating in the research from the start. These interviews with social 
entrepreneurs in different forms of social enterprise helped me to confirm the 
movements of bottom-up actors against the SEPA.  
 
Pilot Study Research Method  
  
In terms of method for the pilot study, electronic interviews were conducted 
via email. This was selected as the preferred research method since face-to-face 
interviews represented a limited option for interviewees located in Korea while I was 
in the UK.  
An advertisement to recruit voluntary interviewees was posted on the 
Facebook group “Social Entrepreneurship Forum in South Korea 
(https://www.facebook.com/groups/SEForum/).” I posted an invitation letter 
addressed to any social entrepreneur or individual who was simply interested in 
social enterprises and was willing to participate in the research. Interviewees were 
expected to have some sort of experience related to social entrepreneurial activities 
in Korea and to identify themselves as social entrepreneurs. It is important to recall 
that the invitation letter did not present a specific definition of social enterprise, 
social entrepreneurial activity, and social entrepreneur because this could have 
biased their perceptions of the phenomenon.  
As soon as the invitation letter was posted on the Facebook group, three 
people immediately expressed their interests in participating in my research. Even 
though three people represented a small sample group of interviewees, individual 
electronic interviews were conducted as soon as they expressed their interest. 
Snowball sampling, moreover, was adopted in order to identify more potential 
interviewees who were well informed in the field. As a result, 13 interviews were 
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carried out by email in writing and 9 of them completed the given questionnaire. The 
overall response rate was of 69.2%. 
 
Table 5-19 Identification of the Pilot Study Interviewees  
 
 Category Emergent Process Number of Interviewees 
1 Certified Social Enterprises Top-down 1 
2 Social Ventures Bottom-up 4 
3 Intermediary Organizations Top-down 1 
4 Cooperatives Top-down 1 
5 For Profit Enterprises (CSR) Bottom-up 1 
6 Academia Top-down 1 
 
All of the interviewees were asked to also fill in a consent form before they 
started the interviews. In terms of knowledge of the field, all of them are well 
informed on social entrepreneurship in Korea. More specifically, Table 5-19 shows 
the identification of the pilot study interviewees. Among them, only one interviewee 
was the CEO of a government certified Social Enterprise, while the four other 
respondents were CEOs of social ventures which have not been certified by the 
government as Social Enterprises. The interviewees also represented small-medium 
sized enterprises, intermediary organizations, cooperatives and academia, one for 
each category. As a result, this pilot study collected a variety of opinions and 
information on the different aspects of social entrepreneurship in Korea.  
Each interviewee was asked open-ended questions on the definitions and 
main characteristics of social enterprise. They were also asked to explain the history 
of the Social Enterprise Promotion Act in relation to the socio-economic, political, 
and cultural environments connected with the establishment of the Act, based on 
their personal experiences. These questions helped to identify the basic theoretical 
categories that can contribute to building a typology of different types of emergence 
of social enterprises. More questions were then raised on the basis of interviewees’ 
responses, knowledge and their experience of the research topic. The interview 
questions I asked are provided in the Appendix.  
With regard to data analysis processes, the interviews were coded in Korean 
first, and then the codes were translated from Korean to English because “meanings 
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are easier to appreciate in the native language than in a translation” (Urquhart 2012: 
105). 
The identity of the individuals interviewed is kept confidential and the data 
given by these interviewees is used solely for the purposes of this pilot study. Also, 
interview transcripts were analyzed by selective coding rather than open coding.  
 
Using the Pilot Study to Inform Subsequent Data Collection  
 
The results of this pilot study confirm that there is a bottom-up movement in 
the social entrepreneurship field while the government at the same time controls the 
field in Korea through the certification system. From this pilot study, it is clear that 
Korean social enterprises are called by different names, including government 
certified social enterprises, preliminary social enterprises, self-sufficient enterprises, 
social ventures, social innovative organizations, cooperatives and others. This 
implies that some social enterprises have emerged before or after the Social 
Enterprise Promotion Act in 2006 and that the world of Korean social enterprise 
varies due to its history, socio-economic and political background which are all 
reflected in the emergence, organization types and characteristics of social 
enterprises.    
The results of the pilot study confirmed the study hypothesis of Korean social 
enterprises as emerging through either a top-down or bottom-up process. Social 
enterprises that have emerged through a top-down or a bottom-up process can be 
identified as such depending on them being certified or not. Social enterprises, 
including preliminary social enterprises, self-efficiency enterprises and cooperatives 
can obtain certifications from the government and therefore, in the pilot study they 
are considered as top-down emerged social enterprises. On the other hand, there are 
social ventures and social innovative organizations which have emerged 
spontaneously and have not attempted to get a certification. Therefore, they are 
identified as bottom-up emerged social enterprises.  
The Ministry of Employment Labor (MoEL), however, has tried to include 
bottom-up initiatives by organizing the “Social Venture Competition” every year 
since 2009. Some of the social ventures who won a prize in the competition have 
already become certified Social Enterprises. However, on the other hand, there are 
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also some social ventures which are not interested in getting a certification, along 
with the government subsidies. In addition to these, it is important to recall that the 
cooperatives also had started to emerge during the 1940s for the first time as a 
bottom-up emergent model of social enterprise. However, when the Framework on 
Cooperatives was institutionalized in 2012, the cooperative initiatives were also 
taken over by the government. 
From the findings of the pilot study, I was able to confirm that the research 
on certified Social Enterprises is limited and does not to date capture the whole 
picture of the emergence of Korean social enterprises. Moreover, another research 
question emerged during this phase of my research in relation to the backgrounds 
and motivations of social entrepreneurs when choosing different routes for social 
enterprise activities. More specifically, why do some social entrepreneurs want to 
obtain the government certification while others prefer not to?  
 
Core Categories of the Emergence of Korean Social Enterprises  
 
The core categories of the determining factors which influence the emergence 
of Korean social enterprises were roughly identified from the pilot study, as shown in 
the Table 5-20. These categories have emerged from the interviewees’ knowledge 
and descriptions on the history of Korean social enterprises. Four core categories 
have been identified: political, economic, social, and technological environment 
changes.  
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Table 5-20 Core Categories and Key Factors for the Emergence of Korean 
Social Enterprises 
 
Core Category Key Factors Year 
Political environment 
changes 
Japanese colonial occupation 1940s 
Government’s social enterprise promotion 
policies 
2006 
Economic environment 
changes 
Korean financial crisis in 1996 – 
Unemployment 
1996 
Financial difficulties of Civil society 1990s-2000s 
Social environment 
changes 
Development of the level of education 1990s 
Civil movements were active 2000s 
Technological 
environment changes Development of the level of technology 2000s 
 
Looking at the changes in the political environment, it is important to recall 
that the government’s social enterprise promotion policy mainly affected the 
emergence of social enterprises in 2006. Interviewees, however, emphasized that the 
first Korean social enterprise was a cooperative that emerged as a reaction to the 
Japanese colonial occupation in the 1940s.  
Second, the Korean financial crisis of 1996 represents another factor which 
hugely affected this field. Interviewees remembered that their life changed greatly as 
a result of the financial crisis. Not only themselves, but also their friends and family 
lost their jobs. As a matter of fact, the financial crisis resulted in high unemployment 
rates and for this reason the government started to support self-sufficient 
organizations in order to increase employment rates by paying employees’ payroll 
costs (Kwon 2002). Big corporations also restructured themselves in a way that 
could increase effective management but this also caused a strong polarization 
between the rich and the poor. The government also reduced tax inputs. However, 
this was in turn related to delays in the delivery of public services due to the fact that 
the government’s financial support towards non-profit organizations had been 
reduced and limited over time.  
The third factor which is worth mentioning is given by the young generation 
who benefitted from the fast economic growth of Korea and who can easily read and 
understand articles written in English. Therefore, they could easily take inspiration 
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from the social entrepreneurship movement abroad and this positively affected them 
when starting social activities which emerged bottom-up.  
Fourth, a fundamental role in the emergence of social enterprises in Korea is 
also played by the development of technology, especially the Internet. Korea, one of 
countries with the highest Internet penetration, presents a well-developed ICT 
friendly environment and people, therefore, can easily access the international social 
entrepreneurship movement along with the innovative or success cases of other 
countries. This is especially true for young people, who are very capable of using the 
Internet, and were strongly impressed by these cases and for this reason started to be 
interested in doing social entrepreneurship activities by themselves.   
 
Limitations of the Pilot Study  
 
The pilot study presents a certain number of limitations. For this reason, the 
research method was subsequently reviewed and the fieldwork, which took place in 
March in South Korea, was carefully planned in order to remove these acknowledged 
limitations. 
First, the sample of interviewees is not representative of all the social 
entrepreneurs in Korea. Consequently, the sample does not contain an equal number 
of social entrepreneurs in each sector; nor does it represent an equal number of top-
down and bottom-up social enterprises. This is because interviewees were mainly 
contacted through a snowballing method and most of them volunteered to participate 
in the interviews. Furthermore, no interviewees from the government sector were 
involved in this pilot study. This was because the government officers who took part 
in the enactment process of the Social Enterprise Promotion Act have mostly moved 
to other departments, which made contacting them more difficult.  
Second, it took a far longer time than expected to complete the planned 
interviews. This is one of the main limitations of electronic interviews, in the sense 
that with this type of interview you cannot receive prompt responses from the 
interviewees. Because of this limitation, some interviewees did not answer the emails 
while exchanging emails, although all of them initially agreed to participate in the 
pilot study.  
 	 127 
Third, there is a possibility that the questions were too difficult to answer. A 
total of 4 out of 13 interviewees did not response to the second or third email asking 
about the history of social enterprise. Interviewees who joined the social 
entrepreneurship field after the establishment of the SEPA in 2006 and who did not 
have previous experiences in the field hesitated to provide a clear answer. However, 
they answered the questions based on what they had read and heard from others. 
Also, because interviewees were randomly and voluntarily recruited, it was hard to 
target a specific level of knowledge and experience of interviewees. This limitation 
led me to recruit interviewees who had worked in the field for more than 5 years and 
who had participated in the legislation process in order to increase the response rate 
as well as the depth of the answers provided.   
Fourth, this pilot study represents a fieldwork and data analysis trial. For this 
reason, findings cannot be fully confirmed due to the lack of data, time and analysis 
skills. For example, the factors which influenced the emergence of social enterprises 
have not been specified according to the various main timelines, namely the 1940s, 
1990s and 2000s. Nonetheless, the findings of this pilot study were helpful to 
identify the categories and key factors of the emergence of Korean social enterprises 
to be used in my research during the later stages.  
 
Contribution of the Pilot Study to My Research   
 
Although the pilot study was at a very rough stage of work with a good 
number of limitations, it still helped me to prepare and construct the fieldwork for 
the later stages of my research. From this pilot study, it was clear that Korean social 
enterprises are called by different names, including government certified social 
enterprises, preliminary social enterprises, self-sufficient enterprises, social ventures, 
social innovative organizations, cooperatives and others. This implies that some 
social enterprises have emerged not only after the Social Enterprise Promotion Act 
(SEPA) in 2006 but also before that date and that the world of Korean social 
enterprises varies due to its history, socio-economic and political background in 
terms of emergence, organization types and characteristics.  
 This has led to a number of new research questions emerging from the pilot 
study including the following: why do some social enterprises want to obtain the 
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government certification, whilst others prefer not to? What is the role of the 
government certification system and what has and has not been done by the 
government certification system? How can certified and uncertified social enterprises 
co-exist in Korea?  
Moreover, the existence of various types of Korean social enterprises takes 
this research into the history of the Japanese colonial occupation era in the mid-20th 
century and into the early 1990s, the period of the financial crisis in Korea. One 
interviewee mentioned that the first Korean social entrepreneurship activities were 
mainly started bottom-up, by independent activists, as a reaction to the Japanese 
colonial government. These activities were called the “Buying Local Products 
Movement.” If this is proven to be right by the documentary analysis of the last 
stages of this study, this implies that Korean social enterprises have a history of 
emerging from bottom up initiatives in the past, and not only from top down policies, 
as it seems to be the case at present. This consideration is linked to the following 
research questions: why and how have the emergent process of Korean social 
enterprises shifted from bottom-up to top-down? Which historical, socio-economic 
and political factors have affected this shift?   
 Since this is still a pilot study which was conducted before fieldwork, both 
documentary analysis and in-depth case studies were necessary in order to confirm 
and justify the main findings from the interviews which have been presented here. 
During my fieldwork, I collected related documents which had been published by the 
government, social enterprises, research institutions, media, and NGOs, as much as 
possible. From a methodological point of view, interviewees were selected again 
among those individuals who had experiences in being involved in the SEPA 
legislation process, and who had established social enterprises, or social ventures in 
the last 3 years and had started their activities around the time of the enactment of the 
SEPA. 
  
 After reviewing the literature on the topic, the field observations and the 
results of the pilot study, my research questions were eventually specified as follows:  
 
“how do the interactions between different groups of social actors shape the 
emergence of a new organizational form?”  
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The next research question is more specifically based on the research context 
of the emergence of social enterprises in South Korea:  
 
“how do the interactions between top-down and bottom-up actors shape the 
emergence of social enterprises as a new organizational form in South Korea?”  
 
More specifically, three research questions were drawn from the above 
considerations.   
 
First, how do social actors interpret the meaning of a new organizational form 
differently? How are the dominant discourses of social enterprise which emerge from 
government policies interpreted differently by social enterprises?  
 
Second, how do social actors push their own discourse of a new 
organizational form to be accepted by powerful actors who can influence 
institutional changes? What are their discursive and practical strategies which 
influence the emergence of a new organizational form?   
 
Third, how do tensions in defining social enterprise between different social 
actors influence the institution-building process of social enterprise?    
 
5.3.2.4 Detailed Study  
 
Data Collection Process  
 
According to Dick (2005), grounded theory can be adapted to any kind of 
data collection strategies or methods, such as focus groups, individual interviews, 
and any other activity that can collect data from the real world. In this research, data 
has been collected from multiple sources, ranging from observations, to government 
documents, news articles, webpages and interviews. “Open-ended electronic 
interviews” were used at the beginning for preliminary data collection and analysis in 
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order to define the key concepts and to test the reliability of the interview 
questionnaire before commencing fieldwork. Interviewees were randomly chosen 
from the available interviewee list, including social entrepreneurs, experts, and 
government officials who have been actively involved in the establishment process 
of the SEPA in 2006. Second, based on the data analysis of the preliminary interview, 
the research questions and the interview questionnaire were edited and narrowed 
down. Third, in-depth and semi-structured interviews were conducted along with 
document collection during the fieldwork. Lastly, I also had the opportunity to 
observe a few official and private meetings between social entrepreneurs during my 
fieldwork.  
  
Document Collection  
 
The related documents were collected at the beginning of the fieldwork. 
Document collection and analysis were necessary to explore and confirm what a 
social enterprise is, what kind of discourses on social enterprise exist, how discourses 
on social enterprises are constructed over time, and which stakeholders are involved 
in the processes of institutional change. 
 
Online Data Collection 
 
Online data collection was done from online news articles, reports and social 
ventures’/social innovative enterprises’ websites to confirm the existence of 
alternative types of social enterprise. Although the government acknowledges the 
existence of social ventures and social innovative enterprises in South Korea by 
describing social ventures as enterprises which have the merits of being able to 
commercialize with a more challenging spirit and creativity through various types 
and shapes which are free from the established standards (Korea Social Enterprise 
Promotion Agency 2013b), there are no official statistics on them. 
For this reason, I collected data on Korean social ventures and social 
innovative enterprises from online news, reports and social ventures/social 
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innovative enterprises’ websites to analyze their characteristics and differences from 
government certified social enterprises. 
Google and the most popular Korean search engine Naver 
(http://www.naver.com) were used as online document searching tools. First, I 
searched on both search engines using the keywords “social venture” and “social 
innovative enterprise” and then I made a list of all the social ventures and social 
innovative enterprises with the related references. After I completed this list, I 
accessed their webpages to collect relevant data on their business sectors, founding 
years, and whether they had received support from the government or from private 
foundations.  
 
Government Documents  
 
Documents related to the government were collected during fieldwork in 
order to understand what the government has actually done to promote social 
enterprises. During this process, documents on cooperatives, self-sufficient 
enterprises, shelter workshops for the disabled and village enterprises were also 
collected because some social groups consider them as a type of social enterprise. 
These government documents inform us of the main purposes and of the background 
of the government’s social enterprise promotion policies and of the development 
process of the concept of social enterprise from a governmental perspective. Table 5-
21 shows the list of government documents which have been collected.   
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Table 5-21 List of collected government documents  
 
Type of 
Document 
Title of Document Category 
Legal 
Document 
1. Framework Act on Cooperatives 
2. Enforcement Decree of the Framework Act on Cooperatives (No. 24164. 12th Nov. 2012) 
3. Enforcement Rule of the Framework Act on Cooperatives (No. 303, 27th Nov. 2012) 
Cooperative 
National Basic Living Security Act (No. 11248, 1st Feb. 2012) 
Self-sufficient 
Enterprise 
Act on the Welfare of the Disabled 
Shelter Workshop for 
the Disabilities 
1. Social Enterprise Promotion Act 
2. Enforcement Decree of the Social Enterprise Promotion Act (No. 22520, 09th Dec. 2010) 
Certified Social 
Enterprise 
1. Ordinance on the Support and Promotion of Social Enterprises (Total of 212, 6 are revoked) 
2. Regulations on the Support and Promotion of Social Enterprises (Total of 39) 
Preliminary Social 
Enterprise 
Government 
Report 
1. Master Plan to Promote Social Enterprises (2008-2012) 
2. Master Plan to Promote Social Enterprises (2013-2017) 
Certified and 
Preliminary Social 
Enterprise 
Other 
Government 
Document 
Young Social Entrepreneurs’ Support Project 
(http://news.molab.go.kr/newshome/mtnmain.php?mtnkey=articleview&mkey=scatelist&mkey
2=28&aid=1267) 
Social Venture (TD) 
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Public Hearings and Meeting Minutes  
 
Public hearings, forums and the minutes of meetings were also collected to 
see what discussions and critical points emerged when the Social Enterprise 
Promotion Act (SEPA) was established. More specifically, it was necessary to 
understand the government’s perspective on social enterprises since I had not met 
many government officers or members of the National Assembly who had been 
involved in the law-making process. Moreover, some public hearing minutes 
contribute to my understanding of how the civil society reacted to the government 
and what arguments they presented in relation to social enterprises. Table 5-22 
shows the list of public hearings and meeting minutes which have been collected.   
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Table 5-22 List of collected public hearing, forum and meeting minutes  
 
Type of 
Document 
Title of Document 
Public Hearing 
Minutes 
1. Enactment of the Social Enterprise Promotion Act and Supporting Social Enterprise (19th April, 2006)  
2. Enactment of the Social Economy Basic Act (11th August, 2014) 
Forum Minutes 
1. Forum on How to Establish the Social Enterprise Promotion Act (24th August, 2006)  
2. Forum on Social Enterprise, What and How (2nd February, 2007)  
Meeting Minutes 
1. 259th General Assembly, 4th Environment and Labor Committee (18th April, 2006) 
2. 259th General Assembly, 13th Environment and Labor Committee (24th November, 2006) 
3. 281st General Assembly, 5th Environment and Labor Committee (26th March, 2009) 
4. 282nd General Assembly, 4th Environment and Labor Committee (21th April, 2009) 
5. 289th General Assembly, 5th Environment and Labor Committee (27th April, 2010) 
6. 262nd, 1st Environment and Labor Committee Law Examination Subcommittee (13th September, 2006) 
7. 262nd, 3rd Environment and Labor Committee Law Examination Subcommittee (27th September, 2006) 
8. 262nd, 4th Environment and Labor Committee Law Examination Subcommittee (22nd November, 2006) 
9. 285th, 2nd Environment and Labor Committee Law Examination Subcommittee (16th December, 2009) 
10. 289th, 2nd Environment and Labor Committee Law Examination Subcommittee (26th April, 2010) 
11. 304th, 2nd Environment and Labor Committee Law Examination Subcommittee (23th December, 2011) 
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In-depth and Semi-structured Interviews  
  
In-depth and semi-structured interviews have been carried out to take into 
account different perspectives on social enterprises and on the emergence of the 
notion. This has been necessary considering that some social groups have been trying 
to promote their own discourses of social enterprise while resisting the dominant 
discourse of social enterprise established by the government. It has been assumed 
that individuals in different social groups present different perspectives and 
definitions of social enterprises which must have been constructed by specific 
experiences or social events.  
In short, interviews have been carried out in order to confirm the findings 
from the literature review and from the pilot study, that is: to support the idea of the 
existence of multiple discourses related to social enterprises, which can be in turn 
divided into certified and uncertified social enterprises; to gain knowledge on the 
different perceptions by social groups concerning certified and uncertified social 
enterprise and the reasons for this; to explore the role of the government and of the 
civil movements; to compare government, intermediary, certified and uncertified 
social enterprises’ view on social enterprises in order to understand the power 
relations between different social groups; to gain greater understanding on the 
socially constructed process of social enterprises. 
Given these considerations, I have interviewed people from different social 
groups in the social enterprise field in Korea, such as government officers, 
intermediaries, researchers, civil activists and social entrepreneurs. These have been 
divided into top-downers, when they define social enterprises according to the 
government’s definition, and bottom-uppers, when they define social enterprises 
differently from the government and try to contribute to the change of the 
institutionalized concept of social enterprise.   
Since the size of the population of certified and preliminary social enterprises 
in Korea is large, more specifically it amounts to over 3,000 in total, and the number 
of uncertified social enterprises is uncountable, interviewees have been recruited by 
using a snowball sampling. First, I contacted key informants and then I asked them at 
the end of the interviews: “who knows a lot about the situation in Korean when 
social enterprise/social venture started to emerge?” Since a few key names were 
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mentioned repeatedly, I contacted those people directly or indirectly through the 
previous interviewees to ask them if they were willing to be interviewed.   
The cycle of interviews was considered to be concluded when the 
interviewees’ names who I already met were mentioned repeatedly. At that moment, 
I considered saturation to have been reached.  
As a result, I have interviewed a total of 36 professionals in the field of social 
entrepreneurship in South Korea between May and August 2014. Among them, 19 
are top-down actors and 17 are bottom-up actors, as shown in Table 5-23. Most of 
them were social entrepreneurs and intermediaries, whilst the numbers of 
government officers and professors/researchers were relatively small. 
 
Table 5-23 Composition of interviewees 
 
 Top-down actors Bottom-up actors 
Social Entrepreneurs 4 7 
Intermediaries 9 6 
Government Officers 2 1 
Professors/Researchers 2 2 
Others 1 1 
Total 19 17 
 
The list of potential interview questions is provided in Appendix II. 
 
Observations  
 
I also had the opportunity to attend a few formal and informal meetings. 
More specifically, I attended several formal annual meetings and seminars of the 
local Social Enterprise network and the cooperative movement networks. I also took 
part in academic and practical events organized by the central government, by the 
local authorities, by companies and by independent organizations. These 
opportunities extended my understanding on the conflicts concerning the meaning of 
social enterprise given that the scope and the concept of what is considered to be the 
“true” meaning of social enterprise were both discussed during all the events.  
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In addition to this, some interviewees invited me to their informal meetings, 
such as dinner out, coffee breaks or drinks after work. I noted the key points of these 
conversations both in the formal and informal meetings in my field notes. However, 
due to confidentiality reasons, I did not include the informal conversations for data 
analysis, but it is important to recall that these opportunities helped me greatly to 
increase my understanding of the field.   
 
Anonymity  
 
In order to maintain anonymity, I have changed the names of the interviewees 
and their affiliations. Sometimes I also changed their job titles to conceal the identity 
of my interviewees. I made a list of my interviewees with their real and their 
corresponding changed names and affiliations to avoid confusion. The list of 
interviewees along with the date and time of interviews is provided in Appendix III.  
 
5.4 Data Analysis  
 
5.4.1 Use of Grounded Theory  
 
Table 5-24 shows the methodological orders I have followed for this research 
project.  
 
Table 5-24 Research Methodological Orders  
 
Orders Activities 
Pilot study Check the validity and reliability of the questionnaire.  
Collect information and problems at the level of the current field.  
(Initial) Emergence of the Key themes of the findings. 
On-line (email) research method  
Literature 
Review 
Review and analysis of the relevant literature on the history of 
the civil society movement in Korea  
Critical view on social entrepreneurship  
Field level 
information 
Greater understanding of the circumstance of the current field 
before initiating fieldwork  
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collection Official statistics on certified Social Enterprises and Cooperatives 
Collection of information on uncertified social enterprises  
Revision of the questionnaire  
Documents 
collection 
Collection of relevant documents both online and offline  
Supplements to interviews (Triangulation) 
Interviews Contacts with potential interviewees. 
Emergence of potential themes. 
Changes and improvements to the questionnaire after carrying 
out a few interviewees  
Different questions were asked to people from different groups 
(top-down and bottom-up)  
Observation Official meeting and seminars  
Informal meeting  
General idea of how bottom-up actors perceive and talk about 
social enterprise policy and about top-down actors  
Notes taken for each observation.  
Memo & coding Memos for each interview collecting my impressions and the 
potential key themes from the interviews. 
Review of memos after the first cycle of coding to remind myself 
of what are the relevant themes of the emerged codes from the 
transcriptions.  
Grouping of the emerged codes based on the different key 
themes.  
Bottom-up and top-down actors are identified.  
Discourse analysis issues emerged  
è For this reason it was necessary to review more work on 
discourse and discourse analysis and attend the related 
discourse analysis seminars.  
Theoretical 
framework 
Development of the theoretical framework on the emergence of a 
new organizational form through the interactions between top-
down and bottom-up actors who are promoting different 
discourses.  
Institutional entrepreneurship and social movement theory have 
been adopted.  
Discourse 
analysis 
First & second coding themes are applied.  
Data (interviews and documents) was analyzed based on the 
theoretical framework used to compare each group of actors’ 
different backgrounds and their understandings of the term social 
enterprise (Frameworks presented in Chapter Two and Three).  
Historical Database Analysis  
Check with the 
theory 
Double check between the discourse and coding themes & theory  
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The process of collecting and analyzing data was based on a grounded theory 
research methodology. In addition to this, discourse analysis enabled me to analyze 
the multiple data on the basis of a certain framework in greater detail.  
This research project relies on 36 interviews as the main sources of data. In 
addition to these, I have also used other documents in order to confirm and support 
the statements made by the interviewees during the interviews. The collected 
documents were used to strengthen interviewees’ arguments and increase the 
credibility of interview data for triangulation. All the recorded interviews were 
transcribed and analyzed using the qualitative data management software NVivo. 
First, I developed an “event history database” (Van de Ven and Poole 1990) which 
ordered chronologically the descriptions of events from multiple perspectives based 
on multiple data sources. Since discourse analysis was adopted as a research method, 
I developed the database as a “discursive-event history database” (Maguire 2004) in 
order to capture “who said what, and when.” By doing so, I developed a narrative 
account in which the institutional setting of social enterprise consisted of the 
discourses mainly promoted by top-down actors which are then contested by 
multiple actors according to their own logics. The developed discursive-event history 
database is provided in Appendix V. In Appendix V, I mainly captured main actions 
and/or sayings of key actors on developing the definition of Social Enterprise in the 
SEPA between 2003 and 2012.  
Second, I identified my interviewees as belonging to two different groups. 
Actors who are in favor of the top-down actors or against the bottom-up actors on the 
basis of the interviews, documents, minutes of meetings or other collected data are 
categorized as top-down actors. Instead, actors who are in favor of bottom-up actors 
or against top-down actors are identified as bottom-up actors. For example, if actors 
used words such as “bad”, “wrong”, “have no ability, skills, knowledge, resources, or 
philosophy”, “evil”, “careless”, “peremptory”, “unilateral”, or “ignore” to describe 
the other actors, I separated them into a different group. Instead, if actors used the 
words “good”, “efficient”, “has limitations but successful”, “progressive”, 
“meaningful”, “considerate”, “responsible”, or “communicative” to describe the 
other actors, I identified them as part of the same group since they share the same 
interests and understandings of their institutional work.  
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After this, I proceeded to categorizing them again into top-down or bottom-
up actors on the basis of their discourses. I identified those who are promoting the 
institutionalized meaning of social enterprise containing work-related, welfare-
related and corporate social responsibility (CSR) discourses as top-down actors. As a 
result, the Ministry of Employment and Labor (MoEL), members of the National 
Assembly, big corporations, certified social enterprises, and some intermediary 
organizations and research institutes subsidized by the government have been 
categorized as top-down actors. Meanwhile, other actors such as NGOs, groups of 
social activists, independent intermediary organizations, and uncertified social 
enterprises who are promoting oppositional and alternative discourses of social 
enterprises such as local development, social economy, or social innovation 
discourse are categorized as bottom-up actors.  
Fourth, I focused on the core struggles between actors over the meaning of 
social enterprise and its institutional settings. Throughout this process of analysis, I 
compared how actors understand social enterprise differently and which discourses 
of social enterprise are used by each actor. Moreover, the historical event dataset 
helped me to clarify the outcome of the conflicts over the official discourse of social 
enterprise and of the institutional change processes over time. The official discourse 
of social enterprise has expanded its scope as criticisms and disputes were raised by 
bottom-up actors. In order to compare the ideal concept of social enterprise promoted 
by each actor, this research highlights several selected core criticisms and disputes 
on the concept of social enterprise between actors. The samples of coding categories 
for struggles over the meaning of Social Enterprise in the SEPA are provided in 
Appendix VI and VII. I analyzed the core struggles in two phases – before and after 
the enactment of the SEPA. Appendix VI includes the criticisms of the Legislative 
Bill of the SEPA, submitted by the Hannara Party and the government responses 
during the phase 1 between 2005 – 2006. Appendix VII includes the criticisms of the 
SEPA from both oppositional and alternative actors during phase 2 between 2007 
and 2012.   
Also, it is interesting to note that the lack of social enterprise theory in 
relation to its emergence in certain social contexts can be seen as another reason to 
use grounded theory in this research project. As a matter of fact, I decided to apply 
grounded theory because it would enable the emergence of theoretical knowledge on 
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how social enterprise develops in this context. Grounded theory will tell us what 
actually happened in the field of social entrepreneurship in South Korea. For this 
reason, I have collected multiple data sources including policy documents, interviews, 
meeting and public hearing minutes, online data, and observational data. Massive 
datasets, which were produced from the field, were the results of these efforts and 
they helped me capture the dynamics of the social entrepreneurship field from 
multiple perspectives, not only from the government perspective. From the empirical 
experiences in the field, I am able to theoretically explain the debate on the dominant 
concept of social enterprise which was being challenged by other actors in the field 
and how these interactions between actors influence the institutional building and 
changes of social enterprise.  
 
5.4.2 Use of Discourse Analysis  
 
Discourse and discourse analysis are useful to examine how a new 
organizational form is produced, maintained and transformed as a phenomenon of 
institutionalization. In order to examine the multiple interactions between actors 
while constructing institutional and organizational settings, I used macro discourse 
analysis rather than micro discourse analysis, rooted in a linguistic approach. Macro 
discourse analysis focuses more on the “broad patterns of what is talked and written 
about, by whom, their social location, and why” (Johnston 1995: 219). Although 
macro discourse analysis might interpret text more loosely than micro discourse 
analysis, it is useful to capture articulated knowledge, understandings and reactions 
in the history and the success of social movements (Johnston 1995: 219).    
Discourse analysis has been used in institutional studies in order to study the 
interactions between actors when constructing institutional and organizational 
settings and is thus named as “institutional dialogue” (Heritage and Sefi 1992; Drew 
and Sorjonen 1997). Institutional and organizational settings are constructed through 
multiple interactions between different actors who have different identities that lead 
them to have different understandings of the phenomenon in question (Scully and 
Creed 2005; Scott 2013). Each actor’s discourse contains the actor’s interests, 
understandings and ideas which are constructed on the basis of their identities. The 
contents of discourses are socially constructed in the context where they are located 
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in (Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy 2004). For these reasons, discourse analysis is 
particularly useful to understand socially produced organizational and inter 
organizational phenomena (Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy 2004).  
In social enterprise studies, discourse analysis has rarely been used. 
Nonetheless, many researchers acknowledge that different discourses exist across the 
world in different contexts. More specifically, Hulgård (2010) divided discourses of 
social enterprise into two types: those linking social entrepreneurship to the private 
sector for profit and those that take into consideration the social economy. According 
to this scholar, the former is more popular in the United States, while the latter is 
more popular in Europe, even though both discourses can exist in the same 
country/context at the same time. 
Given the above considerations, the following questions begged for an 
answer: where do all these different concepts of the term social enterprise come from? 
How has the concept of social enterprise been developed by different actors (the 
government and the civil society) within certain situations? How did they react to 
each other? Which historical, political, economic, social, and cultural backgrounds 
are affected differently by the different discourses of social enterprise? What are the 
tensions between the government and the civil society concerning the meaning-
making processes related to the notion of social enterprise?  
I started the analysis of the collected data by using grounded theory methods. 
As soon as the transcriptions of interviews were ready, I imported all the 
transcriptions, government documents, minutes and memos I wrote during the 
interviews and during my fieldwork to the NVivo software package. While reading 
the transcriptions again, I started to identify themes in my data sources. In my data 
sources, some core themes seem to be recurring. I therefore selected three core 
themes.  
During the analysis process, the conflicts around meanings between different 
actors promoting different discourses have been clarified. The first theme is given by 
the top-down institutional process of social enterprise, which consists mainly of 
establishing the law – SEPA.  This dimension also includes how different actors 
resist against the government’s standardization of social enterprises, and how they 
achieved an agreement on the enactment of the SEPA. The social and political 
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context in which disagreement and agreement on the standardization of social 
enterprises will be examined in Chapter Six.  
The second dimension looks at how the standardization of social enterprises 
affected the positional changes of each actor in the social entrepreneurship field in 
Korea. Although the definition of Social Enterprise provided by the SEPA was 
considered as a universal interpretation of being “social” and “enterprise”, there were 
still some actors who attempted to amend the law which enhanced the official 
definition of Social Enterprise. This reflected the different social positions and 
ideologies of each actor which affected in turn their strategic actions and discourses.  
The third dimension looks at how alternative movements of social enterprise 
emerged in the shape of a discourse resisting against the official definition of social 
enterprise provided by the government.  
The coding techniques I used are given by the “discourse analysis” based on 
the “historical event database” adopted by Maguire and Hardy (2006). More 
specifically, I identified historical events mentioned in my data sources according to 
a timeline. In a table, I added who mentioned what in relation to the event in the 
social entrepreneurship field in order to compare the different perspectives of 
different actors. During this process I also analyzed what each actor did in order to 
push their views on social enterprise to be accepted by other actors. Building a 
historical event database in the social entrepreneurship field helped to reflect upon 
the social and political contexts which affected each actor while constructing their 
ideologies and strategies.  
Interestingly, the official discourse of social enterprise has expanded its scope 
as related criticisms and disputes were raised by actors. In order to compare the ideal 
concept of social enterprise promoted by each actor, I selected the core criticisms and 
disputes focused on the official/dominant discourse of Social Enterprise. Once it 
became clear, the institutionalization process of the official/dominant discourse was 
analyzed on the basis of the challenger/dominance approaches and the collective 
mobilization as institutional processes.  
After that, I analyzed the outside or inside actors before and after the 
institutionalization of Social Enterprises using the same framework as before. More 
specifically, the time period when each actor introduced their own discourse of social 
enterprise was defined in this process. By identifying the time period of the 
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emergence of each discourse, I was able to understand how the movements occurred 
in waves or sequences, producing historical trajectories of change (Schneiberg and 
Lounsbury 2008). 
Each discourse defined in the earlier process of analysis was analyzed again 
in order to understand the relationships between different discourses, which are 
embedded actors’ understandings, and the contexts which affected mobilization and 
movements aimed at producing change (Stryker 2000; Seo and Creed 2002; Morrill 
2006), and the strategies which actors adopted in order to increase the power of their 
understandings. This helped me to understand how multiple factors affected actors 
and the shaping of their understandings, with regard to the perception of problems 
and the adoption of strategic actions to achieve their goals – namely, legitimating 
their understanding of which organizations can be social enterprises, and to gain 
more power. Moreover, this will also help us to understand how different actors in 
the field of social enterprise communicated with each other in order to elaborate the 
meaning of social enterprise over time (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008).  
 
5.5  Limitations and Reflections  
  
5.5.1 Challenges as a Researcher in the Field  
 
Although I have worked in the Korean social entrepreneurship field before I 
started my Ph.D. and I had carried out prior research on the current state of social 
enterprises in South Korea before my fieldwork, sometimes I found myself telling 
my interviewees that I do not know many things about what is currently going on in 
the field especially. By positioning myself as someone who has been away for some 
time and therefore needs to be informed by the people I meet, I was able to ask more 
straightforward questions without appearing to be too blunt. Interviewees were also 
more inclined to tell me more stories in that way and sometimes they also invited me 
to attend their formal and informal group meetings. In most cases, they told me that 
“if you could come to attend our meetings/gatherings, you would learn a lot more 
about what’s going on in the field.” I went to all the occasions I was invited to, 
whether it was formal or informal meetings.  
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Every time I met new people in the field, people always asked me about the 
current state of social enterprises in the UK. For Korean social entrepreneurs, the UK 
represents a well-known country with a strong governmental support promoting 
social entrepreneurship, which has become a role model policy of the SEPA. People 
asked me questions on whether the actual social entrepreneurship field is as they 
heard it is through newspapers, lectures, and documentaries. Sometimes they asked 
me very specific questions focused on a certain sector of social enterprise in the UK: 
such as health care, social investments, impact bonds or cooperatives. All of my 
experiences in the UK, working on research papers about the UK government’s 
policies promoting social entrepreneurship, attending social entrepreneurship 
conferences and seminars, visiting UK social enterprises, having conversations with 
social entrepreneurs, and coordinating visits of Korean social entrepreneurs and non-
profit professionals to UK social enterprises helped me to answer their questions and 
to position myself as someone who can provide field-level information to them in 
return.  
 
5.5.2 Limitations of Data Analysis  
 
Although, other researchers have described how to construct data analysis 
step-by-step in their previous research, a full understanding on how to embrace the 
analysis process and the necessary analysis skills was never easy for me. I doubted 
whether I was analyzing the data correctly all the time, so I had to go back to the 
literature and the theoretical framework many times. I also tried out different 
analysis methods. Finally, I realized that the data analysis and coding process hardly 
work in a systematic fashion, but in a more messy way.  
However, after a few attempts of data analysis, I was able to develop my own 
way of analyzing data. Although I used the NVivo to organize and manage the 
massive data sources I had collected, Microsoft Excel helped me more to structure 
the results of the analysis in a systematic way. For this reason, I re-typed the results 
of the analysis in tables in Excel sheets at the end of analysis with NVivo, and this 
made it easier for me to compare the contents of the disputes between different actors 
promoting their own discourses.   
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However, the interview transcriptions seemed to me to be new and different 
every time I went back to them, so new themes kept emerging even during the 
writing up stage. Managing and constructing new themes into existing themes was 
also a very complicated process.  
I wrote the themes of the findings and the contents of analysis of the results 
in English both on NVivo and Microsoft Excel, even though I had done all the 
interviews in Korean. Regardless of the concern that using dual languages in one 
research would increase the confusion of the researcher and the possibility of 
translation errors, reading, writing, listening, and thinking in both languages vice 
versa in the analysis process helped me to me think more than twice if I had 
translated appropriately between English and Korean.  
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Foreword to the Finding Chapters  
 
The results of my analysis are presented in three Finding Chapters.  
Chapter Six describes the initial stage of the institution building process of 
Social Enterprise in Korea between 2006 and 2010. This Chapter will unpack the 
conflicting processes of meaning making between social actors who are located in 
different social positions. Three instances of conflicts between actors in the policy 
and civil society area, and between the government and civil society illustrate the 
political struggle for institutionalization of the concept of social enterprise and its 
institutional setting. This Chapter outlines how the powerful top-down actors create 
and take the leading role in an institution-building project and how bottom-up actors 
instantly react to contribute to the project.  
Chapter Seven focuses on the emergence of oppositional discourse as a 
reaction to the emergence of official and dominant discourses of social enterprise. 
Two instances of emerging oppositional discourses from intra- and extra-institutional 
entrepreneurs illustrate how two different groups of actors react differently although 
they promote a similar discourse to each other in order to conceptualize the different 
meanings and activities of social enterprise.  
Chapter Eight introduces the emergent process of alternative discourses to the 
official discourse of Social Enterprise – social innovation and entrepreneurship 
discourses. In this Chapter, I will illustrate how alternative actors who fully reject the 
official definition of Social Enterprise in the SEPA interpret the meaning of social 
enterprise differently and how they attracted other actors to their own discourses and 
organizations by being innovative, different, and financially productive.  
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6 Initial Stages of the Institution-building Process of SE: 
Legislation of the SEPA 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
“From my perspective, a social enterprise can be legitimated only when it is in an 
institutional setting - the certification system. Who would call an organization a 
social enterprise, if it is not certified or if it is not in an institutional setting? 
Throughout Korean history, we have never had the concept of social economy and 
so we have no experience of it. So, if a powerful institution like the government 
hadn’t provided a clear concept, along with the definition and the standards of 
social enterprises, people must have struggled to understand what a social 
enterprise is. It’s easier to convince people that ‘we are doing social enterprise’ 
when the concept of social enterprise is defined by the law. That’s why being 
institutionalized is important to be accepted in the Korean context. (BJ7, CEO, G SE, 
16 June 2014, 14:04PM-16:00PM)” 
 
One of the key themes which repeatedly appears in my data sources is that 
the term “social enterprise” was legitimated when the government established the 
law promoting Social Enterprise – the “Social Enterprise Promotion Act (SEPA)” in 
2006. In this chapter, first I will trace the initial institutional-building process of the 
SEPA. Overall, the purpose of this Chapter is to outline the dynamics of the actors 
and their discourses in the field of social entrepreneurship in Korea and how the most 
powerful actor – the government – reacted to these field-level dynamics by 
institutionalizing the meaning and the organizational forms of Social Enterprise. I 
will also briefly introduce the initial institutionalized meaning of Social Enterprise, 
which represents the official discourse. Second, I will analyze the struggles between 
different social groups in the area of policy and civil society and vice versa. This 
shows the existence of confrontations over the concept and over the requirements 
needed to be certified as a Social Enterprise. I will conclude this Chapter by 
outlining the dynamics between the actors and their discourses against the emerging 
institutional logic which attempts to simplify these dynamics. However, the power of 
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political authorities was still exceptionally powerful, especially at the initial stage in 
which the standards of Social Enterprises were constructed.  
 
6.2 The Emergence of Official and Dominant Discourses of 
Social Enterprise 
 
With regard to official discourses of Social Enterprise, the government in 
Korea – consisting in this case mostly of the Ministry of Employment and Labor 
(MoEL) – has mainly promoted the work-embedded social welfare discourse of 
social enterprise. According to the SEPA, Social Enterprise is defined as “an 
enterprise certified in accordance with Article 7, namely one that pursues a social 
objective aimed at enhancing the quality of life of residents in the community by 
providing vulnerable social groups with social services and job opportunities, while 
carrying out its business activities, such as the production and sale of goods and 
services” (Ministry of Employment and Labor 2006). 
In Chapter Four, I introduced how the certification system standardized 
Social Enterprises by defining the social and economic objectives, the beneficiaries, 
the legal organizational forms and different types of social services. The legally 
institutionalized definition and organizational form of Social Enterprise corresponds 
to the official discourse that represents the views, arguments, explanations and policy 
suggestions of the state (Schlesinger, Elliot, and Murdock 1984). However, an 
official discourse does not necessarily have to also be a dominant discourse 
(Williams 1985). Nevertheless, in the case of Korea, where resources and networks 
have been centralized by the state, the official discourse of Social Enterprise spread 
all over the country and became the dominant discourse as soon as the government 
had institutionalized this definition of Social Enterprise. In other words, after the 
legalization of the SEPA, not only had the number of certified Social Enterprises 
increased at a very fast rate, but also the official discourse of Social Enterprise took 
the hegemony over other definitions of Social Enterprise. As a result of this, the 
central object tackled by other actors who did not share the dominant view and 
wanted it to be changed was the official discourse of Social Enterprise which 
corresponded to the dominant discourse of Social Enterprise in the country (Karim 
1993).  
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6.3 Conflict in the Policy Area – Between Government 
Departments 
 
In this section, I show that the conflict over the meaning of social enterprise 
occurred not only between top-down and bottom-up actors, but also between actors 
in the same institutional positions. During the legalization process of the SEPA, the 
Ministry of Labor and Ministry of Welfare competed against each other to 
institutionalize Social Enterprise in accordance to their policy objectives. By 
focusing on the contents of the debate, the reactions to each other over the meaning 
of Social Enterprise and on the policy objectives related to promoting social 
entrepreneurship, I will present how the struggles in the policy area contribute to the 
construction of the institutionalized meaning of Social Enterprise. 
 
6.3.1 Contents of the Debate and Reactions to Each Other  
 
6.3.1.1 Inter-ministerial Conflict on the SEPA  
– Ministry of Labor VS Ministry of Welfare  
 
Each actor involved in the institution-building project of social enterprise in 
Korea is characterized by different objectives, understandings and backgrounds 
which in turn relate to different meanings of social enterprise. The diverse identity of 
the social actors in the institutional field of social enterprise reflected itself in 
conflicts over the meaning of what is defined as a Social Enterprise. These struggles 
occurred not only between actors from different origins, but also between those from 
the same origins. In this section, I will analyze how actors in the same government 
sector struggled with one another to take on the main lead role in social 
entrepreneurship promotion policies.  
In the Korean context, the government as a strong state takes the leading role 
in the institutionalization of a new industry (Spencer, Murtha, and Lenway 2005). 
However, a consensus on the promotion of a certain policy is not always easily 
reached between actors in the policy sector and it often involves inter-ministerial 
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competition for projects (Kim 2002; Park et al. 1996). During the institutionalization 
process of Social Enterprise, the Ministry of Welfare (MoW) and the Ministry of 
Labor (MoL) conflicted with each other over the meaning and purpose of Social 
Enterprise. At the end, the work integrated social enterprise discourse was selected as 
the official discourse of Social Enterprise through the inter-ministerial competition.  
As a first stage, this inter-ministerial competition occurred between the MoW 
and MoL to decide which department will operate and make a decision on social 
enterprise promotion policies. At the beginning, several government departments 
joined the discussion, because each of them had different perspectives in relation to 
the provision of social welfare services. Traditionally, the MoW used to deliver 
social welfare policies, including public health, aging, childcare, disabled and 
pension related issues. As the traditional role of the MoW was to provide social 
welfare services to the public, also the MoW was interested in promoting social 
entrepreneurship policies within the scope of their authority.  
However, the original motivation for establishing social enterprise promotion 
policies was to provide job opportunities to vulnerable people, given that 
unemployment represented the most urgent issue on the government’s agenda to be 
solved. For this reason, promoting social entrepreneurship activities was considered 
to also be a responsibility of the MoL. The main dual objectives of social enterprises, 
which consisted in providing job opportunities and social services to vulnerable 
people, were at the origin of the conflict between the two Ministries, which 
traditionally were in charge of each policy area.  
As shown in Table 6-1, the MoW and MoL perceived social enterprises 
differently in terms of policy goals, beneficiaries of social welfare policies, level of 
work provided by a social enterprise, efficiency of the policy and potential field-level 
partners.  
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Table 6-1 Structure and Contents of Employment and Social Welfare Policies 
by Departments  
 
 Social Enterprise as an 
employment related issue 
Social Enterprise as a social 
welfare related issue 
Actors Ministry of Labor Ministry of Welfare 
Discourses Integrated Work and social 
welfare  
Social welfare related  
Objects Social Work Program NPOs who used to deliver social 
welfare services  
Goal Empowering poor people to be 
financially independent by 
means of paid work activities. 
Providing social services to the 
vulnerable social group.  
Scope of 
beneficiaries 
of social 
welfare 
policies 
Not only people who are in the 
extreme poor category.  
People who are not employed, 
although they have ability to 
work, are also included.  
People who are in the extreme 
poor category. 
Level of work  Various levels of work  Simple and easy work  
Previous 
policies 
Social Work Program made 
good progress on creating work 
opportunities and business ideas 
in the social service sector.  
Public Work Program, Self-
sufficiency organizations 
(NBLS)  
NPOs and NGOs who used to 
deliver social welfare services 
are distrustful.  
- 
Efficiency of 
the policy  
Social Enterprise policy can 
deliver social welfare and 
employment policies at the same 
time.  
- 
Target 
beneficiaries 
Social Enterprise as a social 
welfare services provider  
Vulnerable people as a social 
welfare consumer  
 
 
While the MoW considered the beneficiaries of Social Enterprise policies as 
vulnerable people who are consumers of social welfare services, the MoL insisted 
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that supporting social welfare service providers – Social Enterprises – is a more 
effective way of delivering social welfare and employment policies at the same time. 
Although, the MoW had supported self-sufficiency enterprises within their policy 
schemes, which are often considered to be the origin of Social Enterprises in the 
Korean context, the MoL also criticized the limitations of social welfare policies.  
Secondly, there was another struggle between a group of government 
departments that emphasized the importance of financial sustainability and a group 
emphasizing the role of capacity building of the third sector, of social sustainability, 
of social development and of close relationships with civil society. The first group 
consisted of the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MoSF) and the Ministry of 
Planning and Budget (MoPB), while the second group is given by the MoL, MoW 
and Ministry of Culture (MoC). With regard to the first group, they found the 
certification system and the Social Enterprise promotion strategies (which are 
providing a payroll for certified Social Enterprises to employ workers) to not be a 
sustainable way of supporting social enterprise activities. On the contrary, the second 
group, instead, considered this idea to be a good way of building a good relationship 
with civil society. Also, they believed that civil society has sufficiently matured to be 
able to deal with social problems emerging from the field, such as a jobless and 
ageing society. 
 
6.4 Conflicts between the Government and Civil Society 
 
The emerging discussion on the SEPA caused conflicts between the 
government and civil society, due to the fact that each actor reacts to institutional 
pressures with different strategies following from the different interests that they 
have (Oliver 1991). Some civil society organizations considered the concept of social 
enterprise to have been developed by work-related civil society organization5 which 
had collectively reacted to the government’s attempt to define the standards for 
Social Enterprises. In this section, I will present how top-down and bottom-up actors 
                                                
5 Work-related civil society organizations in this thesis are a part of civil society which is autonomous 
from the state, voluntary and self-generating (Diamond 1994). Among others, work-related civil 
society organizations advocate that employment policies have to be planned and implemented in a 
long-term perspective rather than providing simple and short-term work opportunities to vulnerable 
people in local communities (Choi 2009).  
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competed against each other over the institutionalization of social enterprises based 
on the results of the analysis of the contents of the debate and of the reactions to the 
SEPA. The main arguments that civil society raised related to the limited definition 
of social enterprise in the SEPA, to the speed of the institutionalization process and 
to the impact of the SEPA.  
 
6.4.1 Contents of the Debate and Reactions to Each Other 
 
6.4.1.1 Conflicts with out-group actors during the initial institution-
building process 
 
Relatively powerless actors are also able to promote their understandings of a 
new organizational form so that they are accepted by other actors in the institutional-
building process (Seo and Creed 2002). In the initial process of constructing the 
institutional meaning of Korean Social Enterprise, actors interacted with each other 
by pushing their own discourses to be included in the official discourse of Social 
Enterprise. More specifically, the active interaction started in March 2005 when the 
MoL organized the SEPA Task Force Team. According to Rao, Morrill, and Zald 
(2000), collective actions emerge under certain conditions in order to achieve the 
goals of actors’ activities. As a matter of fact, the establishment of the “Civil Society 
Solidarity for Social Enterprise Development (CSSSED)” against the SEPA Task 
Force Team shows how civil society organizations confronted the emerging 
certification system collectively by representing field-level social enterprises. 
Interestingly, during the initial institutionalization process of the SEPA, the 
CSSSED was the only actor who was against the legislation and the contents of the 
SEPA. More specifically, the CSSSED criticized the SEPA in terms of 1) definition 
of Social Enterprise (criteria and governance of Social Enterprise); 2) fast 
institutionalization (background of the legislation, use of self-sufficiency enterprises, 
and maturity of the field); 3) and effectiveness of the SEPA (certification system and 
conflicts with other related laws), as shown in Table 6-2.  The details of their 
arguments against the SEPA will be presented in the next Section.  
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Table 6-2 Conflicts over the Content of the SEPA between Advocators and 
Opponents  
 
 Against the SEPA In favor of the SEPA 
Actor CSSSED, some self-sufficiency 
enterprises 
Ministry of Labor, Korea Labor 
Institute, Intermediaries 
Governance Cooperative governance is the 
key of social enterprise. 
Cooperative governance will 
make the decision-making 
process inefficient. 
Use of self-
sufficiency 
enterprises 
They have already been 
working as social enterprises in 
the field. The SEPA has to use 
their resources and networks 
and transform them into social 
enterprises. 
They could not make big 
progress during the last few 
years. There is the need to find 
a new type of organization who 
can deliver social services and 
create work opportunities 
efficiently at the same time. 
Certificatio
n system 
Social enterprises who do not 
need subsidies should be 
registered and not certified. 
Only social enterprises who 
want to receive subsidies are 
required to be certified. 
There can be a misuse of 
government subsidies. 
Government funding should be 
controlled and monitored when 
it is invested in a certain type of 
organization. 
Maturity of 
the field  
The Korean social enterprise 
field is not ready to be 
institutionalized. There are not 
many organizations that can be 
certified as social enterprises. 
Further investigation on the 
field is needed before the 
enactment of the SEPA. 
The Korean civil society has 
sufficiently matured to produce 
social enterprises and to accept 
the concept of social enterprise 
provided by the SEPA. 
Fast institutionalization is the 
key characteristic of the Korean 
government. 
Legal 
Framework 
The separate law – SEPA is in 
conflict with other laws (e.g. 
NBLS). 
 
Criteria of 
Social 
Enterprise 
The SEPA as an employment 
law requires social enterprises 
to employ 40% of the 
vulnerable people, which is 
wrong. 
Social Enterprise is supposed to 
solve employment and social 
welfare problems at the same 
time. 
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Background 
of the 
legislation 
The government does not 
consider the Korean context. 
Employment and social welfare 
issues where emergency issues 
need to be solved with a new 
policy. 
 
6.4.1.2 Definition of Social Enterprise  
 
 
According to institutionalists, the role of institutional entrepreneurs is central 
given that they “define, justify and push the theory and values underpinning a new 
form” (DiMaggio 1988: 18). The CSSSED who did not agree with the official 
definition of Social Enterprise provided by the government, defined and presented 
their own definition of social enterprise which reflects their previous field-level 
experiences. From the perspective of the CSSSED, the governmental definition of 
Social Enterprise neglected the most important characteristic of social enterprise, 
namely cooperative governance. While the CSSSED insists that having a cooperative 
governance is the key of social enterprises, actors in favor of the SEPA believed that 
a cooperative governance would make the decision making process inefficient. BB7, 
one of leaders of the CSSSED, commented that:  
 
“We have tried to include the cooperative governance of social enterprises as a 
characteristic of Social Enterprise in the SEPA. The MoEL, instead, was more 
concerned with emphasizing the social mission of social enterprises. However, we 
insisted that social mission and governance should go together, but the MoEL did 
not accept the idea of a cooperative governance. At the end, the MoEL simplified 
cooperative governance as a participation of multi-stakeholders and not as a 
membership of workers. (BB7, Deputy Director, P SE Network, 22 May 2014, 
17:14PM-18:25PM)” 
 
The will of the CSSSED to include cooperative governance as one of the 
main characteristics of a Social Enterprise could be seen from the Legislative Bill on 
Social Enterprises that was the result of a joint effort with Jin, Young from the 
Hannara Party. Article 12 of this legislative bill on the promotion and the support for 
Social Enterprises clearly mentions that:  
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“A Social Enterprise consists of members, and these members include workers and 
users, investors, contributors (donors), volunteers and others who are involved in 
the activities.” 
 
For the members of the CSSSED, which are mostly organizations developed 
around self-sufficiency activities, it is important to emphasize the community spirit 
along with social solidarity and to revive communities through social enterprise 
activities. By highlighting the role of community and social solidarity, they do not 
expect to exclude vulnerable people in society and the labor market.  
With regard to the definition of Social Enterprise, the CSSSED criticized the 
criteria of Social Enterprise as described in the SEPA. More specifically, the initial 
legislative bill of the SEPA clarifies that the employment ratio of vulnerable social 
groups should be greater than 40% for a Social Enterprise to be certified. However, 
the CSSSED was concerned that first, the ratio given to Social Enterprises is too high, 
and second, that these criteria will affect the public image of Social Enterprise as an 
organization only for vulnerable social groups.  BK8 mentioned that:  
 
“It is wrong for people to perceive a social enterprise as a place where disabled 
people bake bread or vulnerable people do public work. The value and meaning of 
social enterprises have been ignored in this fast institutionalization process. (BK8, 
CEO, H SE, 18 June 2014, 13:38PM-15:00PM)”  
 
DW2 also proves that the value of social enterprises has been ignored 
because of the wrong direction taken by the SEPA:  
 
“The criteria that limits the employment ratio of vulnerable social groups does not 
fit the value of social enterprises. The government was just showing off the fact that 
they are helping vulnerable social groups by adding that criteria in the SEPA. (DW2, 
Researcher, U Institute, 10 June 2014, 13:58PM-16:03PM)”  
 
According to Rao, Morrill, and Zald (2000); Tracey, Phillips, and Jarvis 
(2011), a new organizational form will gain legitimacy when social actors realize 
that it corresponds to their interests and values within an institutional context. 
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Similarly, the reason to promote the cooperative discourse so that it is included in the 
SEPA was related to the idea of gaining the legitimacy of the workers’ cooperatives 
which they had created, but had never been institutionalized. Even though the 
activities which had taken the organizational form of the workers’ cooperatives had 
spread all over the country thanks to media coverage, workers’ cooperatives were 
established and managed as unauthorized organizations or public limited companies 
because there was no legal form that fitted the governance of cooperatives (The 
Solidarity Network of Cooperative Social Economy 2012). For this reason, the 
CSSSED tried to solve the problem of the legal status of workers’ cooperative by 
pushing this characteristic related to cooperative governance to be included in the 
official discourse of Social Enterprise. BB7 proved that:  
 
“Structuring the SEPA as a workers’ cooperative law was our main concern in the 
group. For this reason, we suggested criteria and other characteristics of workers’ 
cooperative to be included in the legislative bill of Social Enterprise, based on the 
cases of Italian cooperatives. We expected that we could solve all the legal and 
institutional problems of workers’ cooperatives that we had in practice through the 
SEPA. (BB7, Deputy Director, P SE Network, 22 May 2014, 17:14PM-18:25PM)” 
 
6.4.1.3 Fast institutionalization (backgrounds of the legislation and 
the use of self-sufficiency enterprises) 
 
From the perspective of the CSSSED, the institutionalization process of 
Social Enterprises took place too quickly. According to them, a fast 
institutionalization did matter because the government was not concerned by the 
political, social, and historical contexts and by the relationships between different 
actors in the field. Instead, the government seemed to be attracted by the new term – 
social enterprise. As a matter of fact, BK8 added that:  
 
“The Ministry of Labor institutionalized the idea of civil society. The MoEL asked 
and paid for a few organizations to develop social enterprises even before the 
historical and philosophical perception of social enterprise was sufficiently mature. 
A policy which deals with both the economy and welfare should relate to all 
important social issues, like poverty and education, but the government made the 
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hasty decision to institutionalize the concept without developing a deep concern for 
the matter or discussing it with other actors merely because the term “social 
enterprise” sounds new and fancy. (BK8, CEO, H SE, 18 June 2014, 13:38PM-
15:00PM)” 
 
However, from the government’s perspective, this fast institutionalization has 
been considered as a unique and taken-for-granted characteristic of the Korean 
government, as highlighted by BD3:  
 
“Reacting quickly to changes in society is a characteristic of the Korean government. 
If the government reacts when a social issue becomes serious, it means that we are 
already late. Getting society back on track by reacting to changes quickly and by 
carrying out institutionalization processes is important. We have learnt from 
experiences, such as the fast economic development led by the government, that this 
works. (BD3, Manager, C Government Department, 15 June 2014, 18:09PM-
17:44PM)”     
 
From the CSSSED perspective, as a result of a fast institutionalization of 
social enterprises, previous organizational forms, such as self-sufficiency enterprises, 
have been excluded from the institutional field, as emphasized by BK8:  
 
“If the government wanted to promote social enterprises, they could have used the 
network of self-sufficiency that already existed in the field. This is because self-
sufficiency movements also started with the same objective as social enterprises. At 
that time (in 2006), more than 200 self-sufficiency centers already worked very well 
in the Korean context. But, the government neglected this because of the result-
oriented culture and the relationship between the MoEL and MoW. (BK8, CEO, H 
SE, 18 June 2014, 13:38PM-15:00PM)” 
  
However, the government considered the self-sufficiency movement to have 
limitations with regard to the generation of sustainable outcomes in terms of creating 
work opportunities and delivering social welfare services. BH5 who carried out 
research on the limitations of the previous related policies mentioned that:  
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“Organizations who participated in previous government programs were very 
dependent on government funding. From the MoEL perspective, these organizations 
did not exhibit any characteristic of “enterprise”, but they were more like voluntary 
organizations who are running programs with government funding. That’s why the 
government found the need to build a new organizational form that can cover the 
limitations of previous organizational forms, such as self-sufficiency enterprises. 
(BH5, Professor, E University, 23 June 2014, 13:05PM-14:22PM)” 
 
 As I concluded in the previous Section 6.3.1.1., the MoL perceived the 
previous policies promoting work and social welfare to have failed to deliver social 
welfare programs in a sustainable way. For this reason, the MoL selectively 
interacted with certain actors and therefore some field-level organizations, such as 
self-sufficiency enterprises and voluntary organizations, were excluded in the initial 
process of the institutional-building of Social Enterprise.  
 
6.4.1.4 Impact of the SEPA (certification system and conflicts with 
other related laws)  
 
The CSSSED also criticized the initial Legislative Bill of the SEPA provided 
by the MoL for to its effectiveness. First, they questioned the reason why a 
certification system is needed to promote social entrepreneurship activities. In their 
legislative bill, they insisted on the fact that social enterprise groups have to be 
separated, based on the willingness of social entrepreneurs to receive government 
funding. The CSSSED considered that some social enterprises were already making 
profits and therefore do not need government subsidies, so they would not be 
interested in a certification because the benefits of being certified are mostly related 
to financial support. Instead, the CSSSED emphasized the need for a registration 
system of Social Enterprises for those organizations who prefer to receive only 
educational or consultancy supports (Environment and Labor Committee in the 
National Assembly 2006). 
Second, the CSSSED also pointed out that the contents of the SEPA are in 
contrast with other related laws and policies. For example, although the SEPA 
emphasized the “entrepreneurial” side of Social Enterprises, a private company could 
not be certified as a Social Enterprise based on the Commercial Law. Also, although 
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the SEPA promotes the establishment and the later stages of new businesses based 
on an innovative social entrepreneurial idea, a Social Enterprise cannot apply for a 
support program of the Small and Medium Business Administration (SMBA) based 
on the Small and Medium Business (SME) law. As a matter of fact, BB7 was 
concerned that these potential and practical conflicts would affect the effectiveness 
of the SEPA and claimed that there was a lack of understanding by the government 
on what field level practitioners need:  
 
“We knew which laws or policies can be used to promote social enterprises since we 
have supported field level practitioners. However, the government and the members 
of parliament do not know and understand the field. Establishing a new law (SEPA) 
was not necessary. Instead, one specific law (NBLS) could have been amended to 
promote social enterprise activities. Because they do not know the field level 
difficulties in practice, we were concerned that the SEPA would not be so helpful 
and effective at the early stages of the legislation. (BB7, Deputy Director, P SE 
Network, 22 May 2014, 17:14PM-18:25PM)” 
 
6.5 Conflict in the Civil Society Area 
 
 
In this section, I will present how the members of the CSSSED competed 
against each other to construct their representative discourse against the SEPA. The 
inter-organizational competition of the CSSSED contributes to the discovery of the 
process of combining different ideologies and interests in a group.  
 
6.5.1 The CSSSED’s Inter-organizational Competition over the SEPA  
 
 
Discourse can be used to interact with other actors when sustaining or 
challenging social positions (Van Dijk 1995). As a matter of fact, developing a 
discourse that reflects group members’ purposes and views on social issues can be 
seen as a strategic action to react against dominant actors (Phillips, Lawrence, and 
Hardy 2004). Therefore, building a collective identity is important since it can 
become a communication resource with other actors (Hardy, Lawrence, and Grant 
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2005). However, according to Hardy, Lawrence, and Grant (2005), internal conflicts 
can take place when members of organizations discursively construct their collective 
identity. 
The members of the CSSSED were separated into two groups, a research 
group and a practitioner group, when the CSSSED presented the Legislative Bill for 
Promoting and Supporting Social Enterprises. These two inter-organizational groups 
competed against each other in relation to the contents, governance and financial 
resources mentioned in the bill. Their arguments on the Legislative Bill for 
Promoting and Supporting Social Enterprises are summarized in Table 6-3.  
More specifically, the researcher group supported the contents of the 
Legislative Bill for Promoting and Supporting Social Enterprise, which they drafted 
against other bills presented by other actors. This Legislative Bill invoked overseas 
cases, endorsed previous successful experiences in promoting cooperatives 
governance, challenged the idea of standardizing social enterprises and receiving the 
government subsidies. This group insisted that the cooperative discourse should be 
adopted in the SEPA, because the workers’ cooperative model of social enterprise 
worked well in other countries, such as Spain and Italy, and a cooperative 
governance is good for the empowerment of workers by including them as the 
members of an organization. Moreover, they also emphasized their previous 
experiences of establishing and running workers’ cooperatives in the field. However, 
they rejected the idea of providing financial subsidies to certified Social Enterprises 
because this does not help to empower people to make profits and stand on their own 
feet without government support.  
Interestingly, the practitioners in the group had different opinions on the 
Legislative Bill. More specifically, they did not agree with the researcher group and 
their position mainly challenged the cooperative governance endorsing the idea of 
receiving financial subsidies. For example, the practitioners rejected the workers’ 
cooperative model because it was too idealistic and could not be achieved in practice 
in the Korean context. They also refused to include a cooperative governance 
because this will make the decision-making process inefficient, a contradiction with 
the idea of an “enterprise” which has to be efficient and profit-oriented. In addition, 
they supported the idea of receiving government subsidies to hire employees 
considering that subsidies are helpful when running a business.     
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Table 6-3 The Contents of the Conflict over a Legislative Bill Submitted by the 
CSSSED 
  
 The Good The Bad 
Actor Researchers  Practitioners  
The contents of 
the legislative 
bill 
There are overseas cases 
where the participation by 
society and by the local 
community was strongly 
encouraged. 
It was too idealistic and could 
not be achieved in practice in 
the Korean context.  
Governance 
The history of workers’ 
cooperatives has proven that 
it is possible to achieve.  
Cooperative governance is hard 
to achieve.  
Cooperative governance is 
positive given that workers 
are included as members of 
an organization.  
Cooperative governance will 
make the decision-making 
process inefficient.  
Cooperative governance is not 
appropriate for a social 
enterprise as an incorporated 
company.  
Financial 
Resources 
Empowering social 
enterprises to make enough 
profit, or at least the national 
basic income, is important in 
a long-term perspective.  
Giving subsidies will ruin the 
ecosystem.  
Receiving government subsidies 
is necessary when running a 
business.  
 
BB7 who participated in the process of making the Legislative Bill 
mentioned the different perspectives of researchers and practitioners:  
 
“Practitioners in the field cannot consider carefully all the good and bad aspects of 
the law. They have no reason to refuse the subsidies. If someone thinks that 
practitioners will refuse the subsidies, that person might have overestimated them. 
Doing business is difficult. For them, receiving subsidies is good because they can 
use the government’s money to run their business. In terms of giving and taking 
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subsidies, the government and practitioners always share the same interest. (BB7, 
Deputy Director, P SE Network, 22 May 2014, 17:14PM-18:25PM)”  
6.5.2 Conflicts between Different Groups in Civil Society   
 
 
Meanwhile, actors who mainly worked in civil society also struggled against 
each other. During my analysis, I identified two groups as competing actors in civil 
society. The first group consists of self-sufficiency enterprises and support 
organizations. Among them, since the CSSSED was the active organization, in this 
Section I will refer to this group as the CSSSED. The second group is given by a few 
NGOs working under the with the Working Together Foundation (WT Foundation). 
These organizations were initially included in the Task Force Team of the SEPA as 
field-level practitioners. In this section, I will refer to the second group as the WT 
Foundation, given that the members of the WT Foundation actively interacted with 
the government in designing the SEPA.   
Overall, these two groups had developed different ideas on social enterprises 
and on the SEPA. Although they agreed on the need for the legalization of the SEPA 
in order to legitimate field-level social enterprise activities, they promoted different 
discourses of social enterprise. Nevertheless, they did not resist against each other 
completely but some of their arguments were overlapping. In this section, I will 
present how these two groups developed different discourses of social enterprises 
based on their previous activities and on their relationship with the government 
institutions – MoW and MoL.  
It is important to recall that the members of the CSSSED initially consisted of 
self-sufficiency enterprise support organizations that had previously worked to 
promote self-sufficiency enterprises. Although both the WT Foundation and self-
sufficiency enterprise support organizations agreed on the need to solve 
unemployment issues, they originally had different motivations, views and 
relationships with the government.  
First, although these were all groups of organizations working within civil 
society, their relationship with the government and origins of funding slightly 
differed one from the other. As a matter of fact, these two groups received 
government funding to promote either the Social Work Project and/or Self-
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sufficiency Enterprises. The “Social Work Project” was funded by the Ministry of 
Labor from 2003 onwards in order to provide vulnerable groups of people who are 
not fully employed with work opportunities. Meanwhile, the Self-sufficiency 
program was funded by the Ministry of Welfare under the law of National Basic 
Livelihood Security (NBLS) established in 2000. For these reasons, their main 
disagreements between these two groups reflect also the struggle between two 
different government departments – the Ministry of Welfare and the Ministry of 
Labor (Section 6.3.1.1.).  
Second, since the funding bodies of the two groups were different, the 
objectives of their activities differed too. As a matter of fact, the “Self-Sufficiency 
Program” started out with the enactment of the “National Basic Livelihood Security 
(NBLS)” in October 2000. Before the NBLS, the beneficiaries of social welfare 
policies were limited to those who were under extreme poverty, the disabled, 
children, and the elderly over 60s. However, this limited view on social welfare 
policies was changed after experiencing the Asian currency crisis of 1997, known for 
the IMF crisis in Korea. The IMF crisis affected the Korean society in various ways. 
Most importantly and notably, the number of unemployed increased. Due to the 
economic difficulties of the government and companies, many people were made 
redundant even though they were still able and willing to work. This influenced the 
government and the people to change their view on social welfare policies: not only 
people who are not able to work struggle in finding job opportunities, but also those 
who are able to work because of changes in the environment. The IMF crisis also 
influenced the view that social welfare is supposed to be provided by the government 
to the people. During the process of overcoming the IMF crisis within a partnership 
between the government and civil society, not only by the government on its own, 
citizens in civil society became important actors who can tackle and solve social 
problems.  
Interestingly, the self-sufficiency program emerged from this change of view 
on social welfare. It was delivered by the MoW who aimed at providing work 
opportunities for people so they can stand on their own feet thanks to the work 
experiences within the self-sufficiency program or provided by the self-sufficiency 
enterprises. This program is based on the belief and on the philosophy according to 
which work enables the empowerment of people. The role of self-sufficiency centers 
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is to distribute government funding provided by the MoW by establishing a self-
sufficiency enterprise, by hiring the vulnerable in the communities they are located 
in and by giving them opportunities to learn professional work skills, such as 
building constructions, sewing clothes and making shoes.  
In the meanwhile, the “Social Work Program” was carried out by the MoL 
since 2003. Given that the Ministry of Labor is in charge of labor and employment 
issues, the main objective of the “Social Work Program” was to provide work 
opportunities. More specifically, the MoL mentioned that the Social Work Program 
had been launched as a pilot program of the Social Enterprise Promotion Act. In 
other words, the Social Work Program can be seen as a previous institutionalized 
social enterprise policy in South Korea. Although the government considered the 
concept of social work and of self-sufficiency enterprise as the same, the positions of 
the groups of civil society organizations were located differently for their 
relationship with the government in terms of closeness.  
In particular, from the interviews and document analysis, it was clear that 
these two groups were positioned differently when the SEPA was being developed. 
As a matter of fact, the first group, which had a greater emphasis on the cooperative 
discourse of social enterprise, had not been primarily contacted by the government 
even though they have already established the “Social Enterprise Support Centre” in 
2003.  
The WT Foundation, instead, had a closer relationship with the government – 
especially with the Ministry of Labor (MoL) since they had participated in the design 
of the “Social Work Program” with the MoL and in the delivering of the policy 
(Working Together Foundation 2013). However, one interviewee (CE0, Deputy 
Director, J Intermediary, 20 May 2014, 15:30PM-17:40PM) who was included in 
the TFT of the SEPA mentioned that this group also was in disagreement with the 
government plan of the enactment of the SEPA. They changed their position 
afterwards because the power of the government was too strong, as stated by CE0:  
 
“The government’s will to establish this law was too strong to continue resistance 
against it.  Also, we (the second group) expected that we were able to convince the 
government and negotiate with them so that voices from civil society could be 
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included in the law making process of the TFT of the SEPA. (CE0, Deputy Director, 
J Intermediary, 20 May 2014, 15:30PM-17:40PM)” 
  
Although the CSSSED placed a greater emphasis on the cooperative 
discourse of social enterprises, these two groups basically shared the same objectives 
of their activities – solving field-level unemployment and social welfare problems by 
promoting social entrepreneurship. However, only the WT Foundation and other 
close organizations were included in the initial policy design process. For this reason, 
a cooperative discourse along with the actors promoting cooperative discourse was 
neglected throughout the institutional-building process. After the SEPA, the 
differences between these two groups became more apparent in terms of directions of 
their activities and of the discursive and practice strategies put into place against the 
SEPA. Their diversified objectives, approaches and institutional outcomes they 
achieved as intra- and extra-institutional actors will be analyzed in the next finding 
chapter. 
 
6.6 The Strategies of Actors 
 
 
In this Section, I will summarize the findings of the previous sections related 
to top-down and bottom-up actors and to their discursive and practical strategies, 
which are in turn based on their differing positions and interests aimed at 
legitimating their discourses and activities against one another.  
 
6.6.1 Discursive Strategies 
 
6.6.1.1 Top-down Actors 
 
Endorsing the official discourse and the certification system 
 
 
Top-down actors endorsed the official discourse by claiming it is the only 
way to legitimate social entrepreneurship activities. They also emphasized the good 
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sides of the SEPA, given that field-level practitioners can use government subsidies 
and this helps create jobs for vulnerable social groups in Social Enterprises. In 
addition to these points, top-down actors also endorse the certification system by 
claiming it can raise the productivity and efficiency of Social Enterprises by 
providing subsidies only during a given time – a maximum of three years. Since 
Social Enterprises are required to be fully financially independent in the three years 
after their establishment, certified Social Enterprises are assumed to be working hard 
to raise their own income under this certification system.   
 
Invoking the Idea of Certification from the United Kingdom  
 
 
During the legislation process of the SEPA, some of the main policy makers, 
such as researchers at the Korean Labor Institute (KLI), government officers in the 
Ministry of Employment and Labor (MoEL) and members of the National Assembly, 
carried out research on overseas cases, mainly from European countries such as the 
UK, Italy, and Spain. Among these, the country which caught the eyes of the Korean 
government more than others was actually the UK. Here, in 2005 a legal form of 
social enterprise was established – the Community Interest Company (CIC) in 2005.  
 
“The MoEL took the model of the CIC as a fundamental benchmark throughout the 
entire process. In the UK, the government financially supports registered social 
enterprises. These were part of the government procurement for the rehabilitation of 
poor villages and cities. After researching cases of social enterprises in the UK, the 
MoEL decided to implement the certification system. (BD3, Manager, C Government 
Department, 15 June 2014, 18:09PM-17:44PM)”  
 
Regardless of whether the Korean government mistranslated or 
misunderstood the system of the CIC that provides one of legal organizational types 
for social enterprises (Department for Business Innovation & Skills 2011), it 
definitely changed shape and form when the standard certification system was 
introduced to the Korean context. By invoking a translated British social enterprise 
policy – the certification system- the government justified the need to standardize the 
meaning and the organizational forms of Social Enterprise.  
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Challenging other non-institutionalized discourses  
 
The MoL challenged other oppositional discourses by claiming that they 
were not publicly accredited. In other words, top-down actors considered a new 
organizational form to be legitimated only when political authorities institutionalize 
it. By considering themselves as powerful political authorities who lead institutional-
building and changing processes, they were able to include or exclude field-level 
actors based on the certification standards that they had developed. As a result, 
cooperative and local development discourses were not included in the initial 
concept of Social Enterprise in the SEPA.  
 
6.6.1.2 Bottom-up Actors  
 
Endorsing official discourses in terms of legitimation  
 
Bottom-up actors endorsed the official discourse by claiming that it 
legitimated their social entrepreneurship activities. They disagreed with the timing of 
the establishment of the SEPA because they considered the social entrepreneurship 
field to not be mature enough yet for social enterprises to maintain levels of 
sustainability over time. Bottom-up actors also challenged the official discourse by 
claiming that the SEPA limits the scope of definition and the activities of social 
enterprises. Regardless of these points of disagreement, bottom-up actors 
acknowledged top-down actors as powerful actors who can bring social 
entrepreneurship activities into the institutional field by means of legalization 
processes. BB7’s statement summarizes their main arguments as follows: 
 
 “People who were running workers’ cooperatives and self-sufficiency enterprises 
also agreed with the institutionalization of social enterprise activities. However, the 
definition, purpose and stakeholders of social enterprises along with the potential 
outcomes of the SEPA had not been clearly discussed at that time. We encouraged 
the government and other actors to take more time to discuss these points and to 
  170 
achieve a consensus on the SEPA, but this didn’t work out. (BB7, Deputy Director, P 
SE Network, 22 May 2014, 17:14PM-18:25PM)” 
Endorsing workers’ cooperative discourse as an original 
motivation of social enterprises 
 
The CSSSED endorsed the workers’ cooperative discourse by claiming it was 
the original organizational form including both social and economic objectives to be 
achieved through business activities. They also emphasized the fact that cooperative 
governance can empower the participants of social entrepreneurship activities by 
enabling them to be involved in the decision making process of an organization. 
However, this discourse was rejected by top-down and other bottom-up practitioners 
because they believed that it was too idealistic to actually be carried out in the field.  
 
6.6.2 Practical Strategies  
 
6.6.2.1 Top-down Actors  
 
Legal restrictions, resources and the use of a higher cultural 
position  
 
The government, as a representative of the top-down actors in the 
institutional field of Korean social enterprises, had developed several practical 
strategies to support their discourse so that it could be powerful enough to be 
accepted by other actors.  
First, the MoL defined the concept of Social Enterprise based on the law, the 
SEPA, and legally restricted the use of the name Social Enterprise to only certified 
social enterprises, and not the uncertified ones. As a matter of fact, according to the 
SEPA, an uncertified social enterprise can be fined if they use the name of Social 
Enterprise without having a certification. In 2012, Delight, which had been certified 
once as a preliminary social enterprise by the Seoul Metropolitan Government in 
2010, was fined approximately £3,360 (5,000,000 Won) because they had used the 
name Social Enterprise (E-Daily 2012). Delight has been considered one of best role 
models of social enterprises after winning the first prize as a social venture start-up at 
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the “Social Venture Competition” hosted by the MoEL in 2010 (Korea Social 
Enterprise Promotion Agency 2014). Nevertheless, Delight has not been legally 
acknowledged as a Social Enterprise because of the lack of certification.  
Second, in 2008 the MoEL changed the name of the “Employment Creation 
Support Division” to the “Social Enterprise Division” under the “Bureau for Human 
Resources Policy in Aged Society” of the “Employment Policy Office” within the 
Ministry (Ministry of Labor 2008). The MoEL also established the “Korea Social 
Enterprise Promotion Agency (KOSEA)” which was then amended by Article 20 of 
the SEPA on 8th June, 2010. According to the SEPA, the KOSEA conducts social 
enterprise related projects such as: “1) training social entrepreneurs, scouting for a 
model of social enterprise and supporting commercialization; 2) monitoring and 
evaluating social enterprises; 3) establishing social enterprise networks by business 
type, area and in the entire country and supporting the operation thereof; 4) 
constructing and operating the websites of social enterprises and an integrated 
information system; 5) providing consultancy to improve business administration, 
technology, taxation, labor or accounting issues; 6) cooperating in international 
exchanges related to social enterprises; and 7) other businesses related to social 
enterprises, which have been entrusted as prescribed by this Act or other Acts and 
subordinate statutes” (SEPA, Amended by Act No. 11275, 1st February, 2012). 
The “Social Enterprise Division” solely deals with Social Enterprise 
promotion policies and a governmental agency, the KOSEA. The establishment of 
new institutions which are exclusively responsible for delivering Social Enterprise 
policies shows that the government considers the issue of promoting Social 
Enterprise of top priority. Also, founding the “Social Enterprise Division” in the 
MoEL is further proof of the government’s intention to prioritize the promotion of 
Social Enterprises.  
 Third, the MoEL provided financial resources to social entrepreneurs to 
establish and run certified Social Enterprises. A certified Social Enterprise can 
receive government subsidies for the employment of vulnerable social groups and 
professionals who can contribute to business improvement for three to five years. 
Additionally, every certified Social Enterprise can obtain corporate and income tax 
exemption 100% for the first year and 50% for the second and third year. Moreover, 
a certified Social Enterprise can selectively receive subsidies for business 
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development expenses. In addition, apart from the subsidies for certified Social 
Enterprises, social ventures which have been selected as start-ups with the potential 
to be certified as Social Enterprises also receive subsidies for initial business 
development, temporary offices and consulting services from intermediary 
organizations. 
Fourth, the MoEL has also been promoting public awareness on Social 
Enterprise in various ways. The official definition, objectives, activities and 
examples of good social enterprises have been publicly advertised on public 
transportations with the faces of public figures who were appointed as patrons of 
Social Enterprises. Interestingly, the MoEL organized the “Social Enterprise Song 
Contest” in 2008. The best song “Beautiful Social Enterprise” which was selected 
was sung by a famous singer to increase public awareness on Social Enterprises. 
Also, the song was added to public advertisements on TV and radio.  
Lastly, the MoEL has published a “Social Enterprise Magazine” along with 
posts on the “KOSEA Blog”6 about Social Enterprise activities and about the cases 
of good national and overseas Social Enterprises. The “Social Enterprise Magazine” 
was published by the “Research Institute for Social Enterprise” in June 2007 for the 
first time. After that, the Ministry of Labor and the Research Institute for Social 
Enterprise co-published the magazine until July 2012. In July 2012, the KOSEA 
started to publish the “Social Enterprise Magazine – 36.5” independently.  
Fifth, besides public advertisements, the MoEL has been educating social 
entrepreneurs before and after completing the certification process. An example of 
this initiative is given by the “Social Entrepreneurs’ Academy”, both for potential 
social entrepreneurs and actual social entrepreneurs who are running certified Social 
Enterprises. The Academy was founded in 2010 at a national level. Other academies 
for the CEOs of Social Enterprise have also been developed at a local level, such as 
the Seoul Metropolitan Government which started in 2011.   
Sixth, the MoEL has not only been working with top-down actors. As a 
matter of fact, government officers who are in charge of promoting and supporting 
social entrepreneurship continuously communicate with other actors by taking part in 
conferences and seminars on social enterprises and delivering talks from the 
government’s perspective. Government actors tend to indirectly communicate with 
                                                
6 KOSEA Blog, http://blog.naver.com/se365company 
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the field through the KOSEA and through intermediary organizations. Yet, they 
regularly monitor and receive feedback on Social Enterprise related policies thanks 
to continuous workshops, meetings and reports submitted by research institutes and 
intermediary organizations. For example, the KOSEA has conducted biddings for the 
evaluation of projects hosted by the MoEL and the KOSEA since July 2009. More 
specifically, the KOSEA has evaluated their educational projects, such as “Social 
Enterprise Academy”, “Young Entrepreneurs’ Support Program” and the 
“Consulting Program.” Moreover, some of the government officers in charge of 
supporting Social Enterprise policies have participated as judges in fellowship 
programs organized by bottom-up actors. These various forms of interaction between 
top-down and bottom-up actors provided an additional opportunity to deliver the 
official norms and understandings from the government’s perspective. However, this 
was not only one-way. As a matter of fact, these interactions were also a way for 
field-level understandings on social entrepreneurship and activities in practice to be 
communicated to top-down actors.  
 
Table 6-4 Practical Strategies of the Government to Promote the SEPA 
 
Practical 
Strategies 
Contents 
Legal restriction 
on the use of name 
Social Enterprise  
The government certifies that a Social Enterprise had to fit the 
definition and criteria provided by the SEPA.  
The government fines those organizations which call 
themselves social enterprises without being certified.  
Establishment of 
new departments 
The government established a department exclusively for 
Social Enterprises under the Ministry of Labor.  
The government established a Korea Social Enterprise Agency 
under the MoEL that is exclusively responsible for delivering 
social enterprise policies.  
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Providing 
resources  
Subsidies to Social Enterprises for the employment of 
vulnerable people for three to five years.  
Subsidies to Social Enterprises to employ professionals for 
three years. 
Tax exemptions to certified Social Enterprises. 
Business development expenses to selected Social Enterprises.   
Business development expenses and temporary offices to 
selected social ventures (potential Social Enterprises).   
Use of higher 
position  
Fast institutionalization regardless of opposite opinions.  
Public marketing The government publicizes the definition of social enterprise 
along with good examples and government policies in public 
transportation.  
The government appointed public figures as patrons of Social 
Enterprise.  
The government publicized the Song of Social Enterprise sung 
by a famous singer.  
Public advertisement was broadcast on TV.  
The government published a Social Enterprise Magazine and a 
blog on Social Enterprise.   
Educating social 
entrepreneurs 
Educational programs were delivered to (potential) social 
entrepreneurs.  
Lectures/presentations were delivered at Social Enterprise 
educational programs hosted by the MoEL.  
Consultancy services were provided for Social Entrepreneurs.  
Interaction with 
other actors 
Participation in conferences and seminars on social enterprise 
with presentations on the government’s perspective. 
Participation as a judge in private social entrepreneurs’ 
fellowship programs.    
Continuous monitoring of field-level discussions through 
workshops, meetings and reports submitted by intermediary 
organizations.    
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6.6.2.3 Bottom-up Actors  
 
Providing evidence of their actual activities in the field (See also 
8.6.2.1.)  
 
Bottom-up actors promoting cooperative discourses provided evidence of 
their actual activities and achievements in order to be legitimated as Social 
Enterprise. First of all, they claimed that their activities started back in the 1990s 
under the influence of cases of overseas workers’ cooperatives, such as Mondragon 
in Spain. For example, they cited the book entitled “Making Mondragón: The 
Growth and Dynamics of the Worker Cooperative Complex (Whyte and Whyte 
1991)” translated into Korean with the title “Let’s Learn from Mondragón (Whyte 
1992)” in 1992. From these overseas cases they learnt that workers’ cooperatives can 
be an alternative organizational form promoting the equal status of employers and 
employees by adopting the cooperative mind-set – namely, the participatory 
governance. Based on overseas cases, they tried to build workers’ cooperatives, such 
as the “Thread and Needle” and “Narae Construction” from the 1990s onwards. 
Before the self-sufficiency enterprise, there was no legal form of cooperative except 
for specialized cooperatives, such as the Agricultural Cooperative, Credit Union and 
Fishery Cooperatives that nowadays have been transformed into banks. For this 
reason, workers’ cooperatives have been established as unauthorized cooperatives 
until the organizational form of the self-sufficiency enterprise was introduced by the 
government – Ministry of Welfare.  
 
Establishing a collective organization and interactions with top-
down actors – CSSSED (See also 7.4. and 8.6.2.2.) 
 
In order to actively interact with top-down actors, about nineteen work-
related civil organizations established the “Council of Social Work and Social 
Enterprise Civil Society Organizations” in August 2008 to collect and communicate 
the opinion of civil society to the Task Force Team. As a collective organization, 
they officially submitted a report concerning the limitations and problems of the 
SEPA to the National Assembly in March 2006. Later, in April 2006, they 
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participated in a public hearing organized by the National Assembly and addressed 
their position which challenged the limited definition of Social Enterprise which in 
turn did not embrace their activities and organizations. During the initial 
institutionalization process of the SEPA, the CSSSED was the only actor who was 
openly against the legislation and the contents of the SEPA.  
 
Participation in the SEPA Task Force Team   
 
 
Some bottom-up actors represented by the WT Foundation participated in the 
SEPA Task Force Team as field-level practitioners. At the beginning they had 
refused the idea of the SEPA because they believed that the social entrepreneurship 
field was not mature enough yet. However, they basically agreed with the top-down 
actors that the field-level problems of unemployment and of unstable social welfare 
services had to be solved, and that the legalization could provide the official status of 
Social Enterprise to relevant field-level organizations. Accordingly, they became 
closer to the MoL as partners who were able to deliver field-level opinions. These 
changes in bottom-up actors’ social positions are analyzed in greater detail in 
Chapter Eight.  
 
6.7 Conclusion  
  
This Chapter argues that the initial stage of the institutional-building process 
of the SEPA was not as simple as it has been described in government documents 
and by previous research. Regardless of the existence of powerful actor – the 
government in this case, an institutional building process is further complicated when 
multiple actors who present different understandings and backgrounds are involved. 
More specifically, the SEPA is the result of multiple struggles between actors in the 
policy area and in civil society which took the form of big and small disputes on the 
institutional meaning and setting of Social Enterprise.  
As a matter of fact, actors in the social entrepreneurship field have promoted 
their own discourses of social enterprise in various ways in order to resist the top-
down attempt to standardize their discourses and activities. However, as Cast (2003) 
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found, the definition promoted by powerful actors is accepted more easily by other 
actors in the meaning-making process. Thus, this Chapter concludes that the 
institutional pressure cannot be resisted especially when the powerful actor disables 
sufficient discussions on what to include or exclude in the meaning of social 
enterprise with a strong interest in leading the institution-building process.  
  
  178 
 
7 The Emergence of Oppositional Discourses of Social 
Enterprise 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
“Social enterprise has become a proper noun because of the SEPA. Now people 
perceive a social enterprise only as the certified social enterprises supported by the 
Ministry of Employment and Labor (MoEL). The value of social enterprise should 
not be standardized but diversified. However, the SEPA has limited the scope of the 
value, the meaning and the boundaries of social enterprise. (DW2, Researcher, U 
Institute, 10 June 2014, 13:58PM-16:03PM)” 
 
Early institutionalists claim that value and social meaning are instilled to 
organizations especially under dominant institutional mechanisms (Berger and 
Luckmann 1991). Instead, neo-institutionalists and institutional entrepreneurship 
emphasize the importance of the role of actors who are not “passive recipients of 
institutional frameworks” (Scott 1995; Seo and Creed 2002: 240) to achieve an 
agreement on institutional meaning and settings. An in-depth investigation of the 
case of oppositional discourses which emerged under the pressures of the SEPA can 
help me examine how social actors push their own discourses in reaction to the 
dominant discourse and which strategies they use to do so. In other words, do they 
accept the given institutional framework? Do they influence dominant actors who 
then introduce changes or do they fully reject the dominant discourses?   
In this Chapter, I will firstly provide an overview of the emergence of the 
oppositional discourses which criticize a dominant discourse and its viewpoints, but 
without fully rejecting them (Karim 1993). Second, I will provide an analysis on the 
contents of the debate on the SEPA between groups of actors promoting oppositional 
and official discourses. Third, in order to capture the discursive struggles between 
the two different groups of oppositional actors, I will analyze their discourses based 
on Van Dijk (1995)’s framework on in-group and out-group identification which has 
been introduced in Chapter Three. Then, I will analyze each group’s approaches and 
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strategies related to the SEPA using Schneiberg and Lounsbury (2008)’s approach on 
extra and intra-institutional forces which was discussed in Chapter Two, in order to 
examine the interactions with top-down actors and the outcomes of the interactions. 
At the end of the Chapter, I will conclude by drawing from the previous 
considerations on how intra- and extra-institutional entrepreneurs empowered 
themselves to be institutional entrepreneurs and on which discursive and practical 
strategies enabled them to do so.  
 
7.2 The Emergence of Oppositional Discourses 
 
A discursive approach emphasizes the fact that different social actors put 
forward claims against dominant discourses on the basis of their own positions and 
interests (Maguire and Hardy 2006). According to this approach, struggles between 
different actors understandably take place in the institutional field, in order to sustain 
their social positions or to negotiate the meaning of an organization (Maguire and 
Hardy 2006). In the Korean social entrepreneurship field, the struggles over the 
meaning of social enterprise developed as outcomes of the institutional pressure of 
the SEPA that attempted to integrate diverse actors and their discourses into a single 
standard.   
One of the key recurring themes in my data sources, and mainly in the 
interviews, is given by the confusion over the official meaning of Social Enterprise. 
As a matter of fact, during the interviews, in order to prevent any confusion between 
the different discourses of social enterprise of each actor, I found myself having to 
describe the institutionalized meaning of Social Enterprise as “the Social Enterprise 
as defined by the SEPA.” Meanwhile, I described the other forms of social enterprise 
which had not been included in the official definition as “uncertified social 
enterprises”, “social enterprises in broad terms”, “organizations which are supposed 
to be social enterprises”, or “bottom-up social enterprises.”  
This confusion over the meaning of social enterprise is rooted in the 
disagreement on the official definition of Social Enterprise. In Chapter Four of this 
thesis, local development, cooperative and social economy discourses are identified 
as oppositional discourses. The main actors promoting these oppositional discourses 
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are represented by bottom-up actors, including intermediary organizations and Civil 
Society Solidarity for Social Enterprise Development (CSSSED).  
Intermediary organizations, instead, such as the Working Together 
Foundation (WT Foundation) basically share the same viewpoint of top-down actors 
on the institutionalization of Social Enterprises, as I found in Chapter Six. More 
specifically, they consider their activities and discourses to be legitimated when they 
are integrated into the certification system, as BJ7, director of a social enterprise 
network in local communities, actually mentioned:  
 
“A social enterprise can be perceived as social enterprise because the meaning and 
criteria have been institutionalized by the law. Otherwise, if you call your 
organization “social enterprise” without this being institutionalized, it cannot be 
recognized as a social enterprise by society, especially in the Korean context. (BJ7, 
CEO, G SE, 16 June 2014, 14:04PM-16:00PM)” 
 
In addition, intermediary organizations who implement the SEPA also share 
the institutional meaning of Social Enterprise, containing work-related, welfare-
related and corporate social responsibility (CSR) discourses, which are mainly 
promoted by top-down actors. However, oppositional actors also promoted local 
development discourses from the beginning of the institutional-building project of 
the SEPA. Their arguments on the contents of the SEPA and the strategies used for 
the local development discourse to be included in the SEPA will be analyzed in 
Section 7.4.  
The CSSSED, instead, promotes local development, cooperative and also 
social economy discourses against the official discourse. More specifically, the 
discourse on local development highlights the core objectives and the role of social 
enterprises, which aim to develop an economically and socially sustainable local 
community. The cooperative discourse of social enterprises emphasizes, instead, the 
need to implement the principles of cooperative governance into the official meaning 
of social enterprise. Finally, moving to the social economy discourse of social 
enterprises, this discourse focuses on social entrepreneurship activities as a part of 
the social economy and not of the market economy. The CSSSED also basically 
agreed on the need for an institutionalization of social enterprises and on the basic 
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concept of social enterprise, as described in the SEPA. Nevertheless, the CSSSED 
pointed out that the institutionalized meaning of social enterprise according to the 
law is too limited and therefore does not include the value and philosophy of social 
enterprise, as explained by DW2:  
 
“Social enterprise has become a proper noun because of the SEPA. Now people 
perceive a social enterprise only as the certified social enterprises supported by the 
Ministry of Employment and Labor (MoEL). The value of social enterprise should 
not be standardized but diversified. However, the SEPA has limited the scope of the 
value, the meaning and the boundaries of social enterprise. (DW2, Researcher, U 
Institute, 10 June 2014, 13:58PM-16:03PM)” 
 
 Even bottom-up actors who shared a common background related to civil 
movements do not fully agree with each other’s ideas concerning the purposes of 
social enterprise activities and the role of institutionalization. In order to capture the 
discursive struggles between the two different groups of oppositional actors, I firstly 
analyzed their discourses based on Van Dijk (1995)’s framework on in-group and 
out-group identification. Then I analyzed their approaches and strategies in relation 
to the SEPA by using Schneiberg and Lounsbury (2008)’s extra and intra-
institutional force approach in order to examine their interactions with top-down 
actors and the outcomes of these interactions.  
 
7.3 Changes of Social Position  
 
7.3.1 From Out-group to In-group Actors  
 
 
 In the following Section, I shall discuss in greater depth how intermediary 
organizations changed their social positions to in-group actors from out-group actors 
of the institutional field during the institutional-building process of the SEPA.  
One major question which needed to be addressed by the SEPA was how the 
government was able to identify the term social enterprise and the idea of 
institutionalization, even though social entrepreneurial activities had initially 
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emerged from civil society – more specifically from workers’ cooperatives. 
According to many interviewees, the role of civil society organizations – which had 
been transformed as intermediary organizations – was of great importance in that 
they acted as messengers or bridges between the government and civil society actors 
who were already involved in social enterprise activities. CS1, the Deputy Director 
of the K Intermediary, emphasized the role of pre-intermediary organizations in 
delivering field-level opinions and suggesting ideas for policy:  
 
“Intermediary organizations had been established after the enactment of the SEPA 
to deliver policies in the field. Interestingly, the people who established these 
intermediary organizations had taken part in the legalization process. At that time, 
the definition of social enterprise was not very clear even for us. So we focused on 
collecting and delivering field-level practices of social enterprises to the SEPA TF 
Team and on suggesting policies that can reflect field-level opinions. (CS1, Deputy 
Director, K Intermediary, 16 May 2014, 15:04 PM-15:49PM)”    
 
The main actor who worked as a messenger between the government and 
civil society was the WT Foundation, previously known as the National Movement 
Committee for Overcoming Unemployment (NMCOU). Although the NMCOU 
worked together with the government during the Asian currency crisis – named IMF 
crisis in Korea – in 1997 in order to dissolve field-level struggles, before the 
enactment of the SEPA the relationship between the MoEL and the NMCOU was not 
as close as it became after the SEPA.  
From both the government and the intermediary organizations’ perspectives, 
they did not consider each other as in-group actors until the Ministry of Labor 
organized the SEPA Task Force Team in 2005 as shown in Table 7-1. NMCOU got 
closer to the government because this group managed the money collected from 
people in order to overcome the difficulties during the IMF crisis of 1997. Although 
the government did not control the use of these funds, the government provided the 
office and the fund management system for transparency.  
From the government’s perspective, intermediary organizations were 
considered as an out-group, as mentioned by CE0:  
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“The objectives of actions differed between the government and the intermediary 
organizations. Actually, they could have been included in the SEPA TF Team only 
because the president had an amicable relationship with the civil society. (CE0, 
Deputy Director, J Intermediary, 20 May 2014, 15:30PM-17:40PM)” 
 
The interviewee implies that the close relationship between the government 
and civil society had not been formed until the presidency was changed in 2003. 
Besides that, not much was mentioned in relation to intermediary organizations from 
the government’s perspective before 2005. By contrast, intermediary organizations 
were considered as in-group actors in the institutional field mainly led by the 
government since 2006, as shown in Table 7-1.   
After the intermediary organizations had joined the SEPA TF Team in 2005, 
the government’s view on them positively changed, as BH6, the director of F 
government department, stated:  
 
“We can trust intermediary organizations, and not the beneficiaries (Social 
Enterprises) to manage and deliver policies with government funding. Intermediary 
organizations have to support and help the government to deliver the funding 
efficiently and fairly. (BH6, Director, F Government Department, 13 June 2014, 
15:09PM-16:30PM)” 
 
The government’s view on the intermediary organization – formerly work-
related civil organization – positively changed firstly because the government 
expected intermediary organizations to take over some of the work as policy partners. 
Indeed, intermediary organizations collected field-level opinions from certified 
Social Enterprises and facilitated communications with other actors in the social 
entrepreneurship field. Second, by integrating some work-related organizations into 
the policy area, the government was enabled to mobilize existing networks and 
business ideas. The government co-opted intermediary organizations as well as 
certified Social Enterprises by providing financial funding, which became an 
alternative source of finance for operating their own social agendas.  
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Table 7-1 Changes in Describing “Intermediaries” from the Government 
Perspective  
 
As an out-group (2003) 2005 As an in-group (2006~) 
The objectives of their actions 
were different.  
Part of the 
SEPA TF Team 
We can trust intermediary 
organizations, but not the 
beneficiaries (Social 
Enterprises) to manage and 
deliver policies with 
government funding, not 
beneficiaries. 
They could be included in the 
SEPA TF Team because the 
presidency had an amicable 
relationship with civil society 
which used to be against 
government policies and to 
advocate achieving political 
democracy.  
Intermediary organizations 
have to support and help the 
government to deliver their 
funding efficiently and fairly. 
Intermediary organizations 
have to carry out a crucial role 
to gather practitioners’ 
opinions and to create a 
communication network 
between different actors.  
If an intermediary 
organization plays its role 
properly, it will be able to gain 
more power to negotiate with 
the government.  
Intermediary organizations 
also need to diverse their 
sources of finance.  
 
In summary, on the basis of the analysis of the results following the 
framework by Van Dijk (1995), the descriptions of civil society/intermediary 
organizations have been shifted from out-group actors to in-group actors. As a matter 
of fact, the government de-emphasized and marginalized the role of civil society who 
was traditionally against government policies and therefore could not have been 
included in the legalization process previously. In addition to this, the government 
had also denied the role of civil society by stating that “their objectives of actions are 
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different.” In sum, because the government considered civil society as out-group 
actors, they had understated civil society. 
The position of civil society explicitly changed to in-group actors from out-
group actors after 2005, when intermediary organizations rooted in civil society 
joined the legalization process of the SEPA. From this point onwards, the 
government attributed to intermediary organizations the task of delivering SEPA 
policies efficiently and fairly. They also asserted that intermediary organizations 
accomplish a crucial role in communicating with field-level beneficiaries. In addition 
to these considerations, the government directly stated that intermediary 
organizations also gain more power, more resources and higher positions by being 
in-group actors.  
Interestingly, not only did the government’s descriptions of intermediary 
organizations change positively after the introduction of the SEPA, but also the 
intermediary organizations’ descriptions of the government. Before 2005, 
intermediary groups also considered the MoEL as an out-group by under-estimating 
the level of government understanding on social enterprise, as highlighted by CE0:  
 
“The MoEL did not understand what a social enterprise is. Our broadcast campaign 
on social enterprises has improved their understanding of the concept. (CE0, Deputy 
Director, J Intermediary, 20 May 2014, 15:30PM-17:40PM)” 
 
Moreover, interviewees mention that they had initially resisted the original 
legislation plan of the SEPA:  
 
“Social Work TF organizations in civil society had submitted formal questions to the 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MoSF) regarding their policy plans for social 
service work in 2004. In the opinion of civil society (represented by Social Work TF 
organizations here), the policy plan of the government on social service work had 
not been suitably designed but was only a tool to increase the employment rate. 
(CE0, Deputy Director, J Intermediary, 20 May 2014, 15:30PM-17:40PM)” 
 
Civil society organizations also claimed that they had started activities to 
promote social enterprise even before the enactment of the SEPA. For example, the 
Working Together Foundation worked with the KTV (Korea TV) and KBS (Korean 
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Broadcasting System) to produce and air a documentary on workers’ cooperatives 
and social enterprises in other countries to deepen the public’s understanding of what 
a social enterprise is.  
 
“The documentary actually improved the government’s understanding of social 
enterprises. (CE0, Deputy Director, J Intermediary, 20 May 2014, 15:30PM-
17:40PM)” 
 
When the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MoSF) announced the Policy 
Plan on Social Service Work in 2004, the Social Work TF organizations submitted 
formal questions to the government asking for a justification for the use of the term 
social enterprise in the employment policy.  
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Table 7-2 Changes in Describing “Intermediaries” from Their Own Perspective  
 
As an out-group (2003-2005) 2005 As an in-group (2006~) 
MoEL does not understand what 
a social enterprise is.  
Participated in 
the TF team on 
the SEPA. 
MoEL and government 
officers tried to understand 
social enterprises and protect 
civil organizations involved in 
the institution building 
process.  
We resisted the legislation of the 
SEPA in 2005.  
We interacted with each other 
and built a strong partnership 
with the MoEL in order to 
include social entrepreneurs’ 
opinions from the field.  
We (civil society) developed a 
broadcast campaign on social 
enterprises together with KTV 
and KBS. It improved the 
government’s understanding of 
social enterprises.  
Social Work TF organizations 
submitted a questionnaire to the 
Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance (MoSF) regarding their 
policy plan on social service 
work in 2004.  
When the government began 
the legislation process, we had 
to accept and follow it (we 
could not hold them back) 
(cultural and historical 
context). 
Their policy plan on social 
service work was not suitably 
planned as a tool to increase the 
employment rate.  
Unemployment issues were 
the most important agenda at 
that time (context).  
 
After 2005, intermediary organizations notably changed their statements on 
the MoEL and their policies after joining the Task Force Team on Planning the 
SEPA. They started to perceive the government as positive and helpful. In addition 
to this, they also praised the government’s effort to institutionalize the meaning of 
social enterprise:  
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“The MoEL and the government officers tried to understand social enterprise and to 
protect civil organizations involved in the institution building process. (BH5, 
Professor, E University, 23 June 2014, 13:05PM-14:22PM)” 
 
They also emphasized the good partnership with the government:  
 
“We interacted with each other and built a strong partnership with the MoEL in 
order to include social entrepreneurs’ opinions in practice. (CE0, Deputy Director, 
J Intermediary, 20 May 2014, 15:30PM-17:40PM)” 
 
Lastly, they also pointed out the context, where they had to collaborate 
together on the SEPA:  
 
“Unemployment issues were the most important agenda to be solved at that time. 
(CY2, Director, L Intermediary, 15 May 2014, 10:10AM-11:10AM)” 
 
“When the government begins the legislation process, we have to accept and follow 
it (we cannot hold them back). (CK4, Deputy Director, M Intermediary, 15 May 
2014, 15:41PM-16:48PM)”  
 
It is important to recall that the groups selected as intermediary organizations 
share the same view with the government. As a matter of fact, according to 
interviewees who work in an intermediary organization, only certified Social 
Enterprises were considered to be social enterprises, which corresponds to the 
official discourse of social enterprise in South Korea. Some interviewees even 
mention that: 
 
“If the meaning of social enterprise is not institutionalized by the government, Social 
Enterprise would have no effect at all in the Korean society and no one would have 
accepted an un-institutionalized meaning. (BJ7, CEO, G SE, 16 June 2014, 
14:04PM-16:00PM)” 
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7.3.2 From In-group to Out-group Actors  
 
From the oppositional perspective promoting workers’ cooperatives and 
social economy discourses of social enterprise, intermediary organizations were 
obviously considered as out-group actors even when they moved into the position of 
in-group actors in the institutional field. As a matter of fact, some field-level bottom-
up actors denied the active role of intermediary organizations in negotiating the 
meaning of social enterprise with top-down actors. They stated that intermediary 
organizations did not actively negotiate with the government for the official meaning 
of Social Enterprise. From bottom-up and out-group actors’ perspective, 
organizations that have now become intermediary organizations did not push the 
agenda of local development and cooperative discourses hard enough to be included 
within the official discourse of Social Enterprise. According to this perspective, 
intermediary organizations are criticized for handing over the social enterprise 
initiative to the government in order to promote their own social position and gain 
more power for themselves, rather than for the entire social entrepreneurship 
community. Thus, intermediary organizations are considered as administrative-
friendly organizations that are in favor of the government.  
From the perspective of those bottom-up actors who actively promoted social 
enterprise activities by using workers’ cooperative and local development discourses 
and by consequently establishing workers’ cooperatives in local communities in 
practice, intermediary organizations were not aware of what a “real” social enterprise 
is. This is because intermediary organizations had no experience in running a social 
enterprise, such as a worker’s cooperative, which is an organization model that social 
enterprises are obliged to adopt.  
On the other hand, intermediary organizations also consider other bottom-up 
actors who promote local development and worker’s cooperative discourses as out-
group actors. First, intermediary organizations claim that the cooperative discourse is 
too idealistic and does not fit with the Korean context. Second, intermediary 
organizations also believe that they are the actors who have the ability of creating a 
good relationship with both the government and field-level social entrepreneurs. 
Other bottom-up actors, such as the CSSSED, are closer to the field than other 
intermediary organizations because they established and ran social enterprises which 
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imitated the organizational form of workers’ cooperatives. However, intermediary 
organizations claim that bottom-up actors have failed to reflect the actual needs of 
field-level social entrepreneurs, corresponding to the acquisition of more resources to 
run a business, in their legislative bill. 
 
7.4 Conflict After the Institutionalization 
 
 
As highlighted in the previous Section, oppositional actors positioned 
themselves differently in terms of their understanding of the meaning of social 
enterprise and of the certification as a policy ground legitimating social enterprises as 
an organizational form. In this Section, on the basis of the contents of the debate on 
the SEPA, I will identify their struggles over the meaning of social enterprise and 
over the legitimacy of the certification system, which was supposed to reflect the 
original motivations of social enterprise activities. 
 
7.4.1 Contents of the Debate on the SEPA 
 
Although the CSSSED took the position of an out-group actor with respect to 
the government, this does not mean that they refused altogether to interact with other 
actors. On the contrary, they actually promoted their own discourses at meetings, 
public hearings and in official documents. More specifically, the CSSSED and the 
MoEL related to different discourses on the topic: the MoEL focused on the outcome 
and on the efficiency of institutionalizing a new organizational form, while the 
CSSSED focused on the value and the meanings which are embedded in it. Table 7-3 
shows how the meaning of social enterprise and of the certification systems are 
shaped differently by official and oppositional discourses based on the following 
elements: object, key concepts, key subject positions and possibility conditions 
(Maguire and Hardy 2006). 
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Table 7-3 Comparing Discourses in 2006  
 
Element of 
the 
discourses 
Official discourse Oppositional discourse 
Object Social enterprises, such as 
charity shops, NGOs providing 
educational services and social 
services to the defined 
vulnerable social groups  
Social enterprises, such as 
workers’ cooperatives, self-
sufficiency enterprises 
Key 
concepts 
Providing work opportunities;  
Providing social welfare services 
to the vulnerable; 
Certified with certain criteria  
Providing work opportunities; 
Providing social welfare services 
to the vulnerable; 
Participatory governance 
according to which each 
stakeholder takes part in the 
decision making process; 
Either certified or registered 
depending on the organizational 
objectives. 
Key subject 
positions 
The government is the key actor 
who is responsible for the 
legitimation; 
NGOs do not have the right 
management, knowledge and 
skills to manage social 
enterprises in a financially 
sustainable way; 
Big corporations have 
responsibility over social 
problems and they shall 
contribute to social 
entrepreneurship activities. 
NGOs are ready to solely 
organize and manage social 
entrepreneurship activities; 
The government always takes 
the initiative which emerged 
from civil society by means of 
institutionalization without being 
concerned about field-level 
issues. 
 
Possibility 
conditions 
“Institutionalizing the concept of 
social enterprise” is a valid 
discursive construction for top-
down actors; 
“Excluding the criteria of having 
cooperative governance” is a 
valid discursive construction for 
top-down actors. 
“Institutionalizing the concept of 
social enterprise” is not a valid 
discursive construction for the 
top-down and bottom-up actors.  
“Excluding the criteria of having 
cooperative governance” is not a 
valid discursive construction for 
top-down and bottom-up actors. 
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First, it is important to note that top-down and bottom-up actors have 
different understandings over the organizational forms that can (potentially) be social 
enterprises. More specifically, top-down actors who shaped the official discourse of 
Social Enterprise considered Social Enterprises as charity shops, as NGOs providing 
educational and social services to specific vulnerable social groups. In addition to 
this, for top-down actors, the key concepts of Social Enterprise are centered on 
providing work opportunities and social welfare services to vulnerable social groups. 
Moreover, from the top-down perspective, Social Enterprises have to be certified 
with certain criteria established by the government in order to monitor the use of 
subsidies.  
Second, all these key concepts discussed above are closely related to how 
top-down actors positioned themselves and other actors in this institution-building 
project. With regard to this point, the government positioned themselves as powerful 
dominant actors who can legitimate Social Enterprises by institutionalizing the 
criteria which define Social Enterprises as such. The government along with big 
corporations, who are powerful actors in the institutional field, were expected to 
provide certified Social Enterprises with legal, financial and managerial support. 
However, the government considered NGOs, which are potential Social Enterprises, 
to not be endowed with the suitable management knowledge and skills to generate 
enough profits as an enterprise.  
Third, the elements of the official discourse created the following possibility 
conditions of possibility. First, ‘institutionalizing the concept of Social Enterprise’ is 
a valid discursive construction for top-down actors. From the governmental 
perspective, the fast institutionalization process has been considered as a unique and 
taken-for-granted characteristic of the Korean government. The second condition of 
possibility is that ‘excluding previous forms of social enterprise such as cooperatives 
and self-sufficient enterprises’ is a valid discursive construction for top-down actors. 
As a matter of fact, the government considered that self-sufficient movements have 
shown their limitations in contributing to the creation of work opportunities and 
delivering social welfare services.  
Moving to the perspective of bottom-up oppositional actors, these considered 
social enterprises as workers’ cooperatives and self-sufficient enterprises which they 
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had established long before the SEPA. For bottom-up actors, the key concepts 
constituting the meaning of Social Enterprise include: providing work opportunities 
and social welfare services to the vulnerable, having a participatory governance 
where each stakeholder takes part in the decision making process within 
organizations, being certified or registered depending on the organizational 
objectives and the profits they make.  
From the perspective of the CSSSED, the SEPA has neglected the most 
important characteristics of social enterprises, including the contributions to local 
development through social entrepreneurship activities and the presence of a 
cooperative governance structure. While the CSSSED insists that having a 
cooperative governance is the key of social enterprises, actors in favor of the SEPA 
believe that this will cause inefficiencies to the decision making process.  
It is important to recall that the members of the CSSSED, who are mainly 
organizations related to self-sufficient activities and workers’ cooperatives 
emphasizing community spirit and social solidarity between members of society, 
believed that reviving communities through social enterprise activities was an 
objective of primary importance. For this reason, any members of society, including 
the vulnerable people in the labor market, should not be excluded from this.  
Given these considerations, the CSSSED was of the opinion that field-level 
actors were not ready to establish and run social enterprises which were in line with 
governmental criteria. They insisted on the need for a detailed investigation of what 
local actors can do and what they would like to do. According to this point of view, 
the government always takes on initiatives which emerged from civil society by 
means of institutionalization but without being too concerned about the field-level 
issues which they are embedded in and the historical and philosophical background 
of the actors which are involved. 
By challenging the criteria of Social Enterprise described in the SEPA, the 
CSSSED also claimed that the official discourse neglects the value of social 
enterprises as developed by field-level actors. As a matter of fact, the initial 
legislative bill of the SEPA clarifies that the employment ratio of vulnerable social 
groups should be more than 40% if a Social Enterprise wishes to achieve the 
certification. However, the CSSSED claims that first, the ratio given to Social 
Enterprises is too high to be reached in practice, and second, that these criteria will 
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affect the public image of Social Enterprise as an organization which operates only 
for vulnerable social groups.  
The elements of the oppositional discourse which generated conditions of 
possibility (i.e. “institutionalizing the concept of Social Enterprise without 
understanding field-level issues”) are not valid for both top-down and bottom-up 
actors. As a matter of fact, from the CSSSED perspective, the initial institution-
building process of Social Enterprises was too fast and did not involve many 
interactions with local actors. For bottom-up actors who had already adopted and 
carried out social entrepreneurship activities in local communities, even before the 
institutionalization, social enterprise was a new organizational form based on the 
spirit of community and on the solidarity of civil society. However, the SEPA has 
been structured too fast and on the basis of overseas cases without taking into 
account the political, social and historical contexts and relationships between 
different actors in the field.  
Another condition of possibility which is not a valid discursive construction 
for both top-down and bottom-up actors is the following: “excluding previous forms 
of social enterprise such as cooperatives and self-sufficient enterprises.” From the 
CSSSED perspective, as a result of the fast institutionalization of social enterprises 
which did not enable a sufficient development of enough interactions with other 
actors, previous organizational forms, such as self-sufficient enterprises, have been 
totally neglected and the government did not use existing resources and networks 
efficiently.  
 Unlike the government, but in line with the CSSSED, intermediary 
organizations did not believe the field to be mature enough to be institutionalized. 
From their perspective, Social Enterprise has been institutionalized too quickly under 
the government’s strong policy implementation. During this institutionalization 
process, interactions with other actors, who were actively promoting social enterprise 
activities, had not been fully and appropriately carried out. The lack of interactions 
due to the rapid institutionalization resulted in the exclusion of other discourses, 
forms of social enterprises and relevant actors in the field.  
Another important factor which emerged is given by the increased 
dependency on government funding, which from the oppositional actors’ perspective 
in general is seen as a bad side of the SEPA. Top-down actors reacted to this 
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criticism by stating that government subsidies for employment decrease every year 
during the three years of support time in which they are provided to Social 
Enterprises. For example, in order to reduce the financial dependency of Social 
Enterprises on government funding, the amount of employment subsidies to a Social 
Enterprise decreases year by year: 60% in the first year, 50% in the second year and 
30% + 20% (incentives) in the third year. Nonetheless, oppositional actors still argue 
that the policy of subsidized employment assigns more social obligations to social 
enterprises. In other words, a Social Enterprise has to employ at least one vulnerable 
beneficiary in order to be able to receive employment subsidies. However, the Social 
Enterprise does not only pay wages, but it also has to invest on the education and 
management for the extra employment. In addition to these obligations, the Social 
Enterprise cannot dismiss or replace an underperforming employee which has been 
hired through these government subsidies. In short, given these reasons, government 
subsidies for employment are not always good for Social Enterprises with a view 
towards business efficiency.  
After the SEPA, the MoEL and the in-group opposition actors shared mostly 
the same viewpoint on Social Enterprises and on promotion policies for social 
entrepreneurship. As a matter of fact, top-down actors took a favorable view to the 
enactment of the SEPA because it contributes to institutionalizing Social Enterprises, 
when other social actors in the field would like to do the same. Similarly, 
intermediary organizations, who became over time one of the top-down actors, 
consider the institutionalization of Social Enterprise as successful because Social 
Enterprise activities are legally protected and legitimated by the law. Yet, 
intermediary organizations do not fully agree with the policy directions of the SEPA 
which focus on increasing the number of certified Social Enterprises. According to 
them, one of the negative effects of the SEPA is reflected in the existing ecosystem 
of social enterprise which is being ruined due to an inveterate result-oriented 
tendency, obsessed with producing quantitative outcomes. 
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7.5 Interactions between Actors in the Institution-building 
Project  
 
The confusion over the meaning of social enterprise obliged actors to interact 
with each other. In this section, I will illustrate when and how oppositional actors 
reacted and challenged the official discourse with a series of arguments during the 
first phase of the institution-building project between 2005 and 2007 and the second 
phase between 2008 and 2010. As mentioned in the previous section, the CSSSED 
had different objectives, strategies and understandings of social enterprise, which are 
manifested throughout their own discourses. Conflicts over the institutional setting of 
social enterprises occurred when the CSSSED and the top-down actors interacted 
with each other in order to achieve a shared understanding over the institutional 
arrangement (Beckert 1999; Levy and Scully 2007).  
 
7.5.1 First Phase: 2005-2007 
 
The active interactions between top-down and bottom-up actors started when 
the Ministry of Employment and Labor (MoEL) organized the Social Enterprise 
Promotion Act (SEPA) Task Force Team as part of the legislation process in March 
2005. As a reaction to the top-down legislative actions, work-related civil 
organizations established the “Council of Social Work and Social Enterprise Civil 
Society Organizations” in August 2008 to collect and deliver the opinions of civil 
society to the Task Force Team. In June 2006, they changed the name to the “Civil 
Society Solidarity for Social Enterprise Development (CSSSED).” During the initial 
institutionalization process of the SEPA, the CSSSED was the only actor who was 
against the legislation and the contents of the SEPA.  
Table 7-4 shows when and how top-down and bottom-up actors interacted 
with each other with regard to the establishment of the SEPA. In 2005, the 
government began to prepare for the enactment of the SEPA which provides business 
start-up with opportunities directly for poor people and with support for their 
activities. Meanwhile, civil society has reacted to the implementation of the 
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government’s policy. As a matter of fact, in August 2005, about nineteen civil 
society organizations, some of them which were now certified social enterprises, 
established the Council of Social Work and Social Enterprise Civil Society 
Organizations and discussed the limitations of the legislative bills of the SEPA. Later, 
in March 2006, the Council submitted a report on the limitations and the problems of 
the SEPA to the National Assembly. Moreover, in April of the same year, they 
indicated their position in relation to the SEPA in a public hearing organized by the 
National Assembly. In May 2006, the council resolved to establish solidarity in the 
name of the Civil Society Solidarity for Social Enterprise, which embraces social 
entrepreneurial activities. This new group changed its name to the Civil Society 
Solidarity for Social Enterprise Development (CSSSED) and urged the government 
to establish an act that fitted the social atmosphere in Korea at that time and helped 
develop social enterprise. Despite the reactions of the civil society organizations, the 
government carried out their legislation as planned and the CSSSED changed its 
name again to the Solidarity for Korean Social Economy (SKSE) in June 2008. 
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Table 7-4 The Timeline of the SEPA and Civil Society’s Reaction in the First 
Phase (2005-2007) 
(Revised Table Provided by Moon (2007)) 
 
 
 
Government Civil Society 
March. 2005. The “social work” task 
force team was established.  
August. 2005. The Grand National Party 
prepared for the legislation of the SEPA. 
August. 2005. The Council of Social 
Work and Social Enterprise Civil 
Society Organizations was established.  
December. 2005. The Grand National 
Party proposed a legislative bill for the 
“Establishment and Promotion of Social 
Enterprise.”    
- 
March. 2006. The Our Open Party 
proposed a legislative bill for the 
“Support Social Enterprise.” 
March. 2006. A report about the 
problems of the SEPA was submitted to 
the National Assembly. 
April. 2006. The National Assembly, held 
a public hearing on the legislative bills of 
the “Establishment and Promotion of 
Social Enterprise” and the “Support 
Social Enterprise.”  
April. 2006. The Civil Society’s 
position was indicated in a public 
hearing of the National Assembly. 
May. 2006. The MoL implemented 
follow-up projects to prepare for the Act. 
May. 2006. A meeting was held 
between the heads of the relevant 
organizations.   
- June. 2006. The CSSSED was launched.  
- 
August. 2006. The CSSSED urged to 
establish an act that fits the current 
Korean society situation and can 
develop social enterprise.  
December. 2006. The SEPA was 
established.  
- 
April. 2007. An enforcement ordinance 
on the SEPA was promulgated.  
- 
- 
June. 2008. The name was changed to 
the Solidarity for Korean Social 
Economy.  
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7.5.2 Second Phase: 2008-2010 
 
Between 2008 and 2009, the government interacted with other actors from 
the social entrepreneurship field by organizing advisory meetings and policy forums. 
During these meetings, oppositional actors presented the limitations of the SEPA and 
a proposal for policy changes in relation to social enterprise. As a reaction to the 
criticisms which had emerged from civil society, the government organized public 
hearings on the SEPA in May and July 2008. In November 2008, the government 
announced a five years’ policy plan to promote social enterprises based on the 
comments and opinions collected from multiple actors at meetings, public hearings 
and policy forums. In February 2009, the CSSSED changed its name to the 
Solidarity Council of Social Economy in order to emphasize the fact that they are 
promoting a social economy discourse. In March 2009, the Solidarity Council of 
Social Economy organized a policy workshop on the SEPA for its member 
organizations to increase their understanding of government policies and to react to 
top-down actions.  
As a result of these interactions with other actors, the government found the 
need to investigate field-level problems in the field of social entrepreneurship and 
social services. In May 2009, the Prime Minister’s Office organized several field 
investigation teams along with the Task Force Team on Employment and Social 
Safety Net in July 2009. After this, in September 2009, the Prime Minister’s Office 
officially invited organizations which were related to social services and social 
entrepreneurship to submit their opinions on the related policies. Table 7-3 shows the 
timeline of when and how top-down and bottom-up actors interacted with each other 
regarding the amendment of the SEPA. 
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Table 7-5 The Timeline of the SEPA and Civil Society’s Reaction in the Second 
Phase (2008-2010)  
(Compiled by the Researcher based on Collected Data Sources) 
 
Government Civil Society 
2008-2009. Advisory meetings and 
policy forums with researchers, civil 
activists, and practitioners from the field.   
2008. The limitations of the SEPA and a 
proposal for policy change on social 
enterprise at advisory meetings and 
policy forums were presented.  
May and July 2008. Public hearings on 
the SEPA were organized.  
November 2008. The 5 years’ policy 
plan for promoting social enterprises was 
announced.  
- 
- February 2009. The Solidarity Council of 
Social Economy was established 
March 2009.   The CSSSED organized a 
policy workshop on the SEPA for its 
member organizations. 
May 2009. Field investigation teams 
consisting of officers from the Prime 
Minister’s Office were organized.  
July 2009. The Task Force Team on 
Employment and Social Safety net was 
organized.  
September 2009. Organizations related 
to social services and social enterprises 
were asked to submit opinions on social 
services policies.  
- 
 
 
7.5.3 Institutional Outcomes  
 
 
As soon as these different actors had positioned themselves with their various 
discourses, they started to interact with each other in order to maintain or change the 
institutionalized setting.  As a result, the SEPA has been revised nine times so far, 
and among them the definition of social enterprise has been changed twice in 2010 
and 2012. Although the arguments made by the CSSSED on the initial institutional 
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setting of social enterprise have not been fully reflected in the legislation process, 
their constant critical remarks on the SEPA and attempts to include their own 
discourses into the existing institutional setting have managed to achieve institutional 
changes.  
More specifically, the changes in the institutional meaning of social 
enterprise in the SEPA entailed changes of the institutional settings. For example, on 
9th December 2010, the definition of social enterprise has been legally changed by 
including the local development discourse as part of the institutionalized meaning of 
social enterprise (Article 5-2). As a result, the community development model, which 
contributes to the local community by using local resources to employ local 
vulnerable social groups and providing social services to them, has been added in 
2010 as a certifiable model of social enterprise. Following this change of definition, 
the regional governments were able to organize their own programs to promote 
social enterprise activities in their regions and local communities (Article 10-2). In 
addition to this, the Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency (KOSEA) – a 
government affiliated organization that bridges between policy makers and social 
entrepreneurs in practice- was established on the basis of the revised SEPA (Article 
20).  
Another example of institutional change is given by the fact that social 
cooperatives as a legal organizational form may now apply for a social enterprise 
certification as a result of the amendment of the SEPA on 1st February 2012. In order 
to include social cooperatives as a type of social enterprise, the Ministry of Public 
Administration and Security established the “Framework Act on Cooperatives” 
which defines the concept of social cooperatives and the details of the supporting 
policies in 2012. 
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7.6 Strategies of Actors 
 
7.6.1 Discursive Strategies  
 
7.6.1.1 Out-group Oppositional Actors  
 
 The CSSSED reacted to the top-down meaning making process of social 
enterprise by invoking overseas cases, endorsing a social economy discourse that 
embraces other discourses based on their historical activities in the field. Throughout 
this process, they also challenged the official discourse by claiming a lack of 
cooperative governance, which is the key characteristic of social enterprise as it was 
initially developed in the field.  
Invoking overseas cases: Workers’ cooperatives in Spain and Italy  
 
The discourse of workers’ cooperatives has been introduced to local actors 
who were involved in the urban poverty movement in the 1980s. The main actors in 
the urban poverty movement adopted the “Community Organization theory” 
developed by Saul Alinsky and Paulo Freire. These community organization 
movements were started by religious organizations in order to develop poor 
communities in the 1960s. However, these community organization movements were 
threatened by the militant government. As a matter of fact, political pressures from 
the government forced actors to consider political democracy and political 
development in Korean society. The main target of the religious groups involved in 
the urban poverty movement was the working class.  
In the 1990s, local actors who tried to elaborate on the concept and on the 
definition of Korean social enterprise relied on the cooperative discourse adopted in 
overseas cases, such as Mondragon from Spain and Social Cooperative Law in Italy. 
Although similar organizational forms of social enterprise, such as cooperatives, 
already existed in the history of South Korea, both top-down and bottom-up actors 
agreed on the fact that the term “social enterprise” has been imported from other 
countries. Alternatively stated, the concept of social enterprise was elaborated thanks 
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to the translation of overseas concepts and examples of social enterprise (Creed, 
Scully, and Austin 2002) into the Korean context.   
As a matter of fact, the International Forum on Social Enterprise in 2000, 
which is the first official and international event on overseas cases of social 
enterprises and on the conceptualization of social enterprises in the Korean context, 
took an important role in spreading the term and concept of social enterprise. Many 
Korean researchers and civil activists heard of the terms social enterprise and social 
economy during this event for the first time. Consequently, they soon started to study 
the definition and concept by focusing on overseas cases. For example, some 
researchers and activists formed a private study group on social enterprise in order to 
apply the concept to the Korean context. Moreover, the Work Together Foundation, 
which is an NGO, which was started with people’s donations during the financial 
crisis in 1996, sent researchers overseas to visit actual social cooperatives, mainly in 
Europe.  
 
Endorsing the social economy discourse  
 
The “Civil Society Solidarity for Social Enterprise Development (CSSSED)” 
is one of the main bottom-up actors based in civil society who has been challenging 
the official discourse of social enterprise by promoting their own discourses. The 
discourses promoted by the CSSSED are not completely opposite to the official 
discourse but they overlap and are regarded as oppositional discourses (Karim 1993). 
More specifically, the CSSSED promotes local development, cooperative and social 
economy discourses against the official discourse. The discourse on local 
development highlights the core objectives and the role of social enterprises, which 
is to develop an economically and socially sustainable local community. A 
cooperative discourse of social enterprise emphasizes the implementation of the 
principles of cooperative governance into the official meaning of social enterprise. A 
social economy discourse of social enterprise also focuses on social entrepreneurship 
activities as part of the social economy, rather than of the market economy.  
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Challenge the institutional meaning and setting of Social 
Enterprises  
 
Not only the meaning of social enterprise, but also the institutional setting 
that generates social entrepreneurship activities has been criticized due to the lack of 
inclusion of existing logics in the field. From the CSSSED perspective, the initial 
institution-building process of social enterprise was too fast and did not involve 
much interaction with local actors. For bottom-up actors who had already adopted 
and carried out social entrepreneurship in the local communities, even before the 
institutionalization of the concept, social enterprise was a new organizational form 
based on community spirit and solidarity in civil society. However, the SEPA was 
structured too quickly based on overseas cases, without taking into account the 
political, social and historical contexts and the relationships between different actors 
in the field.  
The CSSSED and MoEL perceived the importance of previous organizational 
forms of social enterprises differently because the MoEL focused on the outcome 
and on the efficiency of institutionalizing a new organizational form, while the 
CSSSED focused on the value and the meanings which are embedded. Besides these 
considerations, the MoEL was closer to another group of civil society, the Working 
Together Foundation, and any member of the CSSSED which had not participated in 
the SEPA Task Force Team from the beginning. This shows that the relationship 
between the MoEL and the two different leading groups in civil society was 
complicated and that actors do not share the same opinion on the topic.  
 
7.6.1.2 In-group Oppositional Actors  
 
Endorsing the official discourse  
 
 
Intermediary organizations endorsed the official discourse of Social 
Enterprise by claiming that it is based on social consensus. Accordingly, the official 
discourse is the dominant discourse that legitimates their social entrepreneurship 
activities, as highlighted in Chapters Six and Seven. By endorsing the official 
discourse of Social Enterprise that contains the institutional meaning and setting of 
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Social Enterprise, intermediary organizations were included as an in-group of the 
top-down actors. As a result, intermediary organizations empowered themselves to 
be closer and more influential in comparison to powerful top-down actors who can 
lead institutional building and changing processes.  
 
Challenging cooperative discourse  
 
   
Intermediary organizations challenged the cooperative discourse especially at 
the beginning of the SEPA legislation process. They claimed that the workers’ 
cooperative model is too idealistic and that it cannot be achieved in practice in the 
Korean context. Second, they believed that having a cooperative governance will 
make the decision-making process inefficient (considering that an “enterprise” has to 
be efficient and profit-oriented). Third, cooperative governance does not fit a social 
enterprise as an incorporated company. Lastly, receiving government subsidies to 
hire employees is necessary and helpful when running a business, rather than 
realizing the cooperative discourse into practice.  
 
Reconciling discourses by promoting possibilities to include other 
discourses into the official discourse  
 
Although these organizations challenged the cooperative discourse at the 
beginning of the legalization of the SEPA, they soon tried to achieve a balance 
between top-down and bottom-up actors as intermediaries. Given the role of 
intermediary organizations, they had to communicate with both top-down and field-
level social entrepreneurs and facilitate the conversations between different actors. 
Throughout this process, on the behalf of top-down actors, they promoted further 
possibilities to include other discourses into the official discourse for other actors, in 
order to influence out-group actors to consider the possibility of being integrated into 
the SEPA.  
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7.6.2 Practical Strategies 
 
 
7.6.2.1 Out-group Oppositional Actors  
 
 
Establishing social enterprises in practice before the SEPA  
 
Community organizers based on mostly religious groups tried to organize 
groups of working class people. They believed that working class people can be 
empowered by organizing political groups among them in order to express their 
voices and to participate in political activities. However, reality revealed itself to be 
harsher when they went to the field – namely the poor urban areas. Organizing 
political working class people was not easy because the top priority of working poor 
people was not political empowerment, but economic empowerment. For them, 
earning money and living everyday with that income was the top priority so they had 
no space to think deeply about the political empowerment. In the meanwhile, a 
pastor Heo, Byung-sub had established a construction workers’ community “Gun-
chuk-il-kun-du-re (construction workers’ community)” which provided work 
opportunities to workers without involving middlemen. This workers’ community is 
considered to be one of first workers’ cooperative in South Korea that started to 
organize workers’ groups based on their “work” and economic activities in 1988 
(Park 1990). 
Later on in the 1990s, a BBC documentary of a worker’s cooperative 
“Mondragon (Spain)” was introduced in South Korea by a consumer cooperative 
“Hansalim.” A group of people who watched this documentary established the first 
worker’s cooperative in South Korea in 1993 called “Thread and Needles.” This 
sewing workers’ cooperative was established according to the articles of the 
cooperative by a group of sewing workers (Jung 1993). The case of “Thread and 
Needles” spread all over the country as an example of overcoming poverty by 
workers who were already in poverty. This example has been discussed by 
newspapers, magazines, broadcastings and it affected other workers who established 
similar workers’ cooperatives in various communities. However, at that time, there 
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was no legal status of “workers’ cooperative” so most of these organizations were 
established as incorporations according to the Commercial Law.   
 
Establishing an independent research institute and network with 
local social entrepreneurs  
 
Bottom-up actors who promoted oppositional discourses expressed their 
disagreement on the SEPA by establishing the CSSSED. Their main disagreement on 
the SEPA was given by the fact that they believed that the institutionalized meaning 
of Social Enterprise according to the law is insufficient with regard to the inclusion 
of the value and philosophy of social enterprise, as discussed previously. As a matter 
of fact, the CSSSED changed its name several times between 2006 and 2012. In June 
2008, the CSSSED changed the name to the Solidarity for Korean Social Economy 
and in February 2009, another change was made to the Solidarity Council of Social 
Economy in 2012 in order to react to the establishment of the Social Economy Act.  
 
7.6.2.2 In-group Oppositional Actors  
 
Conforming (self-adjustment) with powerful actors  
 
Intermediary organizations who deliver government policies on social 
enterprise have mixed identities as top-down and bottom-up actors. Intermediary 
organizations used to be NGOs or foundations based on civil society. For example, 
the interviewees working in an intermediary organization mention that their 
organizations came from the cooperative and self-sufficiency movement. In other 
words, these intermediaries share the identity and the history of cooperative and self-
sufficiency movements with independent civil movement actors.  
However, they have now become intermediary organizations who deliver 
government policies with government funding in order to be considered as an “in-
group” actor in the institutional field mainly designed and led by the government. 
Interviewees mention the following:  
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“Being an intermediary organization is important because we can easily submit 
policy recommendations. In this position, we can make an actual change in the 
policy area. (CS6, CEO, O Intermediary, 12 June 2014, 10:07AM-11:30AM)” 
 
The acquisition of positional gains means that these organizations can gain 
more power to speak out to policy makers. The possibility of their opinions being 
accepted has increased and for this reason they can achieve more stable financial 
resources. Intermediary organizations do not need to be certified Social Enterprises, 
and they basically support the certification process in the region where they are 
located and where they deliver various ad-hoc decisions and policies of the MoEL, 
so that they do not make any financial profits. Intermediaries are usually former 
NGOs working closely with local organizations, such as social enterprises struggling 
with financial sustainability. When they partner with local NGO-like organizations, 
they have to generate some profits by developing their own projects or by charging 
membership fees. However, when they are selected as intermediary organizations, 
the government pays for the personnel which is responsible for the certification 
process. Other administrative fees are also covered by public funding. Obviously, 
they have more opportunities to be accepted by the dominant actor, which is the 
government.  
However, during this process of being an in-group actor in the institutional 
field of social enterprise, intermediaries admit that they were distanced from the 
practical field, so they did not listen to the voice of civil society especially when the 
enactment of the SEPA was discussed in the SEPA task force team. This gave people 
the impression that the institutional process of the SEPA was solely led by the 
government, although intermediaries themselves participated in the process as a 
representative of the civil society.  
Although intermediary organizations positioned themselves as a bridge that 
connects the government, social entrepreneurs and civil society by communicating 
with all the actors in the field, other actors who are based on civil society criticize 
them for taking the social enterprise initiative out of the civil society while having a 
closer relationship with the government and following funding opportunities but 
neglecting what a social enterprise truly is.  
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7.7 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter concludes that bottom-up actors chose different strategies to 
influence the institutional changes, even though they share the basic viewpoints and 
backgrounds. Intermediary organizations empowered themselves by being intra-
institutional entrepreneurs who challenged existing institutions by mobilizing 
insiders and outsiders and who established networks and resources Schneiberg and 
Lounsbury (2008). Their main strategies were compromised to the existing 
institutional rules – the SEPA. As Oliver (1991) found, organizations use balancing 
tactics under conflicting institutional demands. Under the top-down pressures to 
create Social Enterprises which fitted the given definition in the SEPA, intermediary 
organizations tried to balance between top-down and field level actors, conforming 
with the expectations of top-down actors, and also bargaining with top-down actors 
to adopt the local development discourse in the SEPA.   
Out-group oppositional actors remained in their position as extra-institutional 
entrepreneurs who mobilized alternative resources and networks in order to achieve 
institutional changes (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008). They also took a more 
active form of resistance against the SEPA. Their strategies can be summarized to 
manipulation, as they tried to influence top-down actors to change their viewpoint on 
social enterprise by promoting the cooperative discourse. They were able to take an 
active form of resistance because of their accumulated experiences of creating actual 
organizations in the field. Out-group oppositional actors such as member 
organizations of the CSSSED were also able to raise issues about the limitations of 
the SEPA, which narrowed down the definition and scope of activities of social 
entrepreneurship. Because they were considered as nascent actors who from the start 
1) initiated the need to promote social entrepreneurship aimed at the inclusion of 
poor and socially vulnerable people; 2) introduced the concept and the overseas cases 
of social enterprises to Korean society; and 3) established actual social enterprises in 
practice in order to prove that social entrepreneurship activities can contribute to 
solving economic and social problems which local communities face. In short, 
proving that their discourses are true by presenting historically accumulated activities 
is important especially for actors who are not integrated into the institutional field.   
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Although oppositional actors are divided into different groups because their 
interests in the institution-building project are not the same, nevertheless they all take 
important and influential positions in this project. In some instances, they actually 
worked as institutional entrepreneurs who actively influence institutional building or 
change processes. As a result, the scope of definition of certified social enterprise has 
changed over time in South Korea, while local actors discursively pushed their own 
discourses in order to build a shared understanding over social enterprise. The 
findings also show that having a conflict between different actors who have different 
institutional logics can be a positive way to trigger change (Romanelli 1991).  
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8 Emergence of Alternative Discourses of Social 
Enterprise 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
“If we are good at our work and if we are able to produce successful and influential 
cases, other actors naturally follow us and want to learn our way of doing business. 
That’s why I have not been actively interested in interacting with other actors which 
seem to be located at the opposite spectrum of social entrepreneurship. It has been 
more than 5 years since the SEPA was established. So now people know that the 
SEPA model is not the best model to achieve both social and economic objective, as 
a social enterprise is supposed to do. I can actually see the phenomena that people 
started to communicate to each other and learn from each other’s cases. And they 
always contact me first to know and learn our business management skills and 
strategies. (EJ0, CEO, C Investment, 2 June 2014, 10:35AM-12:00PM)”   
 
Despite the strong policy implementation for Social Enterprises, alternative 
discourses which are not in line with the official discourse of social enterprise 
(Karim 1993) have emerged. These alternative discourses initially emerged in 2006 
when the concept of Social Enterprise was about to be institutionalized. Although 
alternative and oppositional discourses officially developed as a reaction to the 
SEPA in 2006, the relationships between actors promoting each discourse are 
different one from the other.  
 In this chapter, first, I will identify social innovation and entrepreneurship 
discourses as alternative discourses of social enterprise. Second, I will analyze social 
innovation and entrepreneurship discourses based on their criticisms of the 
institutional meaning and setting of social enterprise. This analysis on the contents of 
the debate will focus on how the certification system led to conflicts over the 
meaning of social enterprise with those actors who were promoting alternative 
discourses. Third, I will present how alternative actors tried to interact with top-down 
actors in order to carry out changes of the meaning of Social Enterprise in the SEPA. 
Lastly, I will outline the empowerment of alternative actors in relation to the 
strategies of alternative actors – which differed from other discourses by 
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emphasizing social innovation, proving their ability to make profit and choosing 
alternative certifications.   
 
8.2 Emergence of Alternative Discourses  
 
Each actor reacts to institutional pressures by means of different strategies 
given that they have different interests (Oliver 1991). Actors promoting alternative 
discourses reacted to the SEPA by inventing alternative names of social enterprise, 
such as “social venture” and “social innovation enterprise.” The analysis of my 
results shows that they had invented the term “social venture” and “social innovation 
enterprise” for two main reasons. First, they wanted to avoid the penalty for using the 
name of social enterprise despite being uncertified social enterprises. Second, they 
wanted to differentiate the social enterprises they were running from certified Social 
Enterprises. During the interviews, all the interviewees in the social venture sector 
mentioned that:  
 
“We are different from certified Social Enterprises.” 
 
This statement is the key to examining how alternative actors interact or 
disconnect with other actors and how they developed their strategies to promote their 
own understanding of social enterprise. As Oliver (1991) identified, dismissing or 
ignoring is an active strategy to react to institutional pressures. By analyzing 
alternative discourses compared to dominant and oppositional discourses, I will 
conclude this Chapter by showing how alternative actors dismissed other discourses 
strategically but endorsed social innovation and entrepreneurship discourses in order 
to extend their power as their discourses were dramatically conflicting to each other. 
 
8.2.1 Social Venture and Social Innovation Enterprise  
 
Given these considerations, who are the actors promoting alternative 
discourses and how did they develop the alternative term “social venture” and “social 
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innovation enterprise” as a reaction to the SEPA? Three groups of actors used the 
name of social venture or social innovation enterprise, instead of Social Enterprise.  
The Social Enterprise Network (SEN) Korea established in 2006 is the 
organization that first held the “Social Venture Competition for University Students” 
in South Korea. The SEN and the Social Venture Competition influenced the broad 
acceptance of the concept of “social venture” in South Korea. The deputy director of 
the SEN initially learned about social entrepreneurship in the United States in 2003. 
He mainly adopted the US oriented concept of social enterprise when he visited the 
Social Enterprise Competition, a Social Venture Competition organized by the 
Columbia University in 2003. Following this, based on the partnership with the 
Social Enterprise International Network and Columbia University, the SEN Korea 
organized the Korean version of the Social Venture Competition in 2005. 
The six criteria for the best social venture idea of the competition shows what 
was considered to be the defining features of a social venture (Korea Social 
Enterprise Promotion Agency 2013c). The six criteria are: 1) financial, social or 
environmental value proposition; 2) market opportunities (why this idea is needed 
and why this idea has not worked in the market); 3) market solution; 4) target 
customers; 5) members of management team; and 6) financial and social impacts. 
Taking a closer look, these criteria of social ventures are actually different from the 
certification criteria provided by the SEPA. While the SEPA emphasizes the role of 
Social Enterprises providing work opportunities and social services to vulnerable 
social groups, the SEN emphasizes the clarifying motivations of the business and the 
need to be realistic in terms of running a financially sustainable enterprise.  
Interviewees who are working in the business sector while pursuing certain 
social objectives mentioned that they are: 
 
“influenced by the SEN which was the first organization they have met when they 
were seeking to know more about social enterprise. (EJ0, CEO, C Investment, 2 
June 2014, 14:07PM-16:23PM)”  
 
Most interviewees who answered that they were influenced by the SEN, are 
working in the traditional business sector, such as finance and consultancy rather 
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than the social services sector. Examples such as crowd funding and social finance 
organizations are included in this group of actors.  
Second, some supporting organizations established by NGOs or private 
companies also use the term “social venture” or “social innovation enterprise.” The 
Hope Institute, for example, established the Social Innovation Centre in 2006 and 
since then they have organized a supporting program for the social venturing 
activities of university students (The Hope Institute 2006). These activities were 
mainly initiated by Park, Won-soon who is the current mayor of the Seoul 
Metropolitan City, and the former founding member of the Hope Institute. He is a 
well-known civil activist who introduced overseas social enterprise activities mainly 
from the UK, US and other European countries. He also established the Beautiful 
Store, which is considered to be one of first Social Enterprises in South Korea. The 
Beautiful Store established the “Social Enterprise Support Center” and launched the 
“Beautiful Fellowship” that supports the activities of social innovators who are 
running a social innovation enterprise since 2011 (Beautiful Store 2014).  
Third, overseas organizations that have a Korean office, such as the Ashoka 
Foundation, also do not use the term social enterprise. Instead, they use the 
untranslated term “social entrepreneurs” and “social enterprise” in English, rather 
than using the translated term “social entrepreneurs (Sa-hoe-jeok-gi-eop-ga)” and 
“social enterprise (Sa-hoe-jeok-gi-eop)” (Ashoka Korea 2015b). Although the 
Ashoka International uses the term social entrepreneurship, social enterprise and 
social entrepreneurs freely, Ashoka Korea cannot because it may create 
misunderstandings if they use the word “social enterprise (Sa-hoe-jeok-gi-eop)” in 
the Korean language. As mentioned in the previous Chapters, only certified Social 
Enterprises can call themselves a Social Enterprise, otherwise they may get fined. 
Moreover, the official concept of Social Enterprise provided by the government is 
much different from the meaning of social enterprise that Ashoka is promoting. For 
Ashoka Korea, being a social enterprise refers to an organization that can make 
meaningful social changes and solve field level social problems, such as inequality 
and lack of empathy (Ashoka Korea 2015b).  
Ashoka Korea has a high-level reputation in Korean Society because it is 
well-known that Ashoka is one of first foundations who used the term “social 
entrepreneurship” and “social entrepreneurs” in the world. Accordingly, the 
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establishment of the Korean office influences other actors to accept the concept of 
social enterprise. The number of applications for the Ashoka Fellowship is increasing 
and some other organizations are borrowing the concept of the fellowship program 
and social enterprise, as introduced by Ashoka Korea.  
 
8.3 Brief Background of Social Venture in South Korea  
 
The “Social Venture Competition” organized by the Social Enterprise 
Network (SEN) in 2005 is the first event that introduced the concept of social 
innovation. The SEN Korea was established thanks to nine business schools, the 
Korea Development Institute (KDI), the Ark Investment and the Working Together 
Foundation in 2005 (Social Enterprise Network Korea 2015). The SEN mainly 
adopted the term of social enterprise from the United States, as they clearly 
mentioned that they organized the SEN and “Social Venture Competition” based on 
the partnership with the Social Enterprise International Network and Columbia 
University. 
From their perspective, the term “social enterprise” is often explained with 
the term “blended value” according to the US approach. Social enterprise is defined 
as an organization that “pursues blended value returns that may embrace the 
subjugation of a certain amount of financial returns or take on added risk in pursuit 
of social and/or environmental value creation” (Emerson, Bonini, and Brehm 2004: 
20). Here, blended value “posits that value is generated from the combined interplay 
between the component parts of economic, social and environmental performance” 
(Emerson, Bonini, and Brehm 2004: 15). Blended value tackles the traditional views 
on value according to which for-profit organizations create only economic value and 
non-profit organizations create only social value, based on the argument that value is 
non-divisible. In this report, the definition of social entrepreneur is also clarified: “an 
individual who uses earned income strategies to pursue social objectives, 
simultaneously seeking both a financial and social/environmental return on 
investment” (Emerson, Bonini, and Brehm 2004: 20). Authors of the report admitted 
that it is not a broad definition of social entrepreneurship but emphasizes a for-profit 
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objective of social enterprise that creates surplus revenue which can be in turn 
reinvested into relevant social entrepreneurship activities.   
From my data, the SEN Korea and other social entrepreneurs that run social 
ventures stated repeatedly that they are mainly influenced by the concept of “blended 
value.” As a result of the US influence, social venture is defined as:  
an organization which solves social problems that governments and/or the 
third sector organizations have failed to solve, through innovative business activities.  
 
During the process of doing business, social ventures are expected to produce 
a certain amount of financial returns that can maintain their business and contribute 
to further activities. Financial sustainability is therefore considered to be important to 
enable social ventures to conduct their social activities. 
To be a certified Social Enterprise, an organization has to have a clear social 
objective that contributes to employment, social services, and/or local development 
problems (Ministry of Employment Labor 2006). In the meanwhile, the social 
objectives of social ventures can be represented by any social problem which is yet 
unsolved or those which have not been perceived as social problems. Therefore, the 
target groups of certified Social Enterprises are limited to vulnerable social groups, 
while social ventures may target any group of society and also the whole society. 
Perceiving or finding social problems can be a part of the innovation process for 
social ventures. On the contrary, a certified Social Enterprise does not necessarily 
need to be innovative in its way of doing business. Conventional business and 
industries, such as bakeries, restaurants, manufacturing, and health care services, can 
also be certified Social Enterprises if they provide work opportunities and/or social 
services to vulnerable social groups. However, social ventures emphasize the 
innovative side of social enterprise more prominently.  
Because social ventures consider achieving financial sustainability to be more 
important, they prefer to be independent from government subsidies. They believe 
that business will be dependent on the government subsidies and controlled by the 
government if they receive government subsidies. This tendency not to prefer to 
receive government subsidies is also related to having a certain level of flexibility 
and efficiency in their business activities. Given that the certification system has 
been criticized for too much paperwork that lowers efficiency in terms of time and 
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work of social entrepreneurs, social ventures often avoid the extra work given by the 
government to focus on their main work – business. Therefore, most social ventures 
prefer to obtain investments from conventional or angel investors who invest in 
social businesses.    
 
8.4 Social Innovation and Entrepreneurship Discourses as 
Alternative Discourse of Social Enterprise  
 
 
In the previous Section 8.2.1., three groups of actors who are using the 
alternative terms of Social Enterprise – social venture and social innovation 
enterprise- were identified. However, there is no agreed official definition of social 
venture and social innovation enterprise even among these alternative actors. In other 
words, although some groups of actors share the alternative terms of Social 
Enterprise, the details of each organizational form can be different. Here again, the 
government intervention in the social entrepreneurship field not only by means of the 
SEPA, but also given the attempts to integrate social ventures under their definition, 
has resulted in confusion and struggles. As Reinecke, Manning, and Von Hagen 
(2012) emphasized, the certification system which attempts to integrate various 
organizational forms into the single standard externalized the unexpected multiplicity 
of the meaning and organizational forms. For example, an interviewee who has been 
working in a few of the social venture incubating organizations asked me when I 
introduced the term “social venture” during the interview:  
 
“What kind of organizations are you talking about when you use the term “social 
venture”? Are you talking about the movement of young people, social enterprise in 
general, or potential certified Social Enterprises? People define social venture so 
differently. For example, some people define social ventures as social enterprises in 
a broad concept, which aim to achieve social value regardless of having a Social 
Enterprise certification. Or, others think that social venture is a movement of young 
people who want to contribute to solving social problems through social 
entrepreneurial activities. And there are more varieties of definitions of social 
ventures. Everyone views social ventures differently. (DS8, Director, A SV, 20 May 
2014, 09:41AM-10:46AM)”   
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Indeed, the term “social venture” was being used in a broader way, 
comprising various types of social entrepreneurial activities besides certified Social 
Enterprises. During my analysis, I found that alternative discourses of Social 
Enterprise can be divided into two discourses: social innovation and entrepreneurship 
discourses. While the first group of actors emphasizes the idea of making 
organizations financially sustainable, the second group of actors emphasizes the 
sustaining motivation of individual entrepreneurs. This does not mean that keeping 
entrepreneurs’ motivation and performance high is not important for the first group. 
However, the priority in terms of the importance of sustaining organizations differs 
between the two groups of actors even though they promote alternative discourses of 
social enterprise against the dominant discourse. For this reason, I have identified the 
first group of actors as actors promoting social innovation discourse, while the 
second group of actors is given by those promoting entrepreneurship discourse. 
 
8.4.1 Social Innovation Discourse  
 
 
In the Korean context, actors using the term “social venture” and “social 
innovation enterprise” emphasize the fact that a social enterprise should be 
innovative. According to them, a social enterprise has to invent a new or innovative 
way of doing business that can solve any kind of social problem, not only those 
related to employment and social services. From this perspective, a social enterprise 
can drive social changes, system changes or even market changes against traditional 
society, systems or markets. During this process of solving social problems, an 
innovative way of doing business needs to be invented and used in order to achieve 
the business’s objectives. For this reason, for this thesis, an alternative discourse 
emphasizes social innovation as a core characteristic of social enterprise and has 
been identified as “social innovation discourse.” 
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8.4.2 Entrepreneurship Discourse 
 
 
Another characteristic that alternative actors consider to be important is given 
by the abilities of the social entrepreneurs that develop the innovative social business 
idea to establish and manage a socially and financially sustainable social enterprise. 
From this perspective, social entrepreneurs can be detected and related to the social 
enterprise domain through private social entrepreneur support programs, such as the 
Ashoka Fellowship, the Beautiful Fellowship or other social investment programs. 
As a matter of fact, the social entrepreneur support programs of private organizations 
usually seek social enterprise initiatives with innovative, ethical or ecological 
characters, which can hardly meet the criteria of certified social enterprises.  
An example among these is given by the Beautiful Fellowship which 
supports “Socially Innovative Entrepreneurs” who aim at solving social problems in 
the field of environment, human rights, education, culture and social communities 
thanks to innovative social ideas (Beautiful Store 2014). In the case of the Ashoka 
Fellowship, support is provided to social entrepreneurs who present five 
characteristics of new ideas which aim at changing society: creativity, 
entrepreneurship, social impact of business idea and ethics (Ashoka Korea 2015a). 
Compared to the government and to big companies, these private fellowships do not 
think about how much profit a social enterprise can make in a limited amount of time, 
or how many employees it may take on, but they focus instead on single social 
entrepreneurs who have the ability to develop and realize innovative ideas with the 
potential to change society. 
Besides the Ashoka Korea and Beautiful Store, social finance companies also 
consider the abilities of social entrepreneurs to be the most important criteria to focus 
on. They accept a capitalist way of doing business which aims for a social enterprise 
to be competitive enough to survive in the traditional market. They do not target 
vulnerable social groups as their only target groups. Instead, they do business in the 
market just as other (traditional) companies do and they believe that they can 
accomplish changes in a better way by being recognized and accepted by the 
traditional market. In short, they aim to achieve financial success and sustainability 
first. Crowd funding, sharing economy and consultancy companies are examples of 
those who promote the entrepreneurial discourse of social enterprise. 
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8.5 Conflicts between Actors Promoting Alternative and 
Official Discourses  
 
Actors discursively struggle when power relations are fixed in the 
institutional-field (Van Dijk 1997). More specifically, actors claim dominant 
discourses by pushing their own meanings in order to negotiate the institutional 
meaning (Van Dijk 2008). In the Korean social entrepreneurship field, alternative 
actors as outside actors of the institutional filed claimed the limitations of the 
dominant discourses – the SEPA- and promoted their own discourses as the original 
meaning of social entrepreneurship. In this section, I will analyze social innovation 
and entrepreneurship discourses based on their criticisms of the institutional meaning 
and setting of Social Enterprise in the SEPA. The analysis on the contents of debate 
will outline how the certification system led to conflicts on the meaning of social 
enterprise with actors promoting alternative discourses. 
 
8.5.1 Contents of Debate on the SEPA  
 
At the beginning of the institution-building project of Social Enterprise, 
actors who were promoting alternative discourses actively participated in raising 
issues and creating a shared understanding over the concept of social enterprise. As a 
result, the government developed policies to promote social venture activities, such 
as the “Social Venture Competition” in 2008 and the “Young Social Entrepreneur 
Promotion Project” in 2011. However, because the term social venture has been 
adopted in policy in a different manner from the definition discussed by social 
entrepreneurs in the field, groups of actors promoting social innovation and 
entrepreneurship discourses have taken a distance from the certification or from the 
possibility of being part of the institutionalized meaning of Social Enterprise.  
Table 8-1 shows how the different groups of actors promoting alternative 
discourses are for or against the SEPA. All actors including independent social 
entrepreneurs and civil organizations supporting social venture activities agree with 
the fact that the certification system can increase public awareness on social 
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enterprise and can improve public confidence for social enterprises. However, actors 
promoting alternative discourses are fundamentally against the SEPA for a number 
of reasons, as discussed below.  
 
Table 8-1 Comparison between the Positive and Negative Elements of the SEPA  
 
 In favor of the SEPA Against the SEPA 
Independent 
social 
entrepreneurs  
 
  
Business ideas that can solve 
fundamental problems 
The certification system took the 
place of social entrepreneurship 
Promotion of cooperatives  
Institutions do not always 
provide the best way 
Doing business to get resources 
from the government 
  
 
Marginalization of the word 
SOCIAL 
Civil 
organizations  
Certification has a positive 
image for the public.  
Certification will help social 
enterprises to work in the 
public market and in local 
communities.  
Giving subsidies for employment 
The government’s control over 
the market and the ecosystem 
Development of a law with no 
underlying philosophy and no 
understanding of field level 
problems 
Paperwork is a waste of time 
Result oriented activities 
SE ecosystem has been ruined by 
the introduction of subsidies 
 
 
The first key criticism of the SEPA is given by the fact that the certification 
system limits the scope of social enterprises. Here, one big question is raised – “What 
is social? Or what does being ‘social’ mean?” Because the meaning of ‘social’ is too 
limited in the SEPA, the scope of social entrepreneurial activities also becomes too 
limited. For instance, top-down actors define “social” as providing social welfare 
services to people who have been excluded by society. However, according to this 
limited meaning of social enterprise, other uncertified social enterprises are bound to 
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be neglected and excluded from the standard organizational form of social enterprise. 
As a matter of fact, EC1, who introduced the concept of social venture into Korean 
society in 2005, claimed that the scope of the meaning of “social” is too limited in 
the SEPA, as follows:  
 
“We and the top-down actors, mainly the MoEL, understand social enterprise very 
differently. Providing work opportunities and social services to vulnerable social 
groups through social enterprises is not a bad thing at all. However, defining social 
enterprises as part of the social services industry is not a good thing. Excluding 
those uncertified social enterprises who do not fit the criteria of the Social 
Enterprise certification from the official meaning of social enterprise is bad. In this 
sense, the Social Enterprise Promotion Act should have been called the Social 
Services Promotion Act. (EC1, Deputy Director, D SV, 13 May 2014)”  
 
Second, the SEPA has been contested due to its policies aimed at promoting 
social enterprises. Once the MoEL certifies a Social Enterprise, this organization can 
apply for government subsidies to hire professionals and/or vulnerable social groups. 
The subsidies provided by the MoEL depend on the size of the business and of the 
employment force belonging to vulnerable social groups for a maximum of five 
years. The subsidies for employment which are included in this case are represented 
by the minimum wage for an employee and 9.33% of four major public insurances 
that have to be paid by employers. Social Enterprises receiving government subsidies 
are screened by the KOSEA (Korea Social Enterprise promotion Agency) every year 
to see if employees have actually worked and have been paid according to the SEPA 
regulations. The KOSEA and MoEL can either stop or continue subsidizing a Social 
Enterprise for further years depending on the employment and ethic status of an 
organization (Ministry of Employment and Labor 2006).   
Besides the subsidies for employment, the MoEL also provides subsidies for 
business development to support Social Enterprises with regard to product or service 
branding, R&D, market expansion and marketing. The subsidies for business 
development can be provided for a maximum of three years and amount to 
approximately £ 70,000 (100 million Won) per year (Korea Social Enterprise 
Promotion Agency 2016). In the case of both subsidies for employment and business 
development, the amount of subsidies decreases every year in order to prevent Social 
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Enterprises from becoming solely dependent on government subsidies. After one 
year of subsidies for business development, for the second year a Social Enterprise 
bears 20% of the subsidies and 30% of the subsidies in the third year. Similarly, the 
rate of employment subsidies decreases every year from 100% to 70% in the second 
year and to 60% in the third year (Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency 2016).  
The argument from the actors promoting alternative discourses is that 
receiving government subsidies for employment and business development is not a 
sustainable way of managing the social entrepreneurship field and social enterprise 
businesses from a long-term perspective. First, a benefit of receiving government 
subsidies is represented by the fact that it can attract people who are not interested in 
social entrepreneurship but only in the funding. Therefore, some people who are 
running out of money or are in financial difficulties to sustain their business can 
disguise themselves as social enterprises in order to obtain government subsidies. In 
this way, people who disguise themselves as social enterprises would financially 
benefit from this situations, while actual potential beneficiaries may lose the 
opportunity of receiving subsidies to solve social issues. Also, if the number of 
disguised social enterprise increases, this will also affect the good image of social 
enterprises contributing to solving social problems.  
Second, there is a high possibility that the employees who are hired with 
government subsidies get fired when the financial support ceases after the three-year 
support period. The government provides these subsidies under the condition 
according to which a Social Enterprise needs to hire a new employee which has been 
defined as vulnerable by the law. Because the amount of money for employment 
decreases every year and the subsidies are fully withdrawn after the three years of 
benefit, there is a substantial concern that new vulnerable people hired with the 
government subsidies could be fired when the government no longer provides 
support after three years.  
The argument based on this concern and on the conditions of possibility goes 
as follows: the SEPA, which is supposed to be an employment policy, is ironically 
dismissing employees who have been initially hired with the SEPA legal framework. 
Although Social Enterprises employ vulnerable people with the government 
subsidies, their employment is not guaranteed after the three years of government 
support. Thus, the SEPA as an employment policy is not a sustainable way to 
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provide long-term work opportunities to vulnerable people and to include them into 
society.  
Third, the social innovative discourse related actors also contest the SEPA 
due to its bureaucratic control over the market and the ecosystem of social 
entrepreneurship. Once a Social Enterprise has been certified, it has to submit 
financial, social and employment status documents regularly every year. In this 
annual report, a Social Enterprise has to include the social and economic outcomes 
they have achieved, the financial sheets and information on the use of government 
subsidies. A condition of possibility is that the paperwork takes a long time and 
distracts social entrepreneurs from their work and this extra work could decrease the 
productivity of Social Enterprises. This is true especially because most Social 
Enterprises lack the work force and the financial resources and the extra paper work 
imposed by the law can represent a big burden for a social entrepreneur who is solely 
managing the whole business.  
Not only is this extra work for social entrepreneurs, but the market and the 
ecosystem of the social entrepreneurship field can be destroyed following 
government intervention. Social entrepreneurs, who are promoting social innovation 
and entrepreneurship discourses, believe that social enterprises have to survive from 
competition against conventional enterprises in a dominant free market system. From 
a social innovative perspective, if a social enterprise cannot survive in a conventional 
free market system, they are not able to change the traditional views of business 
which accordingly contributes only to economic development. Therefore, although 
they acknowledge the existence and the need for governments to financially and 
managerially support Social Enterprises, they do not agree that all social enterprises 
have to be certified and carry out their market activities in limited boundaries, 
providing work opportunities and social services which are then restricted by the 
government. EJ0 also added:  
“I do not think that the certification is not important. However, the certification can 
limit the scope of business activities. I agree that the role of social services 
enterprises (certified Social Enterprise) is also very important for our society. But, 
not every social enterprise has to be a social service enterprise. In short, the 
certification frames the social objectives of a social enterprise which are supposed 
to be developed by social entrepreneurs themselves. (EJ0, CEO, C Investment, 2 
June 2014, 10:35AM-12:00PM)”  
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Table 8-2 Alternative Discourses Emerged in 2006  
 
Element of 
discourses 
Alternative discourse 
Object Social enterprise, such as social ventures and venture 
philanthropy  
Key concepts 
Influence the 
meaning 
Achieving financial sustainability and independency in the market 
by itself (no need for financial subsidies from the government) 
Business activities also have to be innovative (e.g. distribution)   
Any kind of social objective can be included  
Replicable to any social/economic context – globalization   
A certification system is not always necessary  
Key subject 
positions 
The government can support social enterprises to promote work 
opportunities and social services but not social innovation in the 
traditional market 
NGOs do not have business management skills – capacity  
Conditions of 
possibility 
Making sustainable financial outcomes and social changes 
regardless of the SEPA 
 
The groups of actors promoting alternative discourses with social venture 
activities position themselves on the opposite side of certified Social Enterprises. As 
a matter of fact, as mentioned by DH7, they are different from people who get a 
Social Enterprise certification by emphasizing that they have the ability and the 
business skills to generate profits that can make their organizations sustainable:  
 
“We are different from them (Certified Social Enterprises). We make returns on 
investment. This means that we are not dependent on subsidies, but we are 
independently making our business financially sustainable. Being financially 
sustainable is important for social ventures, because by doing so you can continue 
your business activities to achieve social objectives. (DH7, CEO, Z SV, 18 June 
2014, 11:06AM-12:17PM)”  
 
Table 8-3 summarizes how certified Social Enterprises and social ventures 
are different one from another based on the contents of the debate on the SEPA. First, 
the social objectives of certified Social Enterprises are limited to providing work 
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opportunities and social services to vulnerable social groups. By doing so, they are 
expected to contribute to the development of local communities. Meanwhile, the 
aims of social ventures include any kind of social problems that have failed to be 
solved. For this reason, target groups are also very different from vulnerable social 
groups and from any kind of social groups, as explained by EC1:  
 
“Certified Social Enterprises and our definition of social entrepreneurship are as 
different as medicine and pharmacy. Integrating marginalized people into the labor 
market is their (government) agenda. We, instead, aim to achieve social changes by 
means of social innovation. (EC1, Deputy Director, D SV, 13 May 2014)”  
 
Second, the economic objectives of certified Social Enterprises are also 
limited in comparison to social ventures. Certified Social Enterprises aim to generate 
profit through their business activities, just as social ventures do. However, the 
minimum expectation for certified Social Enterprises is to pay workers stable wages 
and to invest the surplus, if there is any, in other social purpose activities. Social 
ventures aim to maximize their profit through their business activities and to invest 
the surplus in other social innovative business activities if a social entrepreneur 
wants to. DH7 supported this argument, as follows:  
 
“When people ask me why I am doing this business; I reply that I am doing it to 
make profit. We do not work based on an NGO mind-set. We are an enterprise which 
aims to maximize the profit. We support social innovation by adopting a business 
mind-set. (DH7, CEO, Z SV, 18 June 2014, 11:06AM-12:17PM)”  
 
Third, the ways of doing business do not need to be new and innovative for 
certified Social Enterprises. For example, conventional bakeries, cafes or restaurants 
can be certified Social Enterprises if they fit the criteria of the SEPA certification. 
On the contrary, a social venture has to be innovative in its way of dealing with field-
level social problems, as mentioned by EC1:  
 
“Providing work opportunities and social services can reduce the pains which 
people (beneficiaries) are struggling with. However, this does not mean that these 
activities can solve fundamental social problems. Social entrepreneurship means 
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making social changes through innovation (EC1, Deputy Director, D SV, 13 May 
2014)” 
 
Fourth, most certified Social Enterprises receive government subsidies for 
employment and business development. They are also willing to receive other kinds 
of funding from the government or from private companies or from the support 
programs of foundations which can be used for any purpose. On the other hand, 
social ventures refuse to receive government subsidies especially from the MoEL. 
Instead, they are willing to accept government funding from other departments, from 
angel investors and from private finance institutions that do not fully control or 
investigate all the business activities.  
Lastly, the concept and the activities of certified Social Enterprises are 
influenced by European cases, such as social cooperatives and self-sufficiency, while 
social ventures are based on a US influence and on similar concepts such as CSR, 
blended value and social innovation. 
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Table 8-3 Comparison of Certified Social Enterprises and Social Ventures 
  
 Certified Social Enterprise Social Venture 
Social objective Employment, social services, 
and local development  
Any kind of social problems 
Economic 
objective  
Developing a business which 
is profitable enough to pay 
wages and invest surplus in 
other social purpose activities  
Developing a business as 
profitable as possible and 
investing the surplus in other 
social innovative business 
activities  
Way of doing 
business 
Conventional and innovative  Innovative 
Target groups Vulnerable social groups  Society (any group) 
Financial 
resources 
Government subsidies, loans, 
funding from the government 
or private companies’ support 
programs 
Investment, loans, funding 
from the government or 
private companies’ support 
programs (except from the 
MoEL) 
Solution to social 
problems  
Business; economic, social, 
and political change 
Business 
Similar concepts  Social cooperative, self-
sufficiency  
CSR, blended value, social 
innovation  
Overseas 
influence 
Europe United States 
 
 
8.5.2 Interactions between Actors  
 
8.5.2.1 First Phase: 2005 - 2009 
 
The idea of social venture appeared at a very similar moment when the 
concept of social enterprise was introduced at the beginning of the 2000s. Whereas 
the initial introduction of the concept of social enterprise was mainly inspired by 
European experiences, another approach based on the American experiences of 
innovative initiatives supported by foundations was engaged in the formation of the 
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concept of social enterprise related to the SEPA. This approach is more focused on 
the innovative aspects of solving social problems and tried to distance itself from 
other concepts of social enterprise. Table 8-4 summarizes the activities of the actors 
promoting alternative discourses as presented in Section 8.5.3.   
 
Table 8-4 First Phase of the Movement to Promote Alternative Discourses  
 
 Social Enterprise Network (SEN) Other Actors  
2005 
1st Social Venture Competition 
organized (Every Year) 
 
Supported the organization of 
university student study groups on 
social entrepreneurship    
Organized teachers groups on social 
entrepreneurship  
2006 
Continued activities  
Social Innovation Centre established 
by the Hope Institute (NGO) 
2007 - 
2008 Sopoong (SOcial POwer Of 
Networked Group) was established  
2009 
1st Social Venture Competition 
organized within the partnership 
with the SEN and MoEL  
Young Social Entrepreneurs’ 
Promotion Project  
 
 
8.5.3 Government Reaction and Outcomes  
 
Although the government did not include alternative discourses in the official 
meaning of social enterprise, it attempted to embed social innovative and 
entrepreneurship discourses within social enterprise promotion policies. Unlike the 
institutional outcomes which derived from the inclusion of oppositional discourses 
within the institutional meaning of social enterprise after the interactions and the 
conflicts between actors in the field, social innovation and entrepreneurship 
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discourses have not been officially included within the institutional meaning of social 
enterprise. Instead, the government created specific programs to promote social 
venture activities. However, in these cases the definition of social venture is different 
from that of the perspective of actors who are promoting alternative discourses.  
More specifically, the MoEL defined social ventures and social innovation 
enterprises as organizations which are in the stage of the business idea development 
or at the beginning of the business which was established less than two years. The 
official definition that appears on the KOSEA website is as follows: a social venture 
is “a business which is more creative and innovative compared to social enterprises, 
but which does not necessarily meet the criteria of certified social enterprises” 
(Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency 2011). A social venture or a social 
innovation enterprise is considered to be an organization that has the potential to 
become a certified Social Enterprise in a few years’ time, if the government supports 
their activities financially and managerially. In another words, the government uses 
the term social venture and social innovation enterprise as a to-be certified Social 
Enterprise that does not fit the certification criteria yet.  
Although the MoEL narrowed the definition of alternative organizational 
forms of social enterprise down, the use of the alternative term in their policies and 
the development of promotion policies for social ventures and social innovation 
enterprise show that the government also has an interest in the alternatives. For 
example, the term “social innovation” does not appear in any legal documents related 
to Social Enterprises, however, it appears on the website of the Korean Social 
Enterprise Agency (KOSEA), the government agency that delivers social enterprise 
policies which are funded by the Ministry of Employment and Labor (MoEL). 
Moreover, the government has organized the “Social Venture Competition” within 
the partnership with the SEN in 2009 and the “Young Social Entrepreneurs’ 
Promotion Project” organized by the MoEL in 2011 (Korea Social Enterprise 
Promotion Agency 2013c, 2015b).  
More specifically, the government organized the “Social Ventures 
Competition” in 2009 but at that time this was planned to be a temporary event. 
Therefore, the institutionalization of the programs began later in 2011 with the 
“Young Social Entrepreneurs’ Promotion Project”, which represents the first 
incubation program for start-ups led by young social entrepreneurs. This project was 
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motivated by the criticisms received from the actors who were promoting alternative 
discourses which argued that 1) the SEPA had limited the meaning of “social” to 
“social services”; and 2) that the government subsidies were not helping to build a 
sustainable ecosystem of social enterprises that can be more creative and 
independent. Another social issue of new emergence, the constantly decreasing youth 
employment rate, influenced the MoEL to include young people as another group of 
actors and beneficiaries of the SEPA.  
Only teams with a minimum of three members, and with at least half of them 
aged from 19 to 39, could apply for the “Young Social Entrepreneurs’ Promotion 
Project” until 2012. Although this age rule was abolished in 2013, most participants 
of these projects are still less than 40 years old (Korea Social Enterprise Promotion 
Agency 2015b). The teams supported by the “Young Social Entrepreneurs’ 
Promotion Project” are mostly at the seed stage, seeking opportunities to begin 
operations, or they are at the start-up stage of an established business, which has 
been running for less than one year (Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency 
2015b). Although there are no statistics on starting or continuing a business after the 
one-year government financial support offered through the “Young Social 
Entrepreneurs’ Promotion Project”, social ventures for the youth can be considered 
as social enterprises because only teams with an innovative social business model 
aiming at solving social problems are selected as beneficiaries of the project. 
According to the Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency (2015b), team members 
should have a social entrepreneurship mind-set (30 points), the business model 
should pursue social venture creation (30 points), the business model should have a 
creative and innovative idea (20 points), and the business idea should be feasible (20 
points). The selection criteria of the beneficiaries have relatively clear economic and 
entrepreneurial, social and participatory governance indicators. 
When a social venture is selected as a beneficiary from either the “Social 
Venture Competition” or the “Young Social Entrepreneurs’ Promotion Project”, they 
can receive government support in many ways for the maximum of one year. 
According to the Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency (2015b), first, the 
selected beneficiaries can use free office spaces in the cities they are based in. 
Second, the government provides a readiness fund for those social ventures who won 
a prize from the Social Venture Competition and that they can use for business 
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development. Third, they also can benefit from regular consulting services from the 
social enterprise incubation centers. All of these processes are delivered by 
intermediary agencies which have been selected and funded by the MoEL. Also, the 
activities and the outcomes of the beneficiaries are regularly reported to the KoSEA 
and MoEL.  
It is definitely positive that the government, who is the most powerful actor in 
the institutional field of social entrepreneurship in Korea, is interested in alternative 
social enterprise activities and actively supports them. However, the effort of the 
government towards promoting social venture activities is focused more on the 
purpose of including them as certified Social Enterprises which can be freely 
managed and controlled based on the SEPA. One interviewee who took part in the 
Young Social Entrepreneurs’ Promotion Project confirmed this point, as follows:  
 
“The intermediary organizations and consultants that we meet regularly always try 
to push us towards having a certification. That is the only purpose of their social 
venture support programs. They regularly ask us to report our activities and they 
want to know when we will be ready to apply for the certification. (EJ5, CEO, H SV, 
17 May 2014, 10:35AM-12:00PM)”  
 
8.6 Conflicts with Actors Promoting Oppositional Discourses 
 
8.6.1 Contents of Debate on Oppositional Discourses  
 
For actors promoting alternative discourses, self-sufficient enterprises and 
cooperatives are closer to NGOs and not to “enterprises.” In other words, groups of 
social entrepreneurs promoting alternative discourses do not fully reject or contest 
the idea of other types of social enterprises, such as self-sufficient enterprises or 
cooperatives. Basically, they agree with the idea of the empowerment of vulnerable 
and local people through employment and cooperative activities, as mentioned by 
EC1:  
 
“I am not saying that the idea of social services business or cooperatives is wrong. 
Establishing the legal framework for cooperatives is good in terms of bringing them 
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into the institutional field. The problem is putting cooperatives, certified Social 
Enterprises and social innovative enterprises into a single sector. (EC1, Deputy 
Director, D SV, 13 May 2014)”  
 
The understandings of alternative actors on oppositional discourses are 
almost the same as in the case of official and dominant discourses. More specifically, 
they claim that other types of organizations are not financially sustainable, or are 
dependent on government subsidies, and that they have no experience of generating 
financial outcomes before they start social enterprise activities. From the perspective 
of alternative actors, these limitations make the identity of other types of social 
enterprise appear weak. According to them, actors promoting oppositional discourses 
are trying too hard to obtain government support, including subsidies, and that is not 
understandable. From this perspective, the organizations who already had obtained or 
who were going to achieve a Social Enterprise certification are viewed as 
government subsidy chasers, rather than social enterprises aiming to achieve social 
objectives by making enough profit to run a business.  
The view of the oppositional actors is different from that of the alternative 
actors. According to actors promoting oppositional discourses, the government took 
over the term “social enterprise” initiated by bottom-up actors, even before the 
enactment of the SEPA. Although they also noticed that there are some organizations 
chasing the government subsidies, their basic position is that a de-institutionalization 
is almost impossible especially in the Korean context once the government 
institutionalizes anything. The difficulties of de-institutionalization led them to be 
actively involved in institutional interactions and encouraged people to join the 
institutional field of social entrepreneurship by obtaining a certification and 
government support. In this way, the number of organizations that can support their 
institutional power can increase, as I highlighted in Chapters Six and Seven.  
On the other hand, the actors of alternative discourses are not interested in 
increasing their institutional power within the boundaries of the certification. For 
example, although they refused to receive government subsidies from the MoEL, 
some social ventures have received governmental financial support from other 
ministries, such as the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of 
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Education. According to a social entrepreneur who received funding from another 
ministry:  
 
“Other ministries are not restricting the scope, the types of organization and the 
business. We, who are running social ventures, see the problems of a certification 
system that limits the scope of the business activities of Social Enterprises. Therefore, 
we are searching for incubation support from other policies promoting 
entrepreneurship. (EH2, Director, E SV, 19 June 2014, 14:29PM-15:45PM)”  
 
8.6.2 Contents of Debate on Alternative Discourses  
 
While social ventures exclude other oppositional discourses of social 
enterprises, other actors promoting oppositional discourses are also not included in 
the concept of social venture. One interviewee based in an organization promoting a 
social economy discourse mentioned:  
 
“I do not know what they are doing. And I also do not understand why they call 
themselves promoters of social entrepreneurship. (DH3, Researcher, V University, 
11 July 2014, 10:15AM-12:20PM)” 
 
One key theme of the different understandings on social entrepreneurship and 
social ventures is given by the view of social enterprise as a social movement. 
Bottom-up actors promoting oppositional discourses have a long history of 
movements empowering people through employment. According to them, social 
entrepreneurship is part of a social movement which is also a way of empowering 
themselves to be included in society and of promoting their ideologies to be accepted 
by other actors. In this understanding of social entrepreneurship, being innovative 
and maximizing profit are not priorities. Instead, convincing other actors to 
understand the background of their movement and their activities is much more 
important to enable their ideologies to become one of the major (powerful) 
ideologies accepted by society. In this way, actors and their movements are 
legitimated and become powerful enough to influence other actors to change their 
mind set, which can in turn produce long-term and positive social changes.  
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Therefore, the actors promoting oppositional discourses do not include social 
ventures as a part of the social movement through social entrepreneurship. Instead, 
they consider social ventures as a new way of doing business that attracts mostly 
young people who are impressed by “new, fancy and cool” business ideas. Therefore, 
there are no apparent interactions between the actors who are promoting oppositional 
and alternative discourses. Each group of actors considers the other group of actors 
who are promoting different discourses to be on the complete opposite paradigm of 
social entrepreneurship. Yet, oppositional actors are not happy with the lack of 
interactions with alternative actors. One of the interviewees remarked:  
 
“Young people who are running social ventures have received the social and 
economic benefits achieved by the previous generation. But they do not appreciate 
the effort of the previous generation and they are arrogant. (CE0, Deputy Director, J 
Intermediary, 20 May 2014, 15:30PM-17:40PM)” 
 
For those actors promoting oppositional discourses, alternative discourses are 
sometimes too extreme. The social innovation, as suggested by some actors who 
promote an entrepreneurship discourse, emphasizes the fact that social innovation 
means changes of the system. For example, during the interview, one of the 
interviewees working at a social venture support organization explained the 
definition of social innovation with an example of lack of empathy.  
 
“Lack of empathy in society can influence people’s biases of the opposite gender and 
of different races; appearance is a chronic problem which is ingrained in the social 
system. If a social entrepreneur could change the perception and behaviors of 
people who socially discriminate other people by educating them to respect and to 
be more tolerant of others, this can be considered as a social innovation. (EH2, 
Director, E SV, 19 June 2014, 14:29PM-15:45PM)” 
 
However, for actors promoting oppositional discourses, the idea and position 
of those alternative actors who are willing to overthrow the system are too extreme. 
Social entrepreneurship is an activity, a movement that compromises with an 
established market economy that can hardly be overthrown. Instead, social 
entrepreneurship is a movement searching for a way to contribute to empowering 
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people in the existing dominant system. From the perspective of those actors 
promoting oppositional discourses, social entrepreneurship lets them participate in 
the dominant market economy or in the institutional field that helps them to achieve 
a higher social position. Therefore, the institutionalization of social enterprise 
empowered those oppositional actors who used to be neglected or ignored and 
considered to be powerless actors in terms of lack of resources and of the 
informal/social right to speak to powerful actors in an institutional setting. 
 
8.6.3 Institutional Outcomes  
 
Alternative discourses are not included in the institutional meaning of social 
enterprise even in the current year (2016). Although now a social enterprise can be 
established as a small-medium enterprise according to the amendment of the Small-
medium Enterprise Law, this change of legal organizational form is more the result 
of legal convenience, rather than for the inclusion of alternative discourses in the 
institutional meaning of Social Enterprise.  
It is hard to say whether alternative discourses have been institutionalized, 
although the government has introduced policies to support social venture activities. 
The reason for this is that the term social venture has been adopted and interpreted 
differently from the government’s perspective, as explained in the previous section 
8.5. Nonetheless, the key terms of alternative discourses, such as innovation, 
entrepreneurship and social venture, have been continuously appearing on the 
KOSEA website since 2012.  
Also, top-down actors mentioned that alternative forms of social enterprise, 
such as social ventures and social innovation enterprises, have been included in the 
broad concept of social enterprise. They also agree that the diversity of 
organizational forms and of discourses of social enterprise will contribute to making 
the field livelier. 
However, bottom-up actors promoting alternative discourses almost have lost 
their interest in the SEPA. Some of them have not had any interest at all, even at the 
beginning. When I asked the question about how they perceive the SEPA, and if 
there was any possibility of obtaining a certification, or how their organizations 
(social ventures) are different from certified Social Enterprises, during the interviews 
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the recurring expressions were “I am not interested in the SEPA”, “I don’t know the 
definition of the certified Social Enterprise”, and “I am not going to have financial 
support by being a certified Social Enterprise.” In short, unlike actors promoting 
oppositional discourses, actors promoting alternative discourses are not aiming to be 
accepted by top-down actors in the Korean social entrepreneurship field. The lack of 
effort and intention of alternative actors to be included in the institutional field of 
social entrepreneurship shows that not every actor is willing to be accepted by other 
powerful actors.  
Furthermore, although the concept of social venture has gained a significant 
level of popularity, it seems that social venture is not sufficiently institutionalized 
both externally and internally. Interestingly, the participants of social venture support 
programs who were expected to gain a Social Enterprise certification do not have 
their own representative network. Moreover, there are no statistics on how many 
teams have been supported through competitions or projects and are still operating. 
 
8.7 Strategies of Actors  
 
8.7.1 Discursive Strategies 
 
8.7.1.1 Endorse Discourse of Social Innovation  
 
Two groups of actors promoting alternative discourses endorse social 
innovation in different ways. The first group of actors consists of individual social 
entrepreneurs. They endorse a social innovation discourse by claiming that they are 
financially independent and competitive on the market, unlike other social 
enterprises. The second group of actors is given by a group of civil organizations. 
This second group endorses a social innovation discourse by emphasizing that it 
introduces social systemic change. Both groups of actors claim that supporting social 
entrepreneurs to continue their activities and sustain their motivation helps keep the 
performance of a social venture at high levels.  
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8.7.1.2 Challenge Other Discourses by Claiming Financial or Social 
Unsustainability  
 
Actors promoting alternative discourses challenge other discourses by 
claiming that they are unsustainable. While the first group of actors promoting social 
innovation discourse challenges other actors and organizations by claiming that they 
are financially unsustainable, the second group promoting entrepreneurship discourse 
considers other actors as socially unsustainable and naïve. Financial unsustainability 
means that organizations cannot make enough profit to maintain business. The first 
group that consider themselves to be social entrepreneurs have a good potential to 
produce the surplus from their business and can survive in the market, unlike other 
social enterprises. The second group emphasizes that their role in creating social 
change is what makes society more sustainable. However, from their perspective, 
social entrepreneurs with certified Social Enterprises who are satisfied with receiving 
external subsidies, and are running conventional (and not innovative) businesses are 
too naïve to make of social change a social enterprise.  
 
8.7.1.3 Invoke Innovative Discourse from the US (B-corp and 
Ashoka)  
 
Social ventures promoting innovative discourses are not interested in 
obtaining a certification from the MoEL. Instead, they are more interested in 
overseas certification systems, such as B-corps, or in government support from other 
departments, such as the Small Medium Business Administration (SMBA). This 
means that social ventures are resisting the official discourse of Social Enterprise 
presented by the MoEL which focuses on employment and social services.  
Instead, both groups of actors promoting social innovative and 
entrepreneurial discourses invoke overseas cases mainly from the United States. The 
interviewees who are promoting innovative discourses mentioned that they have 
been strongly influenced by the Social Enterprise Network (SEN) Korea who first 
imported and introduced the concept of social enterprise from the US perspective. 
For example, B-corp is one of the well-known role models of social enterprises for 
independent social entrepreneurs promoting alternative discourses in South Korea.  
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After being a social venture, Delight obtained a B-corp certification. More 
specifically, the B-corp certification became a dream role model for social ventures. 
During the interviews, interviewees mentioned that having a certification like the B-
corp is preferable to the SEPA certification. One of interviewees running a social 
investment organization confirms this, as follows:  
 
“I am suggesting that social entrepreneurs should have a B-corp certification rather 
than the SEPA certification. The B-corp certification exhibits the global standard of 
being an innovative social enterprise which fits our definition of social enterprise. If 
a social enterprise has a B-corp certification, people believe that the organization is 
contributing to social innovation and change for real. (DH7, CEO, Z SV, 18 June 
2014, 11:06AM-12:17PM)”  
 
Actors promoting an entrepreneurship discourse also invoke a US social 
entrepreneurship support organization, the Ashoka Foundation. The Ashoka 
foundation influenced the Korean field of social entrepreneurs from the beginning in 
2007, because some innovative and successful cases of Ashoka fellows had been 
introduced through media and books. Especially after the book “How to Change the 
World (Bornstein 2007a)”, containing successful stories of Ashoka fellows, was 
translated in 2008, the concept of social entrepreneurship promoted by the Ashoka 
Foundation became very popular in South Korea.  
The example of the Beautiful Foundation developed by the social innovators’ 
support programme shows that these have been influenced by the Ashoka 
Foundation. The framework for selecting social entrepreneurs (innovators) as fellows 
which are considered able to create social innovations that can change the social 
system and society is similar to the Ashoka’s framework. Clearly, the promotion 
program that supports single social entrepreneurs to fully focus on running a social 
business organization is an innovative way of supporting social enterprises. 
Interestingly, Social Enterprise promotion programs which are mainly organized by 
the government mostly support organizational activities, and not the individual level 
of activities. In other words, although a (preliminary) Social Enterprise or social 
venture may have received any kind of government funding, they cannot use the 
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money to pay the social entrepreneurs themselves who developed the business idea 
and run the organization.   
 
8.7.1.4 Being Indifferent  
 
 
Some social entrepreneurs who are promoting social innovation and 
entrepreneurship discourses are contesting the official discourse given by the 
government by not doing anything or by not reacting to government policies. One of 
the recurring themes from the interviews with independent social entrepreneurs is 
that of being “ignorant of the SEPA.” Interviewees kept emphasizing that they are not 
interested in the SEPA and in certified Social Enterprises. However, independent 
social entrepreneurs are not necessarily avoiding other actors who are promoting 
other discourses and they also are open to any kind of collaboration with other actors 
with regard to their business activities. Nevertheless, they cleared up their position 
on the SEPA, in that they are “not interested in obtaining a certification and the 
government subsidies.” Interviewees who are running social ventures without having 
a certification also mentioned that:  
 
“I do not know much about Social Enterprises and about the SEPA. I think my 
organization is a social enterprise in a broad sense of aiming to achieve both 
economic and social objectives. However, I firmly do not want to limit the scope of 
meaning and the activities of my organization into the limited definition of Social 
Enterprise. (DH7, CEO, Z SV, 18 June 2014, 11:06AM-12:17PM)”  
 
Dismissal is one of the active strategies to resist institutional pressures 
(Oliver 1991). Individual social entrepreneurs who call their organizations social 
ventures resisted the Social Enterprise certification by dismissing the institutional 
rules and values provided by political authorities. With regard to this point, I have 
analyzed how a group of actors promoting social innovative and entrepreneurship 
discourses described other groups of actors in order to understand how they 
distinguish the ideologies of movements, as shown in Table 8-5 (Van Dijk 1995). As 
a result, big corporations, B-corp certification, and government departments 
supporting their activities (except the MoEL), are identified as in-group actors who 
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fully understand what a social venture stands for. Actors promoting alternative 
discourses described big corporations as naïve, and as organizations which were not 
trying hard enough to achieve their social missions. However, social ventures are 
interested in their resources and in the related social goals of breaking the 
conventional market rules that enabled both of them to work together. In short, they 
are willing to receive some financial resources from big corporations if it is possible.  
Despite this point, they are strongly against obtaining the SEPA certification 
because 1) it limits the scope of their business objectives and activities 
(Standardization – cannot be innovative – which is the complete opposite to a social 
entrepreneur’s mind set), 2) it controls and investigates all the business activities and 
decisions (therefore there is no freedom), 3) the image of certified Social Enterprises 
is negative in that it is considered as a business that works only for vulnerable social 
groups, as defined in the SEPA, and 4) it is not worth being in a network which does 
not share organizational objectives.  
NGOs, Social Enterprises, cooperatives, and MoEL have been described as 
an out-group of social ventures. Social ventures do not consider NGOs as partners 
because they do not consider Social Enterprises as ventures; that means they are not 
taking risks from the challenges which emerge to start a new business. Instead, 
NGOs establish and support social entrepreneurship activities due to the running out 
of public funding. NGOs start social businesses to cover a deficit from their 
activities, not because they have found a social problem they want to solve through 
business activities or because they have developed an innovative social business idea 
to solve the social problems they are tackling. Also, at the same time, Social 
Enterprises established by NGOs are not profitable, an aspect which is a core 
economic objective that a social enterprise has to achieve, because they have no 
experience in business and management.  
Similarly, certified Social Enterprises have been identified as an out-group of 
social ventures, which do not share the same ideologies. From the social venture 
perspective, Social Enterprises do not have the ability to make enough profits to 
sustain their business. Therefore, Social Enterprises are dependent on government 
funding in various ways, such as subsidies and procurement in the public market. 
From the social venture perspective, being dependent on external funding means that 
they are not profitable and sustainable as an “enterprise.” Therefore, Social 
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Enterprises are often considered to be weak, unsustainable and not profitable in 
comparison to social ventures. However, ironically, there are not many social 
ventures that have financially succeeded with their social business idea. During the 
interviews, an individual social entrepreneur, DH7, mentioned that they are not 
making enough profit from their business activities as in the following:  
 
“Social business is a long term business. I didn’t expect that I could make profit 
from this business in three years. At least three years of time is needed to invest in 
this type of business. However, I am sure that our business will work someday. My 
team members and I are trying hard to make this come true. (DH7, CEO, Z SV, 18 
June 2014, 11:06AM-12:17PM)” 
 
Cooperatives are also considered as an out-group of social venture, especially 
due to the governance. The core characteristic which characterizes cooperatives as 
such is given by the governance that allows each stakeholder to join the decision 
making process. However, from the social venture perspective, cooperative 
governance is not an efficient way to make quick decisions for real businesses.  
The MoEL is also an out-group of social ventures. All of my interviewees 
working at social ventures made similar remarks, as follows:  
 
“I am not interested in the SEPA and in any of Social Enterprise promotion policies 
and programs.” 
 
Most of the interviewees replied that they do not know anything about the 
SEPA and Social Enterprise promotion programs and that they are not going to 
receive any support from the MoEL in the future. This is because according to social 
ventures, Social Enterprises are creating social services, and not social innovations or 
social entrepreneurship, and the SEPA is a labor focused social welfare policy. 
Especially when social entrepreneurs had to invent the term “social venture” or 
“social innovative enterprise” due to the limited definition of Social Enterprises in 
the SEPA and the prohibition against the use of the name of Social Enterprise for 
uncertified social enterprises, the animosity towards the MoEL was huge. This 
animosity draws on the bureaucratic culture of the Korean government as well, 
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which is considered to be result and goal oriented and peremptory when the 
government promotes a policy.    
 
Table 8-5 In-group and Out-group Identification of Alternative Actors 
 
Identification Group of 
Actors 
Statements 
In group 
actors 
Big 
corporations  
Opportunities to work together (resources and 
related goals – breaking the market rules) but, 
they are naïve 
And they are not achieving their social missions 
B-corp  Gives public confidence 
Government 
departments 
but not 
MoEL 
Need for public confidence 
They are more than welcome 
Out group 
actors 
NGOs They do not consider SEs as Ventures 
Their view has been changed 
They are not profitable 
Social 
Enterprises 
Have to accept that they lack the ability to make 
profit 
They are dependent on government funding 
They are helping vulnerable and not profitable 
They are weak, unsustainable, and small 
Cooperatives Different governance. Cooperative governance is 
not efficient for business.  
MoEL Did not use the term innovation until 2013 
Social ventures are not interested in the MoEL SE 
policies 
SEs are promoting social services, not social 
entrepreneurship 
SEPA is a labor and social welfare policy 
They are not interested in social entrepreneurship  
They are result and goal oriented 
They do not consider us as SEs 
They limit the SE activities 
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8.7.2 Practical Strategies 
  
8.7.2.1 Not Being Actively Communicative with Other Actors but 
Focusing on Business  
  
Actors promoting alternative discourses do not really interact with other 
actors promoting different discourses. They have no strong intention to communicate 
with top-down actors because they think that they are powerful enough to manage 
their business activities in terms of financial resources and managerial skills. Instead, 
they think that other actors have to try to learn from them to be effective, innovative 
and sustainable in doing business in order to achieve both economic and social 
objectives. Their strategies are basically keeping their business sustainable and 
showing other actors that their way of doing business can actually make social 
innovation and positive changes in the society which most social enterprises are 
willing to do. In this way, they have taken a higher position in the relationship 
between them and the other actors.  
As a matter of fact, with regard to this point, an interviewer mentioned that 
the other actors in the field are interested in their business and in their collaboration 
because their business model actually works in the market, unlike Social Enterprises 
whose aim is to achieve economic objectives and to make sustainable profit:  
 
“If we are good at our work and if we are able to produce successful and influential 
cases, other actors naturally follow us and want to learn our way of doing business. 
That’s why I have not been actively interested in interacting with other actors which 
seem to be located at the opposite spectrum of social entrepreneurship. It has been 
more than 5 years since the SEPA was established. So now people know that the 
SEPA model is not the best model to achieve both social and economic objectives as 
a social enterprise is supposed to do. I can actually see the phenomena that people 
started to communicate to each other and learn from each other’s cases. And they 
always contact me first to know and learn our business management skills and 
strategies. (EJ0, CEO, C Investment, 2 June 2014, 10:35AM-12:00PM)” 
  
Indeed, although they are not actively interacting with other actors, social 
innovative and entrepreneurial discourses are influential in many ways. Despite the 
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fact that they are not using the term “Social Enterprise”, they are perceived as a 
social enterprise that creates social innovation and sustainable financial outcomes. 
Whether they intended it or not, their behaviors are indifferent but influence other 
actors which become interested in their business and contact them first to learn their 
secret to business.     
 
8.7.2.2 Selecting Alternative Standards for Legitimation  
 
When political and strategic interests are conflicting, alternative standards 
may emerge (Reinecke, Manning, and Von Hagen 2012). In Korea, social ventures 
chose to have a B-corp certification provided by the B-corp foundation in the United 
States as an alternative. For example, the Delight is the first social venture which has 
been certified as a B-corp in Korea which aims and achieves both social and 
economic objectives in an innovative way. After the Delight received the B-corp 
certification, the reputation of the B-corp certification notably increased in South 
Korea. Many social ventures are aiming to achieve a B-corp certification, with the 
expectation that it will give them public confidence and a positive reputation in the 
field of social entrepreneurship.  
Alternatively, social ventures are also willing to receive domestic 
certifications, except from the MoEL. They are willing to obtain government 
subsidies from other departments, such as the Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
(MoSF) and the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST). Unlike the 
MoEL with its mandatory certification, the MoSF and MEST have provided 
subsidies for start-ups that have innovative business idea and plans. For example, an 
interviewee mentioned:  
 
“Getting subsidies from other government departments is more than welcome. This 
is because other departments do not put our business in a frame which has been 
developed to take advantage of our business. Instead, they understand that our 
business objectives and ideas are different and innovative. (ED3, CEO, F SV, 24 
May 2014, 13:05PM-12:38PM)” 
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Thus, social ventures also have acknowledged that receiving government 
subsidies may help to improve their public confidence and reputation. In other 
words, having alternative certifications, but not the SEPA, is one of their strategies to 
legitimate their discourses and organizations without being integrated into the 
dominant institutional field.  
 
8.8 Conclusion  
 
Alternative actors dismissed other discourses strategically while endorsing 
social innovation and entrepreneurship discourses in order to extend their power 
given that their discourses are dramatically conflicting towards one another. Because 
they are at the outside of the institutional field of social entrepreneurship, they had to 
find a way of legitimating their discourses and organizational forms. At the 
beginning of the institutional-building project, they tried to convince the government 
to adopt the concept of social innovation into government projects. Soon, they 
realized the foundations of their activities, understandings and objectives are far too 
different and refused to interact with each other.  
Instead of actively communicating with other actors, they proved that social 
venture and social innovation enterprise actually exist by creating organizations, 
alternative names, selecting alternative certifications and by making profit as social 
‘enterprises.’ Their emphasis on economic sustainability led them to acquire a higher 
position as successful enterprises.  
The case of the alternative discourses of social enterprise provides a 
possibility of de-institutionalization of the SEPA. As in Rao and Kenney (2008), it is 
important to emphasize the fact that disconnection with other actors can influence 
de-institutionalization. This case also shows a possible way of re-institutionalizing 
social enterprise. Although alternative actors have not achieved the 
institutionalization of their own discourses now, the findings of this thesis lead to an 
expectation, or at least the possibility of, interactions between different actors. 
Despite a reduced number of successful cases of social ventures, some astonishing 
cases, such as the Delight, influenced people to think that they want to learn from 
social ventures, and to reflect on how to make a social enterprise more profitable 
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with an innovative idea of achieving social objectives. Increasing contacts from 
actors promoting other discourses will provide more opportunities to understand 
what each discourse of social enterprise actually means.   
  248 
9 Discussion 
 
9.1 Introduction  
 
 With this thesis I aimed to address the question “how do the interactions 
between top-down and bottom-up actors shape the emergence of social enterprise as 
a new organizational form in South Korea?” I addressed this question by considering 
that social enterprise as a new organizational form does not have a unified definition 
but is diverse and dynamic, although the government established the official 
definition of Social Enterprise under the SEPA. In order to reduce confusion between 
different meanings and organizational forms of social enterprise, I capitalized the 
first letters of certified social enterprise as “Social Enterprise” and set the first letter 
of uncertified social enterprise in lowercase letters throughout the entire thesis.  
 As the result of strong government interventions in promoting social 
entrepreneurship, many bottom-up social enterprises have been co-opted to serve the 
government agenda – providing employment and social services to the vulnerable 
social groups. Still, some bottom-up actors, who do not agree with the official 
government definition of Social Enterprise, confront the government as intra- or 
extra-institutional actors or create their own space apart from the institutional field of 
Social Enterprise. Therefore, the phenomenon of emergence of social enterprise as a 
new organizational form in South Korea is not static, but exists with varying degrees 
of co-optation of different actors into the institutionalized system as well as 
autonomous movements against the institutionalized meaning and setting of social 
enterprise.  
 In the Introduction Chapter, I outlined the limited meaning and organizational 
forms of Social Enterprises provided by the legalization of the SEPA, which had, 
however, stimulated conflicts between actors who interpret the concept of social 
enterprise differently. In Chapter Two, I reviewed previous research on the 
emergence of new organizations from both institutional and social movements 
perspectives. The integrated view of institutional and social movement theories 
allowed me to observe the social entrepreneurship field in Korea as an institutional 
field, which is constantly changing through ongoing interactions between dominant 
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and subordinate social actors.  
 After considering the discourses which shape the understandings and 
behaviors of actors, I proceeded to analyzing how actors compete against each other 
to be (or not be) involved in the institutional-building and changing processes of 
Social Enterprises by relying on macro discourse analysis. Macro discourse analysis 
was adopted in order to analyze the patterns of interactions between actors who are 
located in different social positions and promoting different discourses in the 
institutional field, as I introduced in Chapter Five.  
 The findings Chapters Six, Seven and Eight presented a multiple dataset 
which included information on various discourses of social enterprise, identified as 
official, dominant, oppositional and alternative discourses based on Karim (1993)’s 
discourse identification that analyzes the power relations of the actors involved. After 
this, I analyzed how each actor used their own discourses and strategies to be 
involved in the institution-building processes in order to expand their influences in 
the field. In this Discussion Chapter, I aim to revisit the literature of institutional 
entrepreneurship and social movement theories which I relied on in my theoretical 
framing of the study, with these findings in mind. I will specifically discuss how 
actors in different social positions have changed the power relations in the 
institution-building project of Social Enterprise in Korea by using their own 
discourses and strategies.  
 
The Certification System Leads to Conflicts on the Meaning of Social 
Enterprise  
 
 The Social Enterprise certification system was the starting point of my thesis, 
given that it increased the confusion around the definition of social enterprise. 
According to Bidet and Eum (2015), the Social Enterprise certification system does 
not reflect the real diversity of the concept of Korean social enterprise existing in the 
field. Moreover, the multiple definitions, activities, and organizational forms of 
Korean social enterprise resulted in struggles over the meaning of social enterprises 
similarly to other countries in the world (Laville and Nyssens 2001; Mair and Marti 
2006).  
 Unlike other countries, in South Korea, these struggles over the meaning of 
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social enterprise are more explicit under the institutional pressure on the definition 
and setting of social enterprise as an organizational form provided by the law the 
‘Social Enterprise Promotion Act (SEPA)’ since 2006. As the SEPA is the center of 
contestations on the meaning of social enterprise, actors who are involved in 
developing a shared understanding of the meaning of social enterprise have been 
identified as top-down and bottom-up actors. Throughout the entire thesis, top-down 
actors are those who share the government approach that considers social enterprise 
as a concept which emerges from the formal legalization, the SEPA. Meanwhile, 
bottom-up actors are represented by those who partly or fully reject the governmental 
approach, but perceive social enterprises as independent and alternative 
organizations solving economic, social and political problems which the government 
and traditional businesses are incapable of solving. The identification of top-down 
and bottom-up actors and their discourses are provided in greater detail in Chapter 
Four.  
 Therefore, in this Discussion Chapter, I will discuss the conflicts between 
top-down and bottom-up actors in two different ways. First, the overall finding is 
that these conflicts are waged over the purposes of social entrepreneurial activities. 
Actors differentially define the purposes as policy instruments focused on 
unemployment and social welfare, on the empowerment of marginalized people, or 
on the changes of social norms by means of innovative ways of doing business. 
Second, it will be suggested that any conflicts over the definitions of social enterprise 
represent a resistance against institutional pressures on social entrepreneurship 
activities that are grassroots and independent.  
 
The Empowerment of Field-level Actors to become Institutional Entrepreneurs  
 
 Given that the government dominated the general institutional field in South 
Korea through the legalization and provision of financial resources, bottom-up actors 
used to be neglected or ignored in terms of the lack of resources and an 
informal/social right to speak to top-down actors in an institutional setting. However, 
these actors were actually able to carry out institutional changes by introducing 
variations to the institutional meaning and setting of Social Enterprise in the SEPA. 
As a result, the definition of Social Enterprise under the SEPA has been changed in 
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2010 and 2012 by including cooperative and community development discourses. In 
this Section, I will discuss two different groups of bottom-up actors – intermediary 
organizations and the Civil Society Solidarity for Social Enterprise Development 
(CSSSED) – who empowered themselves by becoming intra-institutional actors or 
by remaining in the position of extra-institutional actors. Since they do not 
completely resist each other’s discourse, I suggest that both of them co-influenced 
the institutional changes in the meaning and setting of Social Enterprise in the SEPA 
as well as emerging discussion on the meaning of social economy even though they 
did not interact closely with each other.  
 
Alternative Discourses Provide the Possibility of De-institutionalization 
 
 Although some actors, who partly reject the official meaning of Social 
Enterprise, are actively involved in the institution-building project of Korean Social 
Enterprise, alternative actors, who fully reject other discourses, distance themselves 
from the other actors (Karim 1993). In this section, I will discuss that actors make a 
decision to be involved or not to be involved in the institution-building or changing 
project of Korean Social Enterprise based on their emphasis on economic or social 
sustainability of social enterprise. As the dominant top-down actors consider social 
sustainability as a first aim to be achieved by a social enterprise, alternative actors 
who place a greater emphasis on the economic sustainability of a social enterprise do 
not communicate with other actors but create their own space by inventing 
alternative terms to Social Enterprise – social venture and social innovation 
enterprise. In this section, I will discuss the emerging possibility of institutional 
changes or de-institutionalization influenced by alternative discourses and the 
practices which are fully against the dominant discourse of Social Enterprise that 
legitimized their existence externally to the institutional field.  
 
9.2 The Certification System Leads to Conflicts on the 
Meaning of Social Enterprise 
 
The Korean case of the institution-building process of Social Enterprises 
illustrates the presence of a variety of actors and of their own discourses which 
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enable active interactions with each other (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008). This 
variety of actors and discourses has led to the institution-building process dynamic in 
the process of promoting, accepting or rejecting the different discourses which have 
emerged. As a matter of fact, the presence of a variety of discourses and actors has 
made the field of social entrepreneurship in Korea much more diverse and dynamic. 
As I presented in the Finding Chapters, nine different discourses of Korean social 
enterprise have been identified: 1) work embedded social welfare discourse; 2) work-
related; 3) welfare-related; 4) corporate social responsibility (CSR); 5) local 
development; 6) cooperative; 7) social economy; 8) social innovation; and 9) 
entrepreneurship discourses. These nine different discourses co-exist and are jointly 
constructed in the field of social entrepreneurship in Korea. This multiplicity of 
definitions of social enterprise in Korea shows that there is no single common 
definition of social enterprise, but a set of diverse definitions.  
In order to capture the power dynamics between actors who promote more 
than one discourse of social enterprise in Korea, I categorized these nine discourses 
into four main discourses: 1) official; 2) dominant; 3) oppositional; and 4) alternative 
discourses using Karim (1993)’s discourse identification. The official discourse of 
social enterprise is composed of work embedded in social welfare, work-related, 
welfare-related, and CSR discourse. In addition, this official discourse of social 
enterprise became the dominant discourse very soon after the legalization the SEPA 
in 2006. Both official and dominant discourses are promoted by government 
institutions, big companies, certified social enterprises, and some intermediaries 
financed by the government. Oppositional discourses include local development, 
workers’ cooperatives, and social economy discourses against the dominant 
discourse. They are mostly promoted by local NGOs who started social 
entrepreneurship activities even before the SEPA. Lastly, social innovation and 
entrepreneurship discourses of social enterprise are considered as alternative 
discourses promoted by private organizations such as the Social Enterprise Network 
(SEN) Korea, social finance organizations, overseas foundations and NGOs 
supporting innovative social entrepreneurial activities, and individual social 
entrepreneurs. These competing, but complementary interests of each actor enabled 
them to exchange their emphasis on understandings, and values of social enterprise 
which resulted in institutional changes. 
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 However, this diversity goes hand-in-hand with a certain level of contestation 
around the meaning of social enterprise, and with the reasons why actors struggled 
against each other from the beginning of the institution-building process of social 
enterprises. 
 
9.2.1 The Purpose of Social Entrepreneurial Activities  
 
The conflicts over the meaning of social enterprise are given by the tensions 
in defining the purpose of social entrepreneurial activities. In Chapter One, I 
reviewed different definitions, origins and characteristics of social enterprises by 
country, ranging from non-profit and innovative approaches based on the hybrid 
objectives of social enterprises. While innovative approaches emphasize new ways of 
delivering social businesses (Defourny and Nyssens 2012), non-profit approaches 
emphasize the social missions of a social enterprise (Austin, Stevenson, and Wei
Skillern 2006). In this Section, I discuss the various purposes of public policies for 
unemployment and social welfare, which empower socially and economically 
marginalized people, and change existing social norms through ways of doing 
business which rely on non-profit, policy and innovative approaches.  
More specifically, in the Korean context, a non-profit approach to social 
enterprises means that the original motivations of the business are preserved 
relatively well in comparison to other approaches. Given that some bottom-up actors, 
such as the CSSSED, are nascent actors who actually invented the concept of social 
enterprise at the field-level where actual organizational forms are created in Korea, 
they have continuously emphasized the community spirit and social solidarity of 
social enterprises, as realities which can revive communities (Chapters Six & Seven). 
For these actors, social enterprise activities are driven by the purpose of including 
socially marginalized people in society, rather than providing public services. 
Therefore, unlike in the government policy approach, a non-profit approach 
perceives marginalized people as partners, and not as target beneficiaries (Chapter 
Seven).  
Moving to the policy approach, previous research (Kerlin 2006; Defourny 
2001; Defourny and Nyssens 2008; Teasdale 2012) found that  policy makers and the 
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governmental institutions attempt to integrate field-level social enterprise practices 
into the service of the government. According to my findings, these attempts 
influenced the struggles over the meaning of social enterprises which became more 
explicit as top-down actors (policy-makers) provided a single standard of Social 
Enterprise, the SEPA. The purpose of Social Enterprise in the SEPA is to deliver 
public services to the vulnerable, an activity which is supposed to be fulfilled by the 
government. More specifically, the Ministry of Labor considered Social Enterprises 
as a social welfare services provider that can effectively deliver social welfare and 
employment policies at the same time (Chapter Six). The scope of the social 
objectives of a Social Enterprise has been limited to creating work opportunities and 
providing social services to the vulnerable, all of which were important policy issues 
in the 2000s (Chapter Six). 
On the other hand, an innovative approach is distant from both the non-profit 
and the policy approaches. Some bottom-up actors promoting alternative discourses 
take into account the fact that a social enterprise can contribute to changing existing 
social norms by means of an innovative way of doing business. Accordingly, any 
kind of social objective that can produce positive social outcomes can be included 
under the umbrella of social enterprise activities (Chapter Eight). In other words, the 
meaning of ‘being social’ is not limited to the vulnerable, but includes the entire 
society and its members (Chapter Eight). For this reason, they consider the 
institutionalized term “Social Enterprise” to have marginalized the meaning of 
‘social’, which is supposed to include any sort of social problem (Chapter Eight). 
Overall, given that their understandings and definitions of social enterprises do not 
fit the SEPA, they were not involved in the policy conversations with other top-down 
and bottom-up actors.  
Researchers have attempted to define typologies of social enterprise based on 
the different approaches, due to the fact that these three different purposes are 
difficultly achieved by only one social enterprise at the same time (Alter 2004; 
Defourny and Nyssens 2010; Kerlin 2013). However, in Korea, the government tried 
to simplify the multiplicity of meanings and activities which go under the concept 
and to provide a single unified definition. As a result, the SEPA provides the 
standards of what social enterprise is. Regardless of the struggles on the meaning of 
social enterprise, based on its inherent multiplicity (Grassl 2012), other discourses 
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were only partly adopted in the SEPA. More specifically, from the policy approach, 
the inclusion of other discourses of social enterprise can be seen as a way of keeping 
power and dominance in the institutional field by satisfying the needs of other actors. 
For instance, government funding is an alternative source of finance to certified 
Social Enterprises and intermediary organizations. As I presented in Chapter Six, in 
order to get government funding for promoting Social Enterprise activities, a social 
enterprise has to meet all the criteria given by the certification system in the SEPA. 
In addition, a certified Social Enterprise has to maintain their social entrepreneurship 
activities of providing job opportunities and/or social services to vulnerable people 
as defined in the SEPA. In other words, the government keeps producing their 
favorable activities in policies using field-level networks and ideas by satisfying their 
need for financial resources.  
 
9.2.2 Resistance Against Institutional Pressures  
 
 The competition between actors promoting their own discourses is not only 
confined to the meaning of social enterprise, but it also underpins the entire 
certification system. As the certification system is the official codification of the 
meaning of social enterprise, contestation over the SEPA is part of struggles over the 
meaning of social enterprise. However, in this Section, I will focus more on the 
certification system in relation to issues of transparency and legitimation of social 
enterprise activities. As a matter of fact, top-down actors legitimized the certification 
system by claiming that it provides evidence on the transparency of Social Enterprise 
activities. From the policy approach, this issue mostly goes into considerations by the 
government on the possible misuse of subsidies by social entrepreneurs. In order to 
prevent this and maintain transparency, the government established that the 
certification system needs to monitor Social Enterprise activities on a regular basis 
(Chapter Six).  
 Contrary to this position, bottom-up actors who have established and 
managed social enterprises, even before the introduction of the SEPA, claimed that 
not every social enterprise needs to be certified and funded by the government. 
Instead, they emphasized the need for a registration system of social enterprises that 
are not interested in the financial support but only in the legal background. From 
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their field-observations, there are social enterprises which survived in the market 
without government subsidies, but they lack the legal grounds to create a certain type 
of organizational form, such as worker’s cooperatives and social enterprises, which 
delayed the legitimation of their existence (Chapter Six & Seven).  
 For these reasons, social entrepreneurs who already achieved the Social 
Enterprise certification claimed that the certification system is crucial to legitimize 
their existence. In relation to this issue, they stated: “how do you know that other 
types of social enterprises actually exist when they are not institutionalized?” 
(Chapter Six). 
 By contrast, for some actors, the SEPA certification is not the only option that 
can legitimize their organizations. Given that alternative standards have been 
developed in the context of conflicting political and strategic interests (Reinecke, 
Manning, and Von Hagen 2012), actors promoting alternative discourses of social 
enterprise chose to be recognized by an international standard, the B Corp 
Certification (Chapter Eight). Therefore, social entrepreneurs promoting alternative 
discourses can also prove their existence by ‘doing’ their organizational activities, 
and not only by ‘thinking’ (Orlikowski and Scott 2015). Unlike some certified Social 
Entrepreneurs who adjust their organizations to fit the certification criteria, 
uncertified social entrepreneurs invented new terms, such as social venture and social 
innovation enterprise to describe their organizations and activities better than the 
SEPA (Chapter Eight). In other words, they produced their own discourses based on 
their practices of creating social venture and social innovation enterprises that are 
independent from the government and from non-profit activities.  
 
9.3 The Empowerment of Field-level Actors to be 
Institutional Entrepreneurs  
 
Social movement theory has contributed to institutional research by 
identifying multiple actors and their different pathways that influence institutional 
changes (Fligstein and McAdam 2012; Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury 2012; 
Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008). Previous research found that not only powerful 
actors, but also powerless actors can make institutional changes by disrupting 
powerful institutions (Maguire and Hardy 2009; Zietsma and Lawrence 2010; 
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Furnari 2016). Nonetheless, previous research has oversimplified the role of 
powerless actors in institutional fields. Some studies investigated the role of extra- 
and intra-institutional actors in institutional changes by using the framework 
developed by Schneiberg and Lounsbury (2008). Furnari (2016) claims that 
institutional changes led by powerless actors who come from the outside of the field 
are likely to be radical, because dominant actors in the field would be de-legitimated. 
Carberry et al. (2017) found that powerless extra-institutional actors tend to more 
influential at the early stage of legitimation, but they become less influential when 
they change their position to intra-institutional actors. Still, the relationship between 
different powerless actors and the mechanisms of how powerless actors decide to be 
intra-institutional actors or stay as extra-institutional actors have not been fully 
studied.  
In my thesis, I re-confirmed that seemingly powerless actors can also make 
institutional changes by pushing their own institutional logics which project their 
socially constructed knowledge and understanding in the field, as defined by 
Maguire and Hardy (2006). My thesis further investigated the two different strategies 
used by powerless actors to become institutional entrepreneurs who are influential in 
the field. In this Section, I will discuss why some oppositional actors choose to be 
intra-institutional actors, while others choose to be extra-institutional actors. 
Moreover, I will also discuss how different powerless actors do not always take the 
same position against the powerful actors and do not consider each other as in-group 
actors, although both are rooted in civil society which is autonomous from the state, 
voluntary, and self-generating at the same time (Diamond 1994). 
 
9.3.1 Becoming Intra-institutional Actors  
 
Some studies have found that the influences of extra-institutional actors can 
be less powerful when they become intra-institutional actors, as soon as the 
institutional field matures Carberry et al. (2017). However, my thesis found that 
institutional entrepreneurs are able to maintain their influences even after they 
become intra-institutional actors. The case of intermediary organizations in the social 
entrepreneurship field in South Korea shows how extra-institutional entrepreneurs 
can become intra-institutional entrepreneurs and how they maintained their 
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influences in the field by nurturing a good relationship with both top-down 
(powerful) and bottom-up (powerless) actors.  
Intermediary organizations define themselves as civil society organizations 
but the government accepted their participation in the discussion on the institutional-
building process of Social Enterprise from the beginning of the project (Chapter 
Seven). In the case of intermediary organizations in Korea, they tackled 
unemployment problems at the societal level prior to becoming intermediary 
organizations, but their main task was not limited to providing policy suggestions in 
operating Social Enterprise related policies (Chapter Seven).  
In my thesis, intermediary organizations were identified as actors who chose 
to be intra-institutional actors who challenge existing institutions by mobilizing 
insiders and outsiders and established networks and resources, as identified in 
Schneiberg and Lounsbury (2008). First, intermediary organizations are able to find 
financial resources relatively easy, because the Ministry of Employment and Labor 
(MoEL) provides funding to operate the SEPA as well as to deliver field-level 
opinions to the government. Second, government funding makes intermediary 
organizations responsible for maintaining a strong partnership with both top-down 
and bottom-up actors as a channel to bridge policy makers and field-level social 
entrepreneurs. Third, intermediary organizations consider themselves as intra-
institutional actors. Intermediary organizations perceive the government and big 
corporations as in-group actors, which they need to build a strong partnership with, 
to solve social warfare issues. They also define the government and big corporations 
as top-down actors who have financial resources and policy interests in promoting 
social entrepreneurship as the main actors leading the social entrepreneurship field in 
Korea. Fourth, nonetheless, intermediary organizations challenged the existing 
institutional meaning and setting of Social Enterprise which mostly reflects powerful 
actors’ understandings on social entrepreneurship. Intermediary organizations 
criticized the government and big corporations on the basis of the idea that they do 
not fully understand the concept of social enterprise and are ruining the ecosystem of 
the field after the SEPA (Chapter Seven). 
 My thesis shows that some intra-institutional actors are able to sustain their 
influences on powerful actors in response to their demands to change the institutional 
settings. The case of the establishment of the Seoul Social Economy Center reflects 
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the ways in which intermediary organizations’ intra-institutional movement 
accomplished institutional changes. As highlighted by Schneiberg and Lounsbury 
(2008), an intra-institutional movement arises as the fields have matured. According 
to them, an intra-institutional movement can emerge in order to not only directly 
contest existing institutions and taken-for-granted understandings, but also to chain 
existing institutional arrangements by theorizing, articulating and combining new 
projects. In this case, intermediary organizations noticed criticisms from the inside of 
the field according to which the SEPA is ruining the ecosystem by limiting the 
concept of Social Enterprise (Chapter Seven). Their effort to collect field-level 
opinions and communicate them to top-down actors represented a strong motivation 
to establish a new public private partnership organization – the Seoul Social 
Economy Centre – that can inclusively support different types of social enterprise 
activities, regardless of their organizational forms. The establishment process of the 
Seoul Social Economy Centre is considered as an intra-institutional movement, given 
that they have used existing networks of Social Enterprise, cooperative, community 
enterprise, and self-sufficiency enterprise and earmarked government funding 
(Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008).  
 
9.3.2 Staying as Extra-Institutional Actors  
 
Furnari (2016) claims that institutional changes led by powerless actors who 
come from the outside of the field are likely to be radical, because dominant actors in 
the field are de-legitimated. My findings confirm that powerless actors, extra-
institutional actors can led institutional changes. However, in my thesis, institutional 
changes led by powerless extra-institutional actors were not radical and dominant 
actors still sustain their legitimacy.  
Unlike intermediary organizations, the CSSSED stayed as an extra-
institutional actor whose focus lies on local problems, politics or characteristics 
(Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008). In my thesis, the CSSSED was identified as 
extra-institutional actors. First, of course the CSSSED also interact with the 
government and with other bottom-up actors, but due to their focus they cannot fit in 
the institutional meaning and setting of social enterprises in the SEPA. Second, they 
mobilize alternative resources rather than receiving the subsidies to spread their own 
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concept of social enterprise – worker’s cooperatives and social economy (Chapter 
Seven).  
The establishment of the CSSSED can be considered as a movement of an 
extra-institutional actor whose focus lies on local problems, politics or characteristics 
(Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008) while crystallizing a broader community of 
practice with the aim of promoting social economy and cooperative discourses 
(Tolbert and Zucker 1983; Baron, Dobbin, and Jennings 1986; Galaskiewicz and 
Wasserman 1989; Strang and Chang 1993). By collectively working with member 
organizations who do not fully agree with the SEPA, these actors clearly state that 
they are creating a new path of social economy / solidarity organizations which 
emphasize the development of solidarity between members of the society (Chapter 
Seven).  
However, not every powerless actor can be an institutional entrepreneur. My 
findings show that potential institutional entrepreneurs are required to have a good 
history of having participated in the development of the fields. The accumulated 
experiences of powerless actors in the field help them to place those who are more 
knowledgeable and influential in a higher position, especially when powerful actors 
are new to the field and not knowledgeable about the field.  
The CSSSED was able to be an institutional entrepreneur because their 
demands to change the institutional settings of Social Enterprise were accepted by 
the powerful actor – the government in this context. Specifically, the government 
positively associated with the CSSSED because they were legitimated as nascent 
actors who developed and practiced the concept of social enterprise in the context 
they were located in, even before the SEPA (Chapter Seven). In other words, the 
accumulated experiences of these social activities helped bottom-up actors to 
convince the government to accept the institutional logics embedded in their 
discourses. As a matter of fact, a long history of experience and activities in 
developing the concept of social enterprise motivated oppositional actors to speak up 
and push their own discourses so that they were not neglected in the institutional 
field. In short, although their discourses of local development and cooperative mind 
sets and governance were not included in the initial institutionalized meaning of 
social enterprise, oppositional actors managed to accomplish institutional changes of 
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Social Enterprise when top-down actors accepted their discourses by amending the 
meaning and scope of Social Enterprise in the SEPA (Chapter Seven).  
Prior research (Scott et al. 2000; Hardy and Maguire 2010; Furnari 2016) 
found that power will be redistributed when new actors challenge the dominant 
institutional field. However, my findings show that institutional changes led by 
powerless extra-institutional actors are not always radical and dominant actors are 
able to sustain their legitimacy even after institutional changes. I found that power 
relations between top-down and bottom-up actors in the Korean social 
entrepreneurship field are fixed. Although powerless bottom-up actors could make 
institutional changes, this does not mean that they replaced existing top-down actors 
and became dominant. As Wooten (2016) emphasizes, my findings show that 
bottom-up actors are able to influence institutional changes when they do not 
challenge dominant actors’ institutional positions. At the same time, the government 
accepted bottom-up actors demands because of their position as those who are 
responsible for solving social problems (Zald and Lounsbury 2010). However, the 
government selectively accepted bottom-up actors’ demands which fit within the 
existing framework Wooten (2016) – the SEPA in my research.   
 
In summary, the two different directions and strategies to institutionalize a 
new organizational form tell us that actors can empower themselves in different ways 
in order to be involved in the institution-building or changing process – by being 
intra or extra-institutional actors. Although both of them are rooted in civil society 
where it is autonomous from the state, voluntary, and self-generating (Diamond 
1994), they do not consider each other as in-group actors, but out-group actors 
(Chapters Six & Seven). Also, the emerging multiple practices and collective actions 
that are involved in the institution-building project of Social Enterprise are similar to 
social movements that collectively challenges to the systems of authority (Snow 
2004), as they empower themselves to make institutional changes (Schneiberg and 
Lounsbury 2008).  
Prior research found that multiple actors often collaborate in order to preserve 
their interests in the process of building a new institution (O'Mahony and Bechky 
2008; Zietsma and McKnight 2009). However, my findings on the two different 
directions and strategies of powerless bottom-up actors which are influential in the 
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institutional-building and changing processes show that different groups of 
powerless actors do not always collaborate against powerful actors. Intermediary 
organizations chose to be intra-institutional actors because they considered that being 
in-group actors of the government would be more beneficial to gain resources, 
networks, and the opportunities to have a good relationship with top-down actors. 
Meanwhile, the CSSSED chose to stay as an extra-institutional actor because their 
understandings on social enterprise could not fit within the legal framework. 
Moreover, they also have been building their own networks and resources that they 
can use in the field.  
Both groups were able to be intra- or extra-institutional entrepreneurs because 
the powerful top-down actors fully or partly accepted their demands. Thus, the 
institutional-building process of Korean Social Enterprise did not involve power re-
distribution although powerless actors challenged the dominant institutional field and 
this led institutional changes.  
Fixed power relations between the powerful top-down and powerless bottom-
up actors are related to the traditional role of the Korean government. In South 
Korea, policy networks, societal groups and resources are centralized to the 
government (Spencer, Murtha, and Lenway 2005). Therefore, once the government 
institutionalizes a new organizational form by establishing a new regulation for 
existing field-level activities, this easily spreads throughout the country. Although 
the relationship between the government and grassroots organizations became more 
amicable after the country achieved political democracy in 1997, the state is still the 
main actor who leads institutional-building and changing processes. Thus, in the 
Korean context, power re-distribution between top-down and bottom-up actors is 
unlikely happen especially in the institutional field. Yet, bottom-up actors are able to 
influence the powerful top-down actors to adapt their demands to institutional 
changes.  
 
9.4 Alternative Discourses Provide the Possibility of De-
institutionalization 
 
The varieties of social enterprise discourses emerge depends on how each 
actor places their priorities in relation to social entrepreneurship. Actors promoting 
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alternative discourses consider as of primary importance the activities aimed at 
creating innovations which can contribute to making a positive social change, as well 
as creating the monetary value that can make an organization and their activities 
sustainable (Chapter Eight). In the meanwhile, actors promoting oppositional 
discourses emphasize the social value of empowering marginalized social groups by 
creating work opportunities and improving working conditions (Chapter Seven). 
For actors in the social entrepreneurship field, sustainability is an important 
concept in social entrepreneurship because it is related to the impact of social 
enterprise activities which aim to achieve both economic and social objectives. 
Actors promote different social enterprise discourses based on their level of emphasis 
on achieving social or/and the economic sustainability of a social enterprise. More 
specifically, Reis, Clohesy, and Foundation (1999: 5) define “the sustainability of the 
organization and its services” as a strong force of driving social entrepreneurship. 
Stevenson (2011: 5) goes into greater detail and identifies two sides of sustainability: 
“financially surviving and enduring over time” and “maintaining or deepening its 
social impact over time.” 
The competitions between official, oppositional and alternative actors in 
social entrepreneurship in Korea also include arguments related to which 
sustainability a social enterprise should achieve first and how. For the actors who are 
promoting a social innovation discourse, organizational sustainability always comes 
after financial sustainability (Chapter Eight). According to these, being sustainable as 
a social enterprise means being accepted in the commercial market by breaking the 
conventional perceptions around business (Chapter Eight). In sum, social ventures 
and social innovation enterprises are, therefore, organizational forms which reflect 
their understandings on the sustainability of social enterprises.  
On the contrary, actors promoting official discourses claim that their activities 
and organizations are already sustainable, since the survival rate of certified Social 
Enterprises is higher than small-medium sized enterprises (24.2%) (Lee 2012). 
However, they have also overwhelmingly benefited of an approximate £ 112,000 
(160 million Won) in subsidies granted every year on average and actually most 
Social Enterprises are not truly making business profits (Korea Labor Institute 2013). 
Accordingly, the social sustainability of certified Social Enterprise has not been fully 
achieved. First, the number of employees of certified Social Enterprises has 
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constantly decreased between 2006 and 2012 (Korea Labor Institute 2013). Second, 
the average wage for vulnerable people working at Social Enterprises has also been 
in constant decline between 2006 and 2012 (Korea Labor Institute 2013). 
The outstanding success of some social ventures and not of others uncovers 
the true limitations of the SEPA which was not able to produce from a financial and 
organizational point of view Social Enterprises which are truly sustainable. 
Ironically, the case of alternative actors who differentiate themselves from other 
actors and do not actively interact with other actors shows that they were able to 
influence the de-institutionalization of Social Enterprise (Rao and Kenney 2008). As 
a matter of fact, official, oppositional and alternative discourses of social enterprises 
mutually construct the phenomena of social enterprise in Korea. However, the basic 
understandings on social entrepreneurship and the directions of activities from 
alternative and other actors are contrasting, as shown in the previous Finding 
Chapters. More specifically, they are distant from each other because their emphasis 
is different, whether the focus be on delivering public policy, community 
development, the empowerment of social actors, solidarity, blended value, or social 
innovation.  
The case of the emergence of social ventures also shows us that organizations 
which are not willing to depend on powerful actors, the government in this context, 
may also take a powerful or influential position in the institutional field. This can 
occur because alternative actors empower themselves and attract other actors by 
being recognized as a creative (innovative) and profitable social business. There is no 
significant institutional outcome from the interactions between alternative actors and 
other actors. However, there is the possibility of institutionalizing social ventures or 
de-institutionalizing the SEPA as another new organizational form in the near future 
if the interactions with top-down actors continue to take place.  
 
9.5 Conclusion  
 
To conclude the Discussion Chapter, I shall summarize the main findings 
related to the phenomena of the emergence of social enterprise to advance our 
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understanding on the various discourses around a new organizational form and their 
struggles in the institutional field.  
The case of the emergence of Korean social enterprises confirmed that 
certification systems can sustain the multiplicity of the meaning and the presence of 
a variety of organizational forms, rather than providing a homogeneous concept 
(Reinecke, Manning, and Von Hagen 2012). The multiplicity of social enterprises 
produces a number of struggles between actors, since their interests and 
understandings were conflicting. These struggles relate to the definition of the 
purpose of social enterprise activities which reflects each actor’s ideologies, in turn 
constructed by accumulated experiences, social interactions, personal beliefs and 
motivations (Van Dijk 1995: 142). More specifically, in the Korean case these 
struggles are caused by the establishment of a certification system which tries to 
standardize the organizational form of social enterprise and thereby homogenize the 
variety of existing discourses and organizational forms of social enterprise. By 
standardizing the organizational form of social enterprise, the government was able 
to co-opt bottom-up social enterprises as providers of public policies. The 
government also used established field-level networks and business ideas from 
bottom-up social entrepreneurs to provide social welfare and employment policies. 
Also, by providing employment subsidies to certified Social Enterprises, the 
government attempted to keep their position at a strong level by intervening in the 
existing field of social entrepreneurship. 
However, conflicts between top-down and bottom-up actors greatly 
contributed to institutional changes, since bottom-up actors constantly contested the 
SEPA and promoted their own discourses. Thus, the case of the institutional change 
process of Korean social enterprises shows that these processes are not harmonious 
and peaceful, but, on the contrary, conflicting. As a matter of fact, actors constantly 
interact with each other, rather than simply agreeing on the institutional meanings 
and settings provided by powerful actors. The actors involved in this institutional 
change processes relied on two strategies to confront the government as intra- or 
extra- institutional actors. My findings show that both strategies are successful to 
influence the government and the SEPA in different ways. The extra-institutional 
actors were able to take an active form of resistance because of their accumulated 
experiences of creating actual organizations in the field. In addition, their positions 
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as nascent actors who initially initiated the need to promote social entrepreneurship 
also enabled them to be influential without being incorporated into the institutional 
field.  
The case of the intermediary organizations which became intra-institutional 
actors after the SEPA shows that some bottom-up actors promote themselves by 
conforming themselves into the existing social order. Despite this, as shown in my 
findings, they still decided to raise their voices, given that they are closely connected 
to the field, unlike the government. In this way, they were able to accomplish 
institutional changes by modifying the structure of the policy delivery system and by 
establishing a new private-public partnership organization, while relying on existing 
networks and resources.  
In addition to these considerations, the findings of this thesis illustrate that 
not every actor wants to be included in the institutional field, especially when the 
institutional setting limits the scope of the meaning and the activities of an 
organization. For example, although the government has been trying to include social 
innovation and entrepreneurship discourses in the institutional meaning of social 
enterprise, actors promoting these alternative discourses are not interested in being 
part of the institutional setting of social enterprise. In contrast to oppositional actors 
who actively interact with other actors, alternative actors do not seek to interact with 
others. Instead of being involved in the institution-building project, alternative actors 
choose to focus on developing their business to survive conventional market 
competition. The conceptual model of this institutionalization process of a new 
organizational form in the Korean context is provided in Figure 9-1.    
 
In summary, having conflicts between actors in the institution-building 
process is not always negative. Instead, the struggles between actors help them to 
understand the existence of multiple institutional logics developed by other actors. 
Knowing and understanding other actors’ logics related to institution-building and its 
background represents an opportunity to include other logics and discourses in the 
institutionalized logic by changing the institutional meaning and settings of an 
organization. Throughout this process, powerless actors are empowered to raise their 
voices to include their own discourses in the institutionalized logic and achieve 
institutional changes as institutional entrepreneurs. Although it is hard to say that 
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institutional entrepreneurs always push their own discourse and logics to be fully 
accepted by other actors at once, institutional entrepreneurs constantly push their 
logics over time with multiple discursive and practical strategies which they are able 
to use and which fit each situation.   
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Figure 9-1. Conceptual model of Institutionalization Process of a New Organizational Form in Korea 
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Conclusion 
 
 
In this Chapter I present the contributions and limitations of my thesis, along 
with the implications for future research. First, I will introduce the theoretical, 
empirical and practical contributions that this thesis has achieved. Second, I will 
explain the limitations of my research and how I tried to overcome these. Finally, the 
implications of this study on present and further research will be outlined based on 
the contributions and limitations of this thesis.  
 
Contributions  
 
This thesis aims to contribute to the growing research area of social 
entrepreneurship by exploring the struggles over the meaning of social enterprise 
which emerged during the institution-building process of social enterprises as a new 
organizational form. The main contribution of my thesis is to show that powerless 
actors can influence institutional changes from the inside and the outside of the field 
by means of intra- and extra-social tactics.  
 The first contribution of this thesis is to conceptualize various forms of 
emerging social enterprises in the Korean context. My research advances our 
understanding of institutional processes at the field level from a multi-level 
perspective, by identifying multiple actors and discourses in the field and how they 
interact with each other (Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008). In my thesis, I uncover 
the co-existence of multiple forms of a new organization which use the same name 
“social enterprise”, by conceptualizing bottom-up social enterprise movements in the 
history of Korean social enterprise.  
 The history of Korean social enterprise used to be written from a top-down 
perspective. As a matter of fact, the grassroots activities of conceptualizing and 
building social enterprises in practice are often mentioned in history from a top-down 
perspective. However, my research reveals that the history of the bottom-up 
movements of social enterprises has been oversimplified. In particular, neglecting or 
simplifying the history of bottom-up social enterprise movements creates a blind spot 
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in the cumulative process of the construction of the meaning of social enterprise. In 
other words, the emergence of Social Enterprise led by top-down actors was not a 
cumulative process, but it was determined by conflicts among actors who had 
developed the meaning of social enterprise in the field even before the introduction 
of the SEPA. For this reason, the progress and development of the concept of social 
enterprise has been retraced from both a top-down and a bottom-up perspective. This 
process sheds light on the fact that the idea of social enterprise has emerged from a 
series of dynamic and complicated circumstances which go beyond top-down policy 
implementation.  
 This finding is novel because the emergence of social enterprise is typically 
depicted as a bottom-up process driven by independent entrepreneurs which are often 
part of civil society and which has been initiated by group of citizens (Laville and 
Nyssens 2001). However, my thesis shows that this assumption does not hold in 
South Korea where a strong state has been able to centralize resources and networks. 
For this reason, the institutionalization of Korean social enterprise has been 
considered as the result of the privatization of policy that leads social enterprises to 
provide social services and mobilize their own networks and ideas into the public 
area (Zahra et al. 2009), rather than as the result of bottom-up movements. Top-down 
actors expand this argument according to which providing alternative sources of 
finance to Social Enterprises represents a benefit for the government as well as for 
field-level actors, as shown in Chapter Seven. On the other hand, in spite of top-
down led institutionalization processes, bottom-up actors who initially introduced the 
concept of social enterprise continued promoting their own understandings of social 
enterprise. Also, bottom-up and top-down actors still interacted with each other to 
achieve a shared understanding of social enterprise.  
The second contribution of this thesis is to present empirical findings to 
examine the emergence of different forms of social enterprise in the Korean context 
by bringing two literatures together – institutional entrepreneurship and social 
movement theories within a neo-institutional perspective. Both theories emphasize 
the role of actors as institutional entrepreneurs who are able to achieve institutional 
changes and to make use of contradicting elements of existing institutions to craft 
new organizational forms (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; Schneiberg and Lounsbury 
2008; Scott et al. 2000). This integrated view of institutional entrepreneurship and 
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social movements enabled me to reveal different existing types of actors along with 
their discursive and practical strategies of creating various organizational forms of 
social enterprises. In other words, Korean social enterprise emerged not only thanks 
to top-down attempts to integrate field-level social enterprise activities into the 
policy area, but also by means of intra- and extra-institutional actors who constantly 
take an active form of resistance against institutional pressure.  
I found that relatively powerless actors have the ability to construct their own 
concepts, definitions and understandings of a new organizational form, as 
emphasized previously by Zilber (2002: 236). Under an institutional pressure driving 
towards a homogeneous meaning and organizational form of social enterprise, 
oppositional and alternative actors constantly promoted their own discourses which 
reflect their own interests based on their social positions and on the context where 
they are located, as highlighted by Seo and Creed (2002).  
Struggles over the meaning of social enterprise show that institution-building 
and organizational change are not harmonious and peaceful processes, where 
conflicts between actors are absent, as early institutionalists claim (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977; Tolbert and Zucker 1983). More specifically, bottom-up actors in the 
Korean social entrepreneurship field did not act as “passive recipients of institutional 
frameworks” (Scott 1995; Seo and Creed 2002: 240) who avoid conflicts with other 
actors in order to achieve an agreement on the institutional meaning and settings. 
Instead, they are institutional entrepreneurs who leverage inside and outside 
resources in order to accomplish institutional changes (Maguire, Hardy, and 
Lawrence 2004: 657). In this case, the contestations over the purpose of social 
enterprise and over the certification system took the form of discourses which reflect 
each actor’s motivations and objectives in relation to social enterprise activities. 
Thus, the struggles over the meaning of social enterprise represent a dialectical 
tension and have created opportunities to be involved in institutional-building 
projects, as argued by Maguire and Hardy (2006). However, alternative actors have 
also gained these opportunities by ‘creating’ their own organizations and by ‘proving’ 
that they are still winners within the traditional market mechanism framework 
(Orlikowski and Scott 2015), rather than promoting their own discourses to other 
actors (Hardy and Thomas 2015).  
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The third contribution of this thesis is to explain the ways of achieving 
institutional changes by means of intra- and extra-institutional tactics, based on 
Schneiberg and Lounsbury (2008)’s social movements framework. Scholars working 
at the intersection of institutional entrepreneurship and social movement scholarship 
have shown that powerless groups can actually accomplish institutional change 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Rao, Morrill, and 
Zald 2000). Yet, mainstream organizational theories have not paid enough attention 
to how these less powerful actors interact with the powerful ones to adjust existing 
institutional arrangements (Seo and Creed 2002). Therefore, in this thesis, I claim 
that different groups of actors in positions of lower power can still exhibit different 
intentions from one another; for this reason, their reactions to powerful actors are 
different. More specifically, oppositional actors who partly reject the official 
definition of Social Enterprise in the SEPA followed the strategy of becoming intra-
institutional actors or staying in the position of extra-institutional actors. Alternative 
actors who fully reject the official definition of Social Enterprise given by the 
government, instead, took on the strategy of isolating themselves, refusing 
interactions and selecting alternative standards in order to legitimate their 
organizations. 
With regard to intra-institutional actors, they mobilized existing field-level 
and policy networks, besides government budgets in order to change the structure of 
the SEPA delivery system. These movements resulted in the inclusion of other types 
of social enterprises, such as cooperatives, social economy and community 
enterprises, in the institutional field. Extra-institutional actors, instead, focused more 
on building a broad concept of social economy together with other alternative actors 
who fundamentally disagree with the concept of certified Social Enterprises. In order 
to achieve this purpose, they established their own network related to the solidarity 
economy on the basis of their long history of activities which emphasizes the 
empowerment of individuals through social enterprise activities. These movements 
resulted in an increased use of the term solidarity economy and social economy, and 
a policy discussion on the establishment of the Social Economy Act. Given these 
arguments, the core argument outlines the fact that powerless actors do not always 
depend on other powerful actors. Instead, they influence institutional changes from 
the inside and the outside of the field by means of intra- and extra-actors’ movements.  
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However, intra- and extra-institutional actors are not completely opposed to 
each other given that they share the roots of work-related organizations in the Korean 
context. As soon as some bottom-up organizations changed their positions by being 
integrated into the institutional field as intermediary organizations, the core 
objectives of their activities and strategies also changed. In this thesis I, therefore, 
claim that the boundaries of intra- and extra-institutional actors are not clear-cut. As 
a matter of fact, although they do not actively interact with each other in the 
institutional field, individuals in different groups of top-down and bottom-up actors 
still communicate with one another in relation to field-level and institutional-level 
problems.  
Fourth, this thesis empirically contributes to extending the boundaries of 
social enterprise theory in a different geographical scope. In relation to this aspect, 
Peattie and Morley (2008) point out the importance of theory development with 
regard to its geographical diversity, which has been considered as one of the 
limitations of the social entrepreneurship research field. Unlike previous studies on 
the emergence of social enterprises in the European or American contexts, the 
Korean case can inform us on how grassroots or alternative organizations are 
included into the existing social order under the influence of a strong state. This 
contributes to explaining the different adaptation processes of social enterprises in 
different times and places (Munoz 2010; Peattie and Morley 2008). More specifically, 
in Korea, by relying on policy networks, societal groups and state-centralized 
resources, pre-existing organizations were able to imitate the structure of certified 
Social Enterprises in order to fit the established standards. As a result, social 
enterprises which existed before the SEPA responded to isomorphic pressures of the 
certified Social Enterprises, even though their activities had motivated top-down 
actors to establish the SEPA. The case of conflicting interests and discourses of 
social enterprises in Korea, therefore, advances our knowledge concerning 
institution-building processes from a neo-institutional perspective. I demonstrate that 
during these processes, the power of dominant actors, such as the government and 
policy makers, assumes a leading role in institutionalization. However, at the same 
time their power does not always rule over the entire field. As a matter of fact, the 
policy system of the SEPA does not define certified the Social Enterprises and 
intermediary organizations as target recipients, but as partners and service providers. 
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In the case of intermediary organizations, they were able to be actively involved in 
institution-building processes by setting their positions closer to the government. As 
intermediaries, they posed themselves as bridges between the government and field-
level social enterprises performing social entrepreneurship activities according to the 
government’s definition. As presented in Chapter Seven, on behalf of the 
government, intermediary organizations took charge of performing the certification 
process – recruiting and advising certified Social Enterprises, organizing a 
certification judge committee, and reporting field-level information to the 
government. Therefore, the changes in political relationships between the 
government and civil society have also led them to exchange opinions more openly.  
 
Limitations  
 
In this thesis, I tried to capture the power struggles and imbalances between 
multiple actors by conceptualizing the multiplicity of social enterprises depending on 
each actor’s ideologies. For this reason, I presented the multiple discourses and 
practices of social enterprises which together construct the phenomena of the 
emergence of social enterprises in Korea. The focus of my research, however, was 
not on a single case of social enterprise or on the in-depth exploration of the role of 
individual actors in this process. As a matter of fact, with inductive grounded theory 
as a research methodology, I aimed to find examples from field-level data and 
observations, instead of collecting data from pre-selected examples. In addition to 
these considerations, the complicated field of Korean social enterprises where 
various discourses co-exist also made it difficult to select certain cases to be studied 
in-depth. Instead, I chose to study the phenomena in a broad way, given that my 
research question derived from the observations of social enterprises at the 
organizational level. In a similar fashion, this research process has not taken into 
account the voice of employees in social enterprise, even though they also contribute 
to developing social enterprise discourses given that they bring with them field-level 
perspectives. However, I did interview the CEOs of social enterprises, intermediaries 
and civil activities who are channels of bridging field-level workers, organizational 
activities and other actors in the institutional field.  
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The second limitation of the thesis is related to differences between the 
current phenomena of social enterprise in 2017 and the phenomena I observed in 
2014. As I already mentioned in Chapter Five, there has been a political attempt to 
introduce new forms to legalize social enterprises – the Social Economy Act. The 
enactment of the Social Economy Act could be accelerated in 2017 during the time 
of the 19th presidential election of Korea. Interestingly, the Social Economy Act 
which is a core outcome of the struggle over the institutional meaning of Social 
Enterprise that aims to include all kinds of social enterprise activities is not limited to 
certified Social Enterprises. Whether the Social Economy Act has been established to 
rule the SEPA or not, its establishment will by all means influence the current 
relationships of actors, policies and activities to some extent. Even though these 
recent considerations are of great importance, I concluded that the inclusion of the 
current social economy debate in my study would generate confusion as to what the 
research object of this work actually is. For this reason, I chose to limit my focus to 
the struggles over the meaning of social enterprise related to the SEPA between 2006 
and 2012, which had already produced explicit dialectical tensions and enabled me to 
capture the power struggles between actors in the institutional field. In this way, my 
research also provides a historical perspective to study the future debate on the 
meaning of social economy which has emerged as a reaction to the limitations of the 
SEPA.   
Third, the identification of discourses and social enterprise approaches which 
I have presented throughout this work can also be seen as overgeneralizations of the 
inherent multiplicity characterizing the field. With regard to this point, I would like 
to emphasize that a group of actors can promote more than one discourse given that 
they construct their ideologies by combining different approaches (Van Dijk 1995). 
For this reason, the borderlines I drew between discourses, approaches and actors in 
the social entrepreneurship field were meant to help the readers understand the 
multiplicity and differences within the field and are not an exact representation of a 
much more complex reality. My research contributes to advancing our understanding 
on how social reality – organizations in this case – is socially constructed through 
constant interactions between actors who have developed their ideologies based on 
different experiences and knowledge. With regard to this point, I emphasize the fact 
that the boundaries to the concept of social enterprise are fuzzy and ever changing.  
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 Fourth, the power struggles between actors have not actually been fully 
studied from a multi-level perspective. Instead, actors have been identified according 
to two different levels – top-down and bottom-up. This type of identification helped 
me to focus on the interactions and power struggles emerging from the top-down 
pressures. For example, the case of intermediary organizations as actors which bridge 
top-down actors and field-level social entrepreneurs can only be studied through a 
multi-level perspective. Considering the fact that intermediary organizations are 
relatively powerful institutional actors in comparison to field-level certified Social 
Enterprises, my research could be expanded to include the resources and strategies 
and extend power in two further different relationships of an organization with the 
relatively powerful and the relatively powerless actors. This limitation is also 
connected to the first limitation which relates to the exclusion of the voice of field-
level employees in my research. However, in this study I focused more on the power 
struggles which emerged from dominant institutional pressures – the SEPA and its 
development processes – instead of the relationships of multiple actors and the multi 
directions of power tactics. In sum, I considered approaching the emergence of 
Korean Social enterprise according to two different levels – top-down and bottom-up 
– which would well present bottom-up contestations against the attempts of 
expanding government power. 
 
Implications and Future Research 
 
By putting the contributions and limitations of this research together, this 
section will discuss how research findings and conclusions can be extended. I will 
also suggest some research questions that could be addressed by future research.  
 
First, the different strategies used by oppositional and alternative actors to 
legitimate their activities raised further research questions on the relationship 
between materiality and discourse. While oppositional actors consider the existence 
of organizations and discourses to be proved only when they are institutionalized, 
alternative actors, instead, proved their existence by creating organizations based on 
their own discourses. These findings can contribute to developing future research 
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building on the current debates on whether, and what, discourse brings to materiality 
and materiality to discourse (Hardy and Thomas 2015), or whether materiality and 
discourses are inseparable (Orlikowski and Scott 2015; Barad 2007). By addressing 
the ontological question “how do we know that alternative types of social enterprises 
exist when they are not institutionalized?”, future research can be carried out through 
the observations of performance and the discourses produced by alternative 
organizations in the field.  
Second, the history of Korean social enterprises can be studied as part of the 
history of social movements which confronted the massive capitalistic pressures 
from the government and from big business groups or Chaebol. My research found 
that the current understandings and organizational forms, which have emerged, are 
based on alternative organizational activities in Korean history, which had tackled 
the economic and social problems that the government and traditional businesses 
were incapable of solving. A long and dynamic history of social enterprises can 
explain in greater depth what and how a certain business activity can contribute to 
solving economic, social and political problems which society is confronted with 
(Laville and Nyssens 2001). For this reason, alternative forms of business, such as 
Dure, National Product Movement, co-operatives and self-sufficiency enterprises can 
be studied as continuous alternative forms or as business activities from a historical 
perspective. This research direction is expected to reveal the existence of alternative 
businesses with different names and organizational forms that have contributed to the 
social development of Korea by tackling certain economic, social and political 
issues. In addition to this, future research could also provide a practical perspective 
on how the organizational forms and objectives of social enterprises will continue to 
change as every society faces new social and economic problems.  
Third, in terms of future research, I hope my research is able to inform 
debates on how contextual factors influence institution-building or changing 
processes in different contexts, by comparing Korean cases with ones in the UK and 
Europe. From my findings, top-down actors explicitly acknowledged that they had 
designed the SEPA with reference to British social enterprise policies, in particular to 
the Community Interest Company (CIC). Meanwhile, bottom-up actors mentioned 
that they were mainly influenced by Mondragon, a Spanish worker’s cooperative and 
the Social Cooperative Law in Italy. The concept of a new organizational form can 
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be elaborated further by translating and importing concepts and examples from 
overseas (Creed, Scully, and Austin 2002). Future research could address the 
following question that I began to ask in this study namely: how do the meanings of 
social enterprises change when being transported to other socio-economic, cultural 
and political contexts, and how do the interests of actors enter into conflict against 
each other within this translation process? The case studies of the translation of the 
CIC and of the worker’s and social cooperatives in Korea present in greater detail 
how actors modified the original concepts and structures within the situation where 
they were located.  
Fourth, my research can be expanded to study the struggles over the meaning 
of hybrid organizations, such as social economy and solidarity economy enterprises, 
in order to investigate the development path of social enterprise discourses. The 
enactment of the Social Economy Act will raise additional research questions on how 
actors change their positions and strategies when an institutional setting is modified. 
Since the Social Economy Act aims to include all kinds of social enterprise activities 
in the field, this legalization naturally leads to the question of whether or not field-
level organizations are isomorphic under strong institutional pressures and are to be 
included as part of the grand narrative of social economy.  
 Fifth, my thesis studied intermediary organizations as intra-institutional 
actors who make institutional changes from the inside of institutions. However, the 
role of intermediary organizations can be further studied by exploring the extension 
of their power in the field. More specifically, intermediary organizations are 
relatively powerless actors in comparison to the government, but they are still 
relatively powerful actors when compared to social entrepreneurs whose activities 
are being managed by them. Therefore, the existence of intermediary organizations 
as street-level bureaucrats who implement public services on behalf of the 
government (Lipsky 2010) raises the following research questions: how do their 
political agendas and strategies differ when they communicate with policy makers 
and the government, and with lowest rank participants? Where do their power 
controls come from – government funding, social positions as street-level 
bureaucrats, or from field-level practices and supports?  
Lastly, in future research, scholars can explore the varieties of capitalism that 
are contained in the each actor’s discourse of social enterprise (Hall and Soskice 
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2001). In my findings, I emphasized that different organizational forms of social 
enterprise, including certified Social Enterprises, CSR, cooperatives, social ventures 
and social innovation enterprises, are the result of a different emphasis on economic 
or social sustainability. However, the conflicting emphasis on survival in the 
traditional market mechanisms, on one hand, and on economic sustainability, or on 
solidarity in society and on the empowerment of marginalized people, on the other, 
raises the question of whether a social enterprise consolidates or deconstructs the 
dominant neoliberal capitalist system. If a social enterprise has originally emerged as 
an alternative to capitalism, can other types of social entrepreneurial activities, such 
as CSR and social ventures, aiming to be winners in the capitalistic market system, 
still be considered as part of social entrepreneurship? What were the original 
motivations of these alternative organizations and how have their economic activities 
been integrated into the market economy?   
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Appendix  
 
I. List of Pilot Study Interviewees (Name of interviewees and organizations are fiction, 2013) 
 
No. Name Organization Position Category 
1st Email 2nd Email 3rd Email 4th Email  
Results  
Sent Received Sent Received Sent Received Sent Received 
1 AA1 Circle CEO Social Venture 8 Oct 11 Oct 14 Oct 19 Oct 23 Oct 1 Nov     Completed 
2 AB2 Magazine S Reporter Media 8 Oct 16 Oct 18 Oct           No answer 
3 AC3 Your Friend  CEO For profit corporation 9 Oct 9 Oct 10 Oct 10 Oct 11 Oct 11 Oct 14 Oct 14 Oct Completed 
4 AD4 Good Traveller CEO Social Venture 9 Oct 10 Oct 11 Oct 18 Oct 23 Oct 5 Nov 14 Nov 2 Dec Completed 
5 AE5 KV&E Foundation 
Chief 
Researcher Academia 16 Oct 18 Oct 23 Oct 30 Oct 31 Oct 18 Nov     Completed 
6 AF6 Upcycle  CEO Social Enterprise 16 Oct 21 Oct 23 Oct 28 Oct 29 Oct 4 Nov     Completed 
7 AG7 You Can Do It  CEO Social Venture 18 Oct 18 Oct 23 Oct 19 Nov 21 Nov       No answer 
8 AH8 Good Investment 
Board 
Member 
Social 
Venture 23 Oct 28 Oct 29 Oct 10 Nov 12 Nov 17 Nov     Completed 
9 AI9 Local Media Chief Director 
Intermediary 
Organization 23 Oct 30 Oct 31 Oct 2 Nov 7 Nov 10 Nov 12 Nov 14 Nov Completed 
10 AJ10 Social Impact CEO Social Venture 23 Oct               No answer 
11 AK11 Transition Board Member 
Social 
Enterprise 31 Oct               No answer 
12 AL12 S Coop Chief Director Cooperative 2 Nov 23 Nov 23 Nov 28 Nov 29 Nov       Completed 
13 AM13 Angel Ventures CEO Social Venture 2 Dec 2 Dec 2 Dec 3 Dec 3 Dec 3 Dec     Completed 
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II. Potential Questions for the Pilot Study Interview 
 
Category Potential Questions 
Initial 
Questions 
1) When did you first notice the term social enterprise and how? 
2) How do you define social enterprise?  
3) Who/what influenced your action/understanding of social enterprise? 
4) How did that person/event influenced you to further understand social enterprise? 
Intermediate 
Questions 
1) What has been your main work in the social entrepreneurship field? 
2) Who are the key actors involved in the emergence process of social enterprise?  
3) Can you please tell me as much as you know about the SEPA?  
4) Can you please tell me about your thoughts and perceptions on the SEPA?  
5) Were you involved in the process of development of the SEPA?  
6) If so, could you describe what events/people importantly influenced the process?  
7) If you first noticed social entrepreneurial activities before the enactment of the SEPA, could you please tell 
me when and how?  
8) What kind of organization was it? Could you please tell me characteristics and objectives of the 
organization? 
9) How do you distinguish between social enterprises before and after the SEPA?  
10) What has the civil society been done regarding the emergence and development of social enterprise?  
11) Did you start your business before or after the SEPA?  
12) What was the main motivation of your business?  
13) Did any social event or environment influence your decision to run a social enterprise?  
Ending 
Questions 
1) Is there anything else you think I should know and understand better about Korean social enterprise? 
2) Do you have any questions to ask me? 
3) Is there anyone you can introduce me to who I could interview on these topics?  
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III. List of Field Work Interviewees (Name of interviewees and organizations are fiction, 2014) 
 
No. Name Title Affiliation Category Interview Date Interview Hours 
1 BC1 CEO A SE Certified & Preliminary Social Enterprise 19 June 2014 17:49PM-19:20PM 
2 BW2 Manager B SE Certified & Preliminary Social Enterprise 15 May 2014 11:20AM-12:15PM 
3 BD3 Manager C Gov Department Certified & Preliminary Social Enterprise 15 June 2014 18:09PM-17:44PM 
4 BJ4 Deputy Director D Gov Department Certified & Preliminary Social Enterprise 23 July 2014 19:30PM-21:30PM 
5 BH5 Academic E University Certified & Preliminary Social Enterprise 23 June 2014 13:05PM-14:22PM 
6 BH6 Director F Gov Department Certified & Preliminary Social Enterprise 13 June 2014 15:09PM-16:30PM 
7 BJ7 CEO G SE Certified Social Enterprise 16 June 2014 14:04PM-16:00PM 
8 BK8 CEO H SE Certified Social Enterprise 18 June 2014 13:38PM-15:00PM 
9 CD9 Chair I SE Certified Social Enterprise 7 July 2014 17:00PM-17:30PM 
10 CE0 Deputy Director J Intermediary Intermediary 20 May 2014 15:30PM-17:40PM 
11 CS1 Deputy Director K Intermediary Intermediary 16 May 2014 15:04PM-15:49PM 
12 CY2 Director L Intermediary Intermediary 15 May 2014 10:10AM-11:10AM 
13 CJ3 Manager M Intermediary Intermediary 15 May 2014 14:16PM-15:18PM 
14 CK4 Deputy Director M Intermediary Intermediary 15 May 2014 15:41PM-16:48PM 
15 CH5 Consultant N Intermediary Intermediary 28 May 2014 11:52AM-13:00PM 
16 CS6 CEO O Intermediary Intermediary 12 June 2014 10:07AM-11:30AM 
17 BB7 Deputy Director P SE Social enterprise 22 May 2014 17:14PM-18:25PM 
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18 CK8 Journalist Q SE Social enterprise 23 May 2014 17:30PM-18:30PM 
19 CH9 Deputy Director R SE Social enterprise 19 May 2014 09:41AM-11:AM 
20 DH0 Manager S Institute Social enterprise 19 May 2014 17:27PM-19:27PM 
21 DS1 Academic T Institute Social enterprise 1 June 2014 16:13PM-18:06PM 
22 DW2 Researcher U Institute Social enterprise 10 June 2014 13:58PM-16:03PM 
23 DH3 Researcher V University Social enterprise 11 July 2014 10:15AM-12:20PM 
24 DJ4 Academic W University Social enterprise 28 May 2014 15:00 PM-16:00PM 
25 DD5 Deputy Director X Institute Social enterprise 10 July 2014 10:10AM-11:30AM 
26 DJ6 CEO Y Investment Social Venture 21 May 2014 15:07PM-17:00PM 
27 DH7 CEO Z SV Social Venture 18 June 2014 11:06AM-12:17PM 
28 DS8 Director A SV Social Venture 20 May 2014 09:41AM-10:46AM 
29 DK9 Manager B Investment Social Venture 10 June 2014 20:03PM-21:51PM 
30 EJ0 CEO C Investment Social Venture 2 June 2014 14:07PM-16:23PM 
31 EC1 CEO D SV Social Venture 13 May 2014 11:10AM-14:12PM 
32 EH2 Director E SV Social Venture 19 June 2014 14:29PM-15:45PM 
33 ED3 CEO F SV Social Venture 24 May 2014 13:05PM-12:38PM 
34 ET4 CEO G SV Social Venture (TD) 16 May 2014 09:02AM-10:35AM 
35 EJ5 CEO H SV Social Venture (TD) 17 May 2014 10:35AM-12:00PM 
36 EJ6 CEO I investment Social Venture (TD) 20 June 2014 10:12AM-11:25AM 
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IV.   Potential Interview Questions  
Category Questions 
Basic 
Questions 
Basic information 
about an interviewee 
and affiliation 
1) Organization Name 
2) Founding Year  
3) Governance  
a. Type of founding members: group of citizens, NPO, public bodies, etc.  
b. Legal Form: Company/limited partnership, corporation/association, non-profit, 
NGOs, social welfare corporation, living cooperative, agricultural cooperative, 
etc. 
c. Distribution of profit 
4) Industry: Nursing/housekeeping service, education, culture/art, health care service, 
child care service, social welfare service, environment, forest preservation, sharing 
economy, IT/technology, crowd funding, design, etc. 
5) Social Objectives: Job creation, social service provision, mixed, local community 
contribution, etc. 
6) Economic Objectives  
7) Origins  
a. Who established this organization (i.e. Individuals, enterprises, third party 
payer, government, etc.)? 
b. What was your previous organizational form? Cooperative, self-sufficiency 
enterprise, preliminary SE, rehabilitation center for the disabilities, social 
venture, innovative social enterprise, private company, etc.  
c. What was your main driver to establish this organization (i.e. To achieve the SE 
social mission, to increase the SE financial sustainability, to increase the range 
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and/or quality of the products and/or services that the SE provides, pressure 
from competitors, pressure from the government, etc.  
8) Entrepreneurial orientation: Innovation, experimentation, risk-taking		
Limitations of SEPA 
1) What do you think what are the limitations of the SEPA?  
a. It limits creativity and freedom of organizational activities.  
b. It increases resource dependency.  
c. Complicated administrative procedure (Reporting system etc).    
d. Other.	
Perception on other 
type of SEs 
1) Why did you choose a certain type of SE as your organizational type (strengths and 
limitations)?  
2) Why didn’t you choose other types of SE as your organizational type (strengths and 
limitations)?  
3) Why did/didn’t you get a government certification? 
4) What characteristics do you think make your organization a social enterprise/social 
venture/social innovative enterprise (whether you are certified or not)?	 
Which factors influenced your action to establish a social enterprise or your understanding of social enterprises the most? And how? 
Political 
Environmental 
Factors 
National Policies 
1) Social Enterprise Promotion Act (2007)  
2) Framework Act on Cooperatives (2012)	
Local Policies 
1) Ordinance on the Support and the Promotion of Social Enterprise (2007) 
2) Other preliminary SEs related policies (ex. Seoul Village Enterprise) 
Promoting Activities 
1) Young Social Entrepreneurs Support Project hosted by the Ministry of Employment 
and Welfare and organized by the Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency (2011) 
2) National Social Venture Competition hosted by the Ministry of Employment and 
Welfare and organized by the Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency (2011) 
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Interaction with 
(local) policy makers 
1) Policy makers or local government officers suggested or pushed to change the 
organizational form to that of a social enterprise 
2) Others 
Economic 
Environmental 
Factors 
Capital Market 
Financial resources provided from  
1) Government  
2) Private Company  
3) Venture Capital 
4) Others 
Buyer-supplier 
relations 
Being a social enterprise attracts buyers and buyers want to trade with SEs.  
1) Government 
2) Private company 
3) Individuals 
4) Others	 
Interaction with local 
venture capitalists 
Being a social enterprise attracts venture capitalists and they want to invest money in SEs.  
Support of start-ups 
by firms 
Big corporations provide financial support to start SEs.  
Employment IMF financial crisis in 1996 and increased unemployment rate 
Lack of Resources Increased financial difficulties of NGOs 
Social 
Environmental 
Factors 
Interaction with public 
education and 
research 
The level of education has been developed.  
1) Increased social recognition for good businesses  
2) Learned success stories of overseas SEs (UK, other European countries, US, Japan) 
Interaction with local 
public opinion 
The public opinion was supportive of the development of social enterprise 
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Quality of life A higher quality of life increased people’s perception concerning their dedication to society   
Culture (the attitudes 
towards cooperation 
and solidarity) 
Increased positive attitudes or necessity towards cooperation and solidarity  
Networks 
Certain networks among a number of actors were crucial  
1) Social activities  
2) NGOs  
3) Entrepreneurs 
4) Others 
Geographical location Certain regions had good conditions to start a social business 
Founding of leading 
firms 
Some successful firms led the emergence of social enterprise 
Local Demand Customers/beneficiaries exerted pressure on organizations to be social enterprises  
Technological 
Environmental 
Factors 
Technology 
Development 
Developed level of technology – Internet, SNS, etc. helped to access the international social 
entrepreneurship movement 
Historical 
Factors 
Tradition and 
Historical 
Preconditions 
History of development of previous organizational forms  
1) Self-sufficiency enterprise 
2) Vocational rehabilitation center for the disabilities  
3) Cooperative 
4) Organization supported by social work program  
5) Others 
Others Chance Won a social venture competition 
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V.  Time Lines and Main Actions/Sayings of Key Actors on Social Enterprise 
Dominant Actors  Oppositional Actors Alternative Actors 
2003. Presidential Committee on Job 
Strategy announced that the “Social Work” 
policy which provides work opportunities to 
people in conditions of extreme poverty is a 
core policy agenda of the government 
(Presidential Committee on Job Strategy 
2006). 
2003. National Movement Committee for 
Overcoming Unemployment (NMCOU) 
organized the “Task Force Team of Social 
Work.”  
2003. The Social Enterprise Network 
(SEN) Korea introduced the term social 
entrepreneurship based on the US 
approach. They defined social 
enterprise (venture) as: an organization 
which solves social problems that 
governments and/or the third sector 
organizations have failed to solve, 
through innovative business activities.  
2003. Presidential Committee on Job 
Strategy defined “social work” as that 
where work places/opportunities are created 
by providing services to the third sector 
(Presidential Committee on Job Strategy 
2006). 
2003. Presidential Committee on Job 
Strategy organized the “Task Force Team 
for Social Enterprise Promotion Act” 
(Presidential Committee on Job Strategy 
2006). 
2003. One of the core managers at 
“National Movement Committee for 
Overcoming Unemployment (NMCOU)” 
participated in the “Task Force Team of 
Social Enterprise Promotion Act” as a 
representative of NGO members of the 
“Task Force Team of Social Work.” 
  
289 
March 2005. Ministry of Labor organized the “SEPA Task Force Team.”  August 2005. The SEN organized the first “Global Social Venture Competition.”  
April 2006. Members of the National Assembly submitted two different legislative bills on Social Enterprise.  
April 2006. The Legislative Bill for 
Establishing and Promoting Social 
Enterprises defined a Social Enterprise as a 
non-profit and/or profit organization which 
provides work opportunities or social 
services to the vulnerable people 
(Environment and Labor Committee in the 
National Assembly 2006). 
April 2006. The Legislative Bill for 
Promoting and Supporting Social 
Enterprises defined a Social Enterprise as 
one consisting of members, which include 
workers and users, investors, contributors 
(donors), volunteers and others who are 
involved in the activities (Environment and 
Labor Committee in the National Assembly 
2006). 
2006. Social Innovation Centre 
established by the Hope Institute.  
April 2006. The Legislative Bill for 
Establishing and Promoting Social 
Enterprises mentioned that certification has 
a positive image for the public and it will 
help social enterprises to work in the public 
market and in local communities.  
(Environment and Labor Committee in the 
National Assembly 2006). 
April 2006. The Legislative Bill for 
Promoting and Supporting Social 
Enterprises included the registration system, 
not only the certification system 
(Environment and Labor Committee in the 
National Assembly 2006). 
- 
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April 2006. The Legislative Bill for 
Establishing and Promoting Social 
Enterprises refused to include a cooperative 
governance because this will make the 
decision-making process inefficient, a 
contradiction with the idea of an 
“enterprise” which has to be efficient and 
profit-oriented (Environment and Labor 
Committee in the National Assembly 2006). 
April 2006. The Legislative Bill for 
Promoting and Supporting Social 
Enterprises  mentioned that a cooperative 
governance is good for the empowerment of 
workers by including them as the members of 
an organization (Environment and Labor 
Committee in the National Assembly 2006). 
April 2006. The Legislative Bill for 
Establishing and Promoting Social 
Enterprises focused more on promoting 
Social Enterprises rather than previous 
organizational forms such as self-
sufficiency.  (Environment and Labor 
Committee in the National Assembly 2006). 
April 2006. The Legislative Bill for 
Promoting and Supporting Social 
Enterprises emphasized their previous 
experiences of establishing and running 
workers’ cooperatives in the field 
(Environment and Labor Committee in the 
National Assembly 2006). 
- 
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April 2006. The WT Foundation had a 
closer relationship with the government – 
especially with the Ministry of Labor (MoL) 
since they had participated in the design of 
the “Social Work Program” with the MoL and 
in the delivering of the policy (Working 
Together Foundation 2013).  
 
December 2006. The Social Enterprise Promotion Act was established.  
November 2008. The Ministry of 
Employment and Labor announced a five 
years’ policy plan to promote social 
enterprises based on the comments and 
opinions collected from multiple actors at 
meetings, public hearings and policy 
forums.  
- 
- 
May 2009. The Prime Minister’s Office 
organized several field investigation teams 
along with the Task Force Team on 
Employment and Social Safety Net in July 
2009. 
February 2009. The CSSSED changed its 
name to the Solidarity Council of Social 
Economy in order to emphasize the fact that 
they are promoting a social economy 
discourse.  
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September 2009, The Prime Minister’s 
Office officially invited organizations which 
were related to social services and social 
entrepreneurship to submit their opinions on 
the related policies.  
March 2009, The Solidarity Council of 
Social Economy organized a policy 
workshop on the SEPA for its member 
organizations to increase their understanding 
of government policies and to react to top-
down actions.  
9th December 2010. Amendment of the SEPA. The definition of social enterprise has been legally changed to include the local 
development discourse as part of the institutionalized meaning of social enterprise (Article 5-2). Regional governments were able to 
organize their own programs to promote social enterprise activities in their regions and local communities (Article 10-2).  
2009. The Ministry of Employment and 
Labor organized the “Social Venture 
Competition” within the partnership with the 
SEN (Korea Social Enterprise Promotion 
Agency 2013c, 2015b).  
- 
2009. The SEN organized the “Social 
Venture Competition” within the 
partnership with the Ministry of 
Employment and Labor (Korea Social 
Enterprise Promotion Agency 2013c, 
2015b).  
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2011. The Ministry of Employment and 
Labor organized the “Young Social 
Entrepreneurs’ Promotion Project” (Korea 
Social Enterprise Promotion Agency 2013c, 
2015b).  
October 2011. The Solidarity Committee 
for Establishment of the Framework Act 
on Cooperatives was established in a 
partnership with 29 self-sufficiency, social 
enterprise, and cooperatives related 
organizations. They insisted on the need to 
establish the Framework Act on Cooperatives 
which enables existing cooperatives to gain 
legal legitimacy.  
2011. The Beautiful Store established 
the “Social Enterprise Support Center” 
and launched the “Beautiful Fellowship” 
that supports the activities of social 
innovators who are running a social 
innovation enterprise (Beautiful Store 
2014). 
2011. The Beautiful Fellowship defined 
“Socially Innovative Entrepreneurs” as 
those who aim at solving social problems 
in the field of environment, human rights, 
education, culture and social communities 
thanks to innovative social ideas 
(Beautiful Store 2014).  
2011. The Korea of Social Enterprise promotion Agency (KOSEA) wrote the official definition on the KOSEA website for the first 
time as follows: a social venture is “a business which is more creative and innovative compared to social enterprises, but which does not 
necessarily meet the criteria of certified social enterprises” (Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency 2011).  
1st February 2012. Amendment of the SEPA. In order to include social cooperatives as a type of social enterprise, the Ministry of 
Public Administration and Security established the “Framework Act on Cooperative” which defines the concept of social 
cooperatives and the details of the supporting policies in 2012. 
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November 2012. The Solidarity Network of 
Cooperative Social Economy was 
established by merging “The Solidarity 
Committee for Establishment of the 
Framework Act on Cooperatives” with the 
“Solidarity for Korean Social Economy.” 
October 2012. Delight obtained a first B-
corp in Korea. 
    
March 2013. Ashoka Korea started 
supporting social entrepreneurs who 
present five characteristics of new ideas 
which aim at changing society: creativity, 
entrepreneurship, social impact of 
business idea and ethics (Ashoka Korea 
2015a).  
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VI. Coding Categories for the Struggles over the Meaning of Social Enterprise 
 
   Illustration of Data Coded Description Coding Category 
Criticisms of the Legislative Bill of the SEPA (2005-2006)  
It is wrong that people perceive a social enterprise as a 
place where disabled people bake bread or vulnerable 
people do public work.  (BK8, CEO, H SE, 18 June 
2014, 13:38PM-15:00PM) 
Instances in which actors criticized the limited 
definition of social enterprise in the Legislative 
Bill of the SEPA.  
Criticism of a limited 
interpretation of social 
enterprise activities.  
We suggested criteria and other characteristics of 
workers’ cooperative to be included in the legislative 
bill of Social Enterprise, based on the cases of Italian 
cooperatives. (BB7, Deputy Director, P SE Network, 
22 May 2014, 17:14PM-18:25PM) 
Instances in which actors proposed an additional 
definition of social enterprise for consideration 
and inclusion in the final legal text of the SEPA.  
Recommendation to expand 
the meaning of social 
enterprise in the SEPA.  
Social Work TF organizations in civil society had 
submitted formal questions to the Ministry of Strategy 
and Finance (MoSF) regarding the policy plans for 
social service work in 2004. In the opinion of civil 
society (represented by Social Work TF organizations 
here), the policy plan of the government on social 
service work had not been suitably designed but was 
only a tool to increase the employment rate. (CE0, 
Deputy Director, J Intermediary, 20 May 2014, 
15:30PM-17:40PM) 
Instances in which actors proposed or submitted 
additional texts to redesign the policy plans. 
Recommendation to 
redesign the policy to 
consider the original 
objectives of social 
enterprise activities. 
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Government Response  
From the MoEL perspective, previous forms of social 
enterprise such as self-sufficiency enterprises did not 
exhibit any characteristic of "enterprise", but they were 
more like voluntary organizations who are running 
programs with government funding. That’s why the 
government found the need to build a new 
organizational form that can cover the limitations of 
previous organizational forms. (BH5, Professor, E 
University, 23 June 2014, 13:05PM-14:22PM) 
Instances in which a recommendation to include 
an additional definition of social enterprise was 
not accepted.  
Rejecting a 
recommendation to include 
an expanded meaning of 
social enterprise.  
The MoEL took the model of the CIC as a fundamental 
benchmark throughout the entire process.  In the UK, 
the government financially supports registered social 
enterprises. These were part of the government 
procurement for the rehabilitation of poor villages and 
cities. After researching cases of social enterprises in 
the UK, the MoEL decided to implement the 
certification system. (BD3, Manager, C Government 
Department, 15 June 2014, 18:09PM-17:44PM) 
Instances in which an overseas case of social 
enterprise (Italian cooperatives) suggested by the 
civil society was not accepted. Instead, the 
government endorsed the concept of social 
enterprise from the UK policies.  
Rejecting a 
recommendation to include 
other organizational forms 
of social enterprise. 
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VII.  Coding Categories for the Struggles over the Meaning of Social Enterprise 
 
 
Identification 
of Actors 
Illustration of Data Coded Description Coding Category 
Criticisms of the SEPA (2007-2012)  
Oppositional 
Actors  
(…) The value of social enterprise should not be standardized 
but diversified. However, the SEPA has limited the scope of 
the value, the meaning and the boundaries of social enterprise.  
(DW2, Researcher, U Institute, 10 June 2014, 13:58PM-
16:03PM) 
Instances in which 
actors proposed that the 
meaning of social 
enterprise needs to be 
expanded. 
Recommendation to expand 
the meaning of social 
enterprise in the SEPA.  
We suggested criteria and other characteristics of workers’ 
cooperative to be included in the legislative bill of Social 
Enterprise, based on the cases of Italian cooperatives. We 
expected that we could solve all the legal and institutional 
problems of workers’ cooperatives that we had in practice 
through the SEPA. (BB7, Deputy Director, P SE Network, 22 
May 2014, 17:14PM-18:25PM) 
Instances in which 
actors proposed or 
submitted additional 
texts to be considered 
and included in the final 
legal text or the SEPA.  
Recommendation to 
redesign the policy to 
consider the original 
objectives of social 
enterprise activities. 
Alternative 
Actors  
We and the top-down actors, mainly the MoEL, understand 
social enterprise very differently (...) Excluding those 
uncertified social enterprises which do not fit the criteria of the 
Social Enterprise certification from the official meaning of 
social enterprise is bad. In this sense, the Social Enterprise 
Promotion Act should have been called the Social Services 
Promotion Act. (EC1, Deputy Director, D SV, 13 May 2014)   
Instances in which 
actors criticized the 
meaning of social 
enterprise in the SEPA.  
Criticism of a limited 
interpretation of social 
enterprise activities.  
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Alternative 
Actors 
The certification frames the social objectives of a social 
enterprise which is supposed to be developed by social 
entrepreneurs themselves. (EJ0, CEO, C Investment, 2 June 
2014, 10:35AM-12:00PM) 
Instances in which 
actors acknowledge that 
social enterprise is a 
grassroots emergent 
concept.  
Criticism of a limited 
interpretation of social 
enterprise activities.  
I am not saying that the idea of social services business or 
cooperatives is wrong. Establishing the legal framework for 
cooperatives is good in terms of bringing them into the 
institutional field. The problem is putting cooperatives, 
certified Social Enterprises and social innovative enterprises 
into a single sector. (EC1, Deputy Director, D SV, 13 May 
2014) 
Instances in which 
actors propose different 
types of social 
enterprise to be legally 
identified.  
Recommendation to identify 
different organizational 
forms of social enterprise.  
I am suggesting that social entrepreneurs should have a B-corp 
certification rather than the SEPA certification. The B-corp 
certification exhibits the global standard of being an 
innovative social enterprise which fits our definition of social 
enterprise. If a social enterprise has a B-corp certification, 
people believe that the organization is contributing to social 
innovation and change for real. (DH7, CEO, Z SV, 18 June 
2014, 11:06AM-12:17PM) 
Instances in which 
actors select alternative 
standards for 
legitimation. 
Differentiation of their 
organizations from the 
SEPA.  
  
299 
I do not know much about Social Enterprises and about the 
SEPA. I think my organization is a social enterprise in a broad 
sense of aiming to achieve both economic and social 
objectives. However, I firmly do not want to limit the scope of 
meaning and the activities of my organization into the limited 
definition of Social Enterprise. (DH7, CEO, Z SV, 18 June 
2014, 11:06AM-12:17PM) 
Instances in which 
actors ignore or reject 
the SEPA. 
Differentiation of 
themselves from the SEPA.  
  Support of the SEPA (2007-2012)  
Oppositional 
Actors  
If the meaning of social enterprise is not institutionalized by 
the government, Social Enterprise would have no effect at all 
in the Korean society and no one would have accepted an un-
institutionalized meaning. (BJ7, CEO, G SE, 16 June 2014, 
14:04PM-16:00PM) 
Instances in which 
actors support the 
meaning of social 
enterprise in the SEPA 
(2006).  
Supporting the 
government’s activities in 
promoting Social 
Enterprises.  
The MoEL did not understand what a social enterprise is. Our 
broadcast campaign on social enterprises has improved their 
understanding of the concept. (CE0, Deputy Director, J 
Intermediary, 20 May 2014, 15:30PM-17:40PM) 
Instances in which 
actors influenced 
government related 
actors’ understanding of 
the concept of social 
enterprise.  
Proposing their position as 
in-group actor of the 
government.  
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The MoEL and the government officers tried to understand 
social enterprise and to protect civil organizations involved in 
the institution building process. (BH5, Professor, E University, 
23 June 2014, 13:05PM-14:22PM) 
Instances in which 
actors praised the 
government’s effort to 
institutionalize the 
meaning of social 
enterprise.  
Praising the government’s 
effort.  
Unemployment issues were the most important agenda to be 
solved at that time. (CY2, Director, L Intermediary, 15 May 
2014, 10:10AM-11:10AM) 
Instances in which 
actors acknowledged 
the government’s 
established meaning of 
social enterprise.  
Justification of the 
government’s objectives in 
promoting Social 
Enterprise.  
  Government Response 
  
  
  
A social venture is “a business which is more creative and 
innovative compared to social enterprises, but which does not 
necessarily meet the criteria of certified social enterprises” 
(Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency 2011). 
Instances in which a 
criticism of an 
interpretation was 
(partly) accepted.  
Accommodating a 
recommendation to include 
additional definitions of 
social enterprise.  
A social enterprise can be established as a small-medium 
enterprise according to the amendment of the Small-medium 
Enterprise Law (2016).  
Instances in which a 
criticism of an 
interpretation was 
(partly) accepted.  
Accommodating a 
recommendation to include 
additional definitions of 
social enterprise and to 
revise a law.  
A social enterprise can gain the legal status of social 
cooperative according to the establishment of the Framework 
of Cooperatives Act (2012).  
Instances in which a 
criticism of an 
interpretation was 
(partly) accepted.  
Accommodating a 
recommendation to include 
additional definitions of 
social enterprise and to 
revise a law.  
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